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Revisiting the Question of Whether Young Children
in Child Protection Proceedings Should Be
Represented by Lawyers
Randi Mandelbaum *
In the late twentieth century, one would expect our nation to have
settled the question of whether legal representation must be provided
for children involved in judicial proceedings affecting the rest of their
lives-cases in which their parents' interest may clearly be at odds
with theirs. This question is far from settled.1
I. INTRODUCTION
In 1974, by its passage of the Child Abuse Prevention and Treatment
Act ("CAPTA"), Congress established a statutory right to
representation, although not necessarily by counsel, for all children who
are the subjects of child protection proceedings. 2  Specifically, as a
* Visiting Clinical Professor of Law and Acting Director, Child Advocacy Center, The State
University of New Jersey, Rutgers University - Newark, School of Law. LL.M. Georgetown
University Law Center 1994; J.D. The American University, Washington College of the Law
1988; B.A. Brandeis University 1985. This paper primarily was written while I was an Associate
Clinical Professor at the University of California, Hastings College of the Law. I wish to thank
Kathy Hessler, Shauna Marshall, and Laura Rovner for their unending encouragement and
support, and Mark Aaronson, Kate Bloch, Joshua Davis, Justine Dunlap, Peter Edelman, Bea
Moulton, Ascanio Piomelli, Michael Wald, and Kelly Weisberg for their invaluable suggestions
and advice. Patricia Brown, Michelle Dicks, Lisa Kearns, David Kiernan, Kristine Kim, and
Michelle Miller provided excellent research assistance. The library support rendered by Linda
Weir and Carolyn Kinkaid at Hastings College of the Law was essential. Finally, without the
continual nurturance, guidance, assistance, and love bestowed upon me by my life partner, David
Giles, this paper would not have been possible.
1. Howard A. Davidson, Foreword to ANN M. HARALAMBIE, THE CHILD'S ATTORNEY: A
GUIDE TO REPRESENTING CHILDREN IN CUSTODY, ADOPTION, AND PROTECTION CASES at xi
(1993); see also Robert E. Shepherd, Jr. & Sharon S. England, I Know the Child Is iy Client, But
Who Am 1?, 64 FORDHAM L. REV. 1917, 1923 (1996) (referencing Davidson's Foreword in
HARALAMBIE, supra, and expressing frustration with their perception that "the nation continues
to be ambivalent regarding the provision of quality legal representation to children").
2. See Child Abuse Prevention and Treatment Act, Pub. L. No. 93-247, 88 Stat. 4 (codified at
42 U.S.C. §§ 5101-5107 (1994 and West Supp. 2000)). Throughout this paper, the term "child
protection proceeding" will be used to refer to the entire set of hearings that occur in juvenile
court pursuant to the filing of a petition, usually by a child welfare agency, alleging child abuse
and/or neglect. Typically, a child protection proceeding will consist of four types of hearings.
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condition for receiving federal funds, "in every case involving an
abused or neglected child which results in a judicial proceeding," each
state is required to "provide a guardian ad litem ... to represent the
child."-3  Congress amended the statute in 1996 to specify that the
guardian ad litem ("GAL") may "be an attorney or a court appointed
special advocate 4 (or both)" and that the purpose of such appointment
shall be "(I) to obtain first-hand, a clear understanding of the situation
and needs of the child; and (II) to make recommendations to the court
concerning the best interests of the child."-5  No further congressional
However, depending on what transpires, all may not occur in any given proceeding. While each
jurisdiction may give the hearings different names and may structure the child protection
proceeding differently, each proceeding usually is comprised of an emergency removal or shelter
care hearing, an adjudicatory or fact-finding hearing, a disposition hearing, and any number of
review hearings. An emergency removal or shelter care hearing typically is held to determine
whether it is safe for the children to remain in the care of their parent(s) pending a more complete
determination of whether the children have been abused and/or neglected and what is in their best
interests. It is at the adjudicatory hearing that a full evidentiary proceeding occurs and a decision
as to whether the children were abused and/or neglected is made. In other words, findings are
made as to whether the facts, as portrayed in the petition alleging child abuse and/or neglect, can
be proven and whether the statutory definitions of abuse and/or neglect have been met. If a
finding of child abuse and/or neglect is made at the adjudicatory hearing, the case proceeds to a
disposition hearing. At times, the adjudicatory and disposition hearings may be held
simultaneously, or at least on the same day. A disposition hearing is the part of the proceeding
where the court renders decisions as to where the children should be placed and what services are
needed by the family. These decisions are made in accordance with the children's best interests.
See KAREN AILEEN HOWZE, MAKING DIFFERENCES WORK: CULTURAL CONTEXT IN ABUSE AND
NEGLECT PRACTICE FOR JUDGES AND ATrORNEYS 38-39 (1996). Moreover, the court will make
determinations as to the legal status of the children and what are the short- and long-term goals
for the children and the family. All of these plans and orders are then periodically reviewed by
the court. See id. Such review hearings are mandated by federal law and must occur no less than
once every twelve months. See 45 C.F.R. § 1356.2 1(b)(2)(i) (2000); 45 C.F.R. § 1355.20 (2000).
As the proceeding progresses, the court must address and focus on issues concerning the
children's need for permanency. See HOWZE, supra, at 38-39.
3. 42 U.S.C.A. § 5106(a)(2)(A)(ix) (West Supp. 2000). The initial objectives of CAPTA were
to provide federal financial assistance for the "identification], prevent[ion], and treat[ment]" of
child abuse and neglect, primarily through demonstration projects, and to create a National Center
for Child Abuse and Neglect. S. REP. NO. 104-117, at 4 (1995), reprinted in 1996 U.S.C.C.A.N.
3490, 3493. Three states, California, Indiana, and Pennsylvania, do not receive CAPTA funds
because these states allow the child to be represented by the same attorney who represents the
child welfare agency. See Jennifer Walter, Averting Revictimization of Children, 1 J. CTR. FOR
CHILDREN & COURTS 45, 47, 59 nn.26-27 (1999).
4. A Court Appointed Special Advocate ("CASA") is a volunteer lay advocate who has
received specialized training and made certain time commitments. For a more in-depth analysis
of the development of CASA programs throughout the country, and a more complete description
on the role of the CASA, see Laurie K. Adams, CASA: A Child's Voice in Court, 29 CREIGHTON
L. REV. 1467 (1996), and Rebecca H. Heartz, Guardians Ad Litem in Child Abuse and Neglect
Proceedings: Clarifying the Roles to Improve Effectiveness, 27 FAM. L.Q. 327 (1993). See also
infra notes 72-74, 322-38 and accompanying text (discussing the role of CASA volunteers).
5. CAPTA Amendments of 1996, Sec. 107, § 107(b)(2)(A)(ix)(I)-(Il), Pub. L. No. 104-235,
110 Stat. 3063, 3073-74 (1996) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C.A. § 5106a(b)(2)(A)(ix)(I)-(II)
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guidance was or has been given as to the role of the GAL or the purpose
of the representation.
6
Over the past two decades, numerous scholars and organizations,
including various committees of the American Bar Association
("ABA"), have attempted to provide some guidance for child advocates
struggling to provide ethical and quality representation to their child
clients. For example, in 1983, as part of its efforts to develop model
ethical rules, the ABA created Model Rule 1.14. 7 Additionally, during
this time, a growing number of scholars have examined and debated the
question of what is the appropriate role for the child's representative,
particularly the role of an attorney. 8  Most recently, several
(West Supp. 2000)).
6. The corresponding regulations, both past and current, provide little additional guidance as
to the role and purpose of the GAL. The original regulations stated that the GAL's
responsibilities include "representing the rights, interests, welfare, and well-being of the child."
See Heartz, supra note 4, at 331. The current regulations simply state that "[in] every case
involving an abused or neglected child which results in a judicial proceeding, the State must
ensure the appointment of a guardian ad litem or other individual whom the State recognizes as
fulfilling the same functions as a guardian ad litem, to represent and protect the rights and best
interests of the child." 45 C.F.R. § 1340.14(g) (1999); see also Heartz, supra note 4, at 330-31
(maintaining that CAPTA "did not offer guidance about what the qualifications ... or... duties"
of the GAL should be); Sarah H. Ramsey, Representation of the Child in Protection Proceedings:
The Determination of Decision-Making Capacity, 17 FAM. L.Q. 287, 289 (1983) (concluding that
CAPTA never made it clear what role the child's representative was supposed to play). A look at
the legislative history of CAPTA does not offer much additional guidance. A brief summary is
provided by Rebecca Heartz:
The original version of the law passed by the Senate contained no mention of the need
for independent legal representation of the child. It was not until subsequent
committee hearings that this issue was addressed in testimony given by Brian Fraser,
then staff attorney for the National Center for Prevention of Child Abuse and Neglect.
It was Fraser who played the primary role in the inclusion of the guardian ad litem
requirement in the final law. Fraser had previously authored an article on the role of
guardians ad litem, which broadly defined their duties to include both legal and
nonlegal activities. Fraser's view of the guardian ad litem was as a "special guardian"
legally obligated to do everything within his power to insure a judgment that is in the
child's best interests, including acting as investigator, advocate, counsel, and guardian.
Heartz, supra note 4, at 331 (citations omitted). From a historical standpoint, Professors Robert
Kelly and Sarah Ramsey attribute the enactment of this statutory provision to the following
factors: a heightened awareness of the issue of child abuse and neglect, especially the harms that
can occur to children, the children's rights movement, which had developed in the 1960s, and the
Supreme Court's decision in In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1 (1967), concluding that children in
delinquency matters have a right to counsel. See Robert Kelly & Sarah Ramsey, Do Attorneys for
Children in Protection Proceedings Make a Difference?-A Study of the Impact of Representation
Under Conditions of High Judicial Intervention, 21 J. FAM. L. 405, 409-411 (1983).
7. MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.14 (1992). See infra note 97 for the
text of the Model Rule.
8. For exhaustive lists of some of the many articles and papers on the representation of
children published in the last twenty-five years, see JEAN KOH PETERS, REPRESENTING
CHILDREN IN CHILD PROTECTIVE PROCEEDINGS: ETHICAL AND PRACTICAL DIMENSIONS 711
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recommendations for more uniform standards have been developed by
various organizations and conferences. 9 Despite these efforts, much
confusion remains and many commentators have found that lawyers
who represent young children in child protection proceedings exercise
too much discretion and therefore may make determinations on behalf
of the young children that are based on their own views and
backgrounds and not those of their child clients. 10 The situation is
worsened by the fact that all of the systems designed to protect these
extremely vulnerable children and serve their needs, including the
current systems for providing representation, are failing.
Given the lack of clarity over the role of the representative, as well as
concerns about the quality of much of the representation being provided
to children, it is not surprising that recently there has been renewed
scholarly attention and legislative inquiry concerning the question of
app. D.2 (1997); Ann M. Haralambie, The Role of the Child's Attorney in Protecting the Child
Throughout the Litigation Process, 71 N.D. L. REv. 939, 941 n.l 1 (1995); Peter Margulies, The
Lawyer as Caregiver: Child Client's Competence in Context, 64 FORDHAM L. REV. 1473, 1473
n.1 (1996).
Additionally, Volume 64, Number Four of the Fordham Law Review is devoted entirely to the
recommendations, reports, articles, and responses that were generated from the Proceedings of the
Conference on Ethical Issues in the Legal Representation of Children. This conference was
sponsored not only by the Fordham Law Review but also by the Administration for Children,
Youth and Families, U.S. Department of Health and Human Services; the ABA Center on
Children and the Law, Young Lawyers Division; the ABA Center for Professional Responsibility;
the ABA Section of Criminal Justice, Juvenile Justice Committee; the ABA Section of Family
Law; the ABA Section of Individual Rights and Responsibilities; the ABA Section of Litigation,
Task Force on Children; the ABA Steering Committee on the Unmet Legal Needs of Children;
the Juvenile Law Center; the National Association of Counsel for Children; the National Center
for Youth Law; the National Council of Juvenile and Family Court Judges; and the Stein Center
for Ethics and Public Interest Law, Fordham University School of Law. See Special Issue,
Ethical Issues in the Legal Representation of Children, 64 FORDHAM L. REV. 1281 (1996)
[hereinafter Special Issue]. The conference was attended by "more than seventy lawyers, judges,
legal scholars, and representatives of other professions" over a three-day period in December
1995. Bruce A. Green & Bernadine Dohrn, Foreword: Children and the Ethical Practice of Law,
64 FORDHAM L. REv. 1281, 1283 (1996).
9. See, e.g., Linda Elrod et al., Representing Children Standards of Practice Committee,
American Bar Association, Proposed Standards of Practice for Lawyers Who Represent Children
in Abuse and Neglect Cases, 29 FAM. L.Q. 375 (1995); Special Issue, supra note 8. The latter
publication is the written documentation, including recommendations, working group reports,
articles, and responses, from the Proceedings of the Conference on Ethical Issues in the Legal
Representation of Children at Fordham Law School from December 1-3, 1995. To review the
recommendations or find more information about the conference, see Special Issue, supra note 8,
at 1301-23.
10. See infra Part III.A. Unless otherwise noted, when I refer to "young" or "impaired"
children, I mean those children unable to direct the objectives of representation. The questions of
how one determines who is "young" and what is the appropriate role for attorneys for young
children are the subject of much disagreement. The former question is beyond the scope of this
paper. The latter will be discussed extensively below.
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whether all children, especially young children, should be represented in
child protection proceedings. Professor Martin Guggenheim has called
for the curtailment, if not the elimination, of legal representation of
young children, and Professor Emily Buss has recommended that
lawyers refrain from taking positions on behalf of their child clients."I
II. See generally Emily Buss, Confronting Developmental Barriers to the Empowerment of
Child Clients, 84 CORNELL L. REV. 895 (1999) [hereinafter Buss, Developmental Barriers];
Martin Guggenheim, Matter of Ethics: Counseling Counsel for Children, 97 MICH. L. REV. 1488
(1999) [hereinafter Guggenheim, Matter of Ethics] (reviewing PETERS, supra note 8); Martin
Guggenheim, A Paradigm for Determining the Role of Counsel for Children, 64 FORDHAM L.
REV. 1399 (1996) [hereinafter Guggenheim, Paradigm]; Martin Guggenheim, Reconsidering the
Need for Counsel for Children in Custody, Visitation and Child Protection Proceedings, 29 LOY.
U. CHI. L.J. 299 (1998) [hereinafter Guggenheim, Reconsidering the Need]; Martin Guggenheim,
The Right to be Represented but Not Heard: Reflections on Legal Representation for Children, 59
N.Y.U. L. REV. 76 (1984) [hereinafter Guggenheim, Reflections]. For further elaboration on the
recommendations of Professors Guggenheim and Buss, see infra Part III.
It is important to note that Professor Buss never calls for the elimination of the role of the
attorney for young children. She is primarily concerned with the questions of when and whether
children can be empowered. Yet, in concluding that many children cannot be empowered,
Professor Buss also voices her concern with the roles that representatives for young children play
and accordingly recommends that these representatives be prohibited from taking positions in
court proceedings. This paper will only address the latter concern.
Professor Guggenheim, who has voiced his concerns about the role of the attorney for young
children since 1984, has, in recent years, devoted much attention to the topic, having written three
times on the subject in the last four years and co-authored the American Academy of Matrimonial
Lawyers' Representing Children: Standards for Attorneys and Guardians Ad Litem in Custody or
Visitation Proceedings. See 13 J. AM. ACAD. MATRIM. L. 1 (1995) [hereinafter AAML
Standards]. These standards propose that "courts should not routinely assign counsel or
guardians ad litem for children in custody or visitation proceedings," and that if a representative
is appointed for a child under twelve, that representative should "not advocate a position with
regard to the outcome of the proceeding or issues contested during litigation." Id. at 2, 19
(referencing Standards 1. 1 and 2.7, respectively).
Both Professors Guggenheim and Buss have authored other works as well. Those writings,
however, do not directly or indirectly address the question of whether children in child protection
proceedings should be represented. See, e.g., Emily Buss, Getting Beyond Discrimination: A
Regulatory Solution to the Problem of Fetal Hazards in the Workplace, 95 YALE L.J. 577 (1986);
Emily Buss, Parents' Rights and Parents Wronged, 57 OHIO ST. L.J. 431 (1996) [hereinafter
Buss, Parents' Rights]; Emily Buss, Too Young to be Rehabilitated? Comments on Lipsey's
"Can Rehabilitative Programs Reduce the Recidivism of Juvenile Offenders?" 6 VA. J. SOC.
POL'Y & L. 653 (1999); Emily Buss, What Does Frieda Yoder Believe?, 2 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 53
(1999); Emily Buss, "You're My What? The Problem of Children's Misperceptions of Their
Lawyers' Roles, 64 FORDHAM L. RE V. 1699 (1996) [hereinafter Buss, Children's
Misperceptions]; Martin Guggenheim, Considerations in Child Welfare Cases: Duties of the Law
Guardian and the Parent's Attorney, 179 PLI/CRIM 657 (1998); Martin Guggenheim, The Effects
of Recent Trends to Accelerate the Termination of Parental Rights of Children in Foster Care-An
Empirical Analysis in Two States, 29 FAM. L. Q. 121 (1995); Martin Guggenheim, Fee-
Generating Clinics: Can We Bear the Costs?, I CLINICAL L. REV. 677 (1995); Martin
Guggenheim, The Foster Care Dilemma and What to Do About It: Is the Problem that Too Many
Children are Entering Foster Care?, 2 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 141 (1999) [hereinafter Dilemma];
Martin Guggenheim, The Making of Standards for Representing Children in Custody and
Visitation Proceedings: The Reporter's Perspective, 13 J. AM. ACAD. MATRIM. L. 35 (1995);
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The legislative probe has taken several different forms. In 1988,
through its reauthorization of CAPTA, Congress directed that the
National Center on Child Abuse and Neglect ("NCCAN") study "the
effectiveness of legal representation of children in cases of abuse or
neglect through the use of the guardian ad litem and court appointed
special advocates" and report the results to Congress. 12 More recently,
in 1995, Congress proposed decreasing funding for CAPTA and
abolishing the federal requirement for the appointment of
representatives for children who are the subjects of child protection
proceedings.' 3 Additionally, the American Academy of Matrimonial
Lawyers ("AAML"), a committee of the ABA's Family Law Section,
and the National Conference of Juvenile and Family Court Judges have
recently adopted standards and principles that support the notion that
Martin Guggenheim, Reflections on Judges, Juries, and Justice: Ensuring the Fairness of
Juvenile Delinquency Trials, 33 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 553 (1998); Martin Guggenheim, State
Intervention in the Family: Making a Federal Case Out of It, 45 OHIO ST. L.J. 399 (1984); Martin
Guggenheim, State-Supported Foster Care: The Interplay Between the Prohibition of
Establishing Religion and the Free Exercise Rights of Parents and Children: Wilder v. Bernstein,
56 BROOK. L. REV. 603 (1990); Martin Guggenheim & Jeffrey Fagan, Preventive Detention and
the Judicial Prediction of Dangerousness for Juveniles: A Natural Experiment, 86 J. CRIM. L. &
CRIMINOLOGY 415 (1996); Martin Guggenheim & Marc Miller, Pretrial Detention and
Punishment, 75 MINN. L. REV. 335 (1990).
12. Child Abuse Prevention, Adoption and Family Services Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-294,
§ 104, 102 Stat. 102, 118 (1988). The U.S. DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES'
NATIONAL STUDY OF GUARDIAN AD LITEM REPRESENTATION (1990) [hereinafter NATIONAL
STUDY] and the FINAL REPORT ON THE VALIDATION AND EFFECTIVENESS STUDY OF LEGAL
REPRESENTATION THROUGH GUARDIANS AD LITEM (1993) [hereinafter FINAL REPORT],
discussed herein, are the embodiment of this Congressional directive. The National Study is
viewed as Phase I and Appendix A of the Final Report (although it is bound separately). Both
the National Study and the Final Report were conducted by CSR, a Washington, D.C. consulting
firm.
13. See Shepherd & England, supra note 1, at 1923. These contemplated reductions in
spending and eliminations of statutory mandates never came to pass due to disagreements
between the House and Senate. See id. at 1923-24. However, the issue of whether to provide
representation to children in child protection proceedings, especially representation by attorneys,
is still an issue in many states. See infra notes 67-80 and accompanying text (describing how the
states have not adequately met their obligation to provide appropriate representation); see also
Cheryl Romo, In Court Alone, L.A. DAILY JOURNAL, Feb. 29, 2000, at I (quoting Adam B.
Schiff, chair of the California State Senate Select Committee on Juvenile Justice as stating that
providing legal representation to all children involved in child protection proceedings is a "tough
sell" in the legislature and describing the public as not "convinced [that] kids need attorneys.").
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children in custody and visitation matters 14 are not required to have
lawyers. 15
It is unclear if the views of two prominent and thoughtful scholars,
ongoing legislative concerns, and institutional pronouncements from
organizations in different, but related, fields will result in any changes
to the current systems that provide representation to young children.
The implications are so grave, however, that further examination is
warranted as to the appropriate role of an attorney representing young
children in the context of child protection proceedings and to our ability
to ensure that the needs and legal interests of these children are
represented. The thesis of this paper is that representation of young
children is needed, that this representation is best when it is conducted
by attorneys acting, as much as possible, in the traditional attorney role,
and that concerns regarding unguided discretion and bias by lawyers
can be substantially reduced with a concerted effort by attorneys to
understand the lives of their young child clients, including their
families, backgrounds, and cultures.' 6  However, recognizing that
accomplishing these goals will entail additional resources that
jurisdictions may not be willing to allocate, this article also recommends
that enhancements in the roles and responsibilities of juvenile court
judges and child welfare agency social workers be made. Further, the
article advocates that we continue our discussions regarding how court-
appointed special advocates ("CASAs") and attorneys can best work
together. While these recommendations would not protect the interests
of young children to the same degree as a competent and well-supported
attorney would, they are worth considering as part of the dialogue
14. While issues concerning custody and visitation occur in child protection proceedings, the
reference here and throughout this article to custody and visitation matters refers to those cases
where custody and/or visitation is in dispute, and where allegations of child abuse or neglect are
not at issue, or at least are not central to the proceeding. A typical example is a divorce
proceeding where there are conflicts over the custody of the children.
15. See AAML Standards, supra note 11; A.B.A. & NAT'L COUNCIL OF JUV. & FAM. CT.
JUDGES, PRINCIPLES FOR APPOINTMENT OF REPRESENTATIVES FOR CHILDREN IN CUSTODY AND
VISITATION PROCEEDINGS (1997) (cited in Guggenheim, Reconsidering the Need, supra note 11,
at 302 n.10). For a contrary view of whether children in custody and visitation proceedings
should be represented, see Patricia S. Curley & Gregg Herman, Representing the Best Interests of
Children: The Wisconsin Experience, 13 J. AM. ACAD. MATRIM. L. 123 (1995) (describing the
practice in Wisconsin, one of only two states that mandates the legal representation of children in
custody disputes, and calling for such mandatory representation in all states). See also Ann M.
Haralambie & Deborah L. Glaser, Practical and Theoretical Problems with the AAML Standards
for Representing "Impaired" Children, 13 J. AM. ACAD. MATRIM. L. 57 (1995)
16. By emphasizing that all children need legal representation, I do not mean to ignore the fact
that other parties in child protection proceedings, especially the parents, also need representation.
Rather, like children, parents need competent, well-supported, and committed legal representation
as well.
2000]
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which has begun, and needs to continue, on how child protection
proceedings can be made more responsive to the needs and interests of
the children it serves.
In order to place these questions and issues in context, the second
part of this article will discuss the current plight of children in this
country who are abused and neglected. 7 This discussion will include
brief descriptions of the systems designed to meet the needs of these
children, including the provision of legal representation. This part will
also address the serious deficiencies in these systems.18 In addition,
Part II of this article will introduce two fictional children whose lives
are reflective of the many children who are abused and neglected.' 9
Their stories will be used throughout the paper to illustrate common
situations confronted by children in the dependency system that must be
taken into account when reconsidering the need to provide legal
representation to young children.
Part III then elaborates on some additional concerns about the legal
representation of young children and summarizes two proposals that call
for the curtailment of such representation. 20 Acknowledging the merits
of the concerns summarized in Parts II and III of the article, Parts IV, V,
and VI respond to the recommendations calling for the reduction or
elimination of the role of the attorney for young children. 21
Specifically, Part IV explains how the proposals will not eliminate bias
and discretion in the representation of young children, 22 while Part V
discusses why it is necessary for young children to have
representatives. 23 Part VI focuses on the question of how lawyering for
young children can be improved and thus become less haphazard and
more reflective of the interests and needs of children.24 This discussion
will highlight some of the recent writings of Professor Jean Koh Peters
and will propose areas of study in order to further develop and support
her paradigm. 25 Finally, Part VII suggests that alternative approaches to
the representation of young children be studied.26 Part VII also calls for
alterations to our child welfare policies, particularly regarding the role
17. See infra Part I.
18. See infra Part I.
19. See infra notes 28-37 and accompanying text.
20. See infra Part Hm.
21. See infra Parts IV, V & VI.
22. See infra Part IV.
23. See infra Part V.
24. See infra Part VI.
25. See id.
26. See infra Part VII.
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of the agency social worker, and in the responsibilities that we place on
juvenile court judges.27 As stated above, these latter recommendations
are especially important if the support, financial and otherwise, for the
improvement and augmentation of legal representation continues to be
deficient.
II. THE CONTEXT
A. The Lives of Two Neglected Children
In order to better understand the complexities and difficulties of a
child protection case, it is helpful to look first at an individual family
situation as it might become known to a child's legal representative at
the beginning of such a proceeding. 28 Throughout and following this
narrative will be more general descriptions of the characteristics of
children who may be victims of abuse and/or neglect, and the systems
and laws that are in place to protect and serve them and their families.
Such a contextual portrayal is necessary to thoroughly examine the
question of whether legal representatives are needed.
The children whose situation we are going to examine are Andrew
and Brenda Smith. They entered the child protection system within the
last 48 hours. Andrew is ten years old and Brenda is eight. They are
African Americans. 29  Prior to being removed from their home, they
27. See id.
28. The following fictionalized fact pattern is based upon a compilation of many cases in
which I was appointed the child's legal representative. From March 1989 until May 1992, I was
a staff attorney at the Child Advocacy Unit of the Legal Aid Bureau, Inc., in Baltimore,
Maryland. As such, I represented hundreds of children in child protection proceedings. This
hypothetical example is also intended to highlight some of the prevalent characteristics of abused
or neglected children. Moreover, the story is told from the perspective of a white, middle-class
attorney, as that is the only reliable account I could write. Throughout this narrative, as well as
the entire article, I will use the terms "lawyer," "attorney," "counsel," and "legal representative"
interchangeably to refer to a child's representative who is a member of a state bar. Where the
term "representative" or "advocate" is used, it will refer to a representative for a child who may
be an attorney or a lay advocate.
29. Children of color, especially African American and Native American children, are
disproportionately represented in the child protection system as compared to their representation
in the national child population. In 1997, "two-thirds (66.7 percent) of all victims were white,
29.5 percent were African American, 2.5 percent were American Indian/Alaska Native, and 1.3
percent were Asian Pacific Islander." U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES, CHILD
MALTREATMENT 1997: REPORTS FROM THE STATES TO THE NATIONAL CHILD ABUSE AND
NEGLECT DATA SYSTEM 4-5 (1999) [hereinafter CHILD MALTREATMENT 1997]. Moreover, "[iun
35 states, 13.3 percent of victims were Hispanic, compared to 18.8 percent of the population of
these states." Id. The Child Maltreatment 1997 Report summarized that the "proportions of
victims who were African American or American Indian/Alaska Native were two times greater
than the proportions of those children in the general population. The proportions of victims who
were white or Asian Pacific Islander were lower than the proportions of those children in the
2000]
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lived with their mother, Caroline Smith, who is twenty-six years old.30
They have different fathers and neither father has had much contact
with his child. Brenda's father has a serious substance addiction. The
exact whereabouts of Andrew's father are unknown. The family's only
source of income is public assistance.
31
general population." Id. (citations omitted).
Children of color also are disproportionately represented in foster care. See S. REP. NO. 104-
117, at 3 (1995), reprinted in 1996 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3490, 3492 (finding that "minority children
enter the child protection system in disproportionately large numbers and are far more likely to
remain in substitute care for long periods of time - even years"); CHILD WELFARE LEAGUE OF
AMERICA, CHILD ABUSE AND NEGLECT: A LOOK AT THE STATES (1999 CWLA STAT BOOK) 95
(1999) [hereinafter 1999 CWLA STAT BOOK] (reporting that "African American and American
Indian children are highly overrepresented in ... out-of-home care"); Annie Woodley Brown &
Barbara Bailey-Etta, An Out-of-Home Care System in Crisis: Implications for African American
Children in the Child Welfare System, 76 CHILD WELFARE 65, 74-75 (1997) (reporting that
African American children make up 42.4 percent of all children in foster care, a figure that is
grossly disproportionate to their 15 percent representation in the general population); Mark E.
Courtney et al., Race and Child Welfare Services: Past Research and Future Directions, 75
CHILD WELFARE 99, 100-01 (1996) (analyzing a study of five states and concluding that the
proportion of African American children in care ranged from three times as high to over ten times
as high as the proportion of Caucasian children in care); Guggenheim, Dilemma, supra note I1, at
144 (citing New York City Administration for Children's Services, Selected Child Welfare
Trends (noting that a report on New York City found that out of 42,000 children in foster care in
New York City in December 1997, only 3.1% were white)); Dorothy E. Roberts, Is There Justice
in Children's Rights?: The Critique of Federal Family Preservation Policy, 2 U. PA. J. CONST. L.
112, 125 (1999) (citing statistics to support the fact that 45% of the foster care population in 1998
was black, while black children only comprised 15% of the general population under the age of
eighteen).
These figures are quite shocking when one learns that there is not any correlation between race
and rates of child maltreatment. See U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES, THE THIRD
NATIONAL INCIDENCE STUDY OF CHILD ABUSE AND NEGLECT (NIS-3) 8-7 (1996) [hereinafter
NIS-3]. These "findings suggest that the different races receive differential attention somewhere
during the process of referral, investigation, and service allocation and that the differential
representation of minorities in the child welfare population does not derive from inherent
differences in the rates at which they are abused or neglected." Id. The 1999 CWLA Stat Book
states that the disproportionate number of substantiated reports of abuse or neglect for children of
color may be due to biases related to race and ethnicity as well as to the high correlation between
race and poverty. See 1999 CWLA STAT BOOK, supra, at 21, 95; see also HOWZE, supra note 2,
at 13 (reviewing census data and concluding that more than half of all African American children
under the age of eighteen live in poverty compared to approximately seven percent of white
children).
30. Frequently, the parents in child protection proceedings are single mothers. See HOWZE,
supra note 2, at 11; see also Annette R. Appell, Protecting Children or Punishing Mothers:
Gender, Race, and Class in the Child Protection System, 48 S.C. L. REV. 577, 584 (1997)
(maintaining that the "vast majority" of parents involved in child welfare matters are mothers).
31. The fact that Andrew and Brenda are forced to live in poverty, unfortunately, is also very
common among abused and neglected children. "Children from families with annual incomes
below $15,000, as compared to children from families with annual incomes above $30,000 per
year, were over 22 times more likely to experience some form of maltreatment that fit the Harm
Standard [actual harm] and over 25 times more likely to suffer some form of maltreatment as
defined by the Endangerment Standard [risk of harm]." NIS-3, supra note 29, at xviii. The
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disparities are even greater when the incidence of neglect (as contrasted with abuse and neglect
combined) is studied (44 times more likely by either definition). Id. at 5-6 to 5-8, 8-10. For a
statistical and more in-depth analysis of the correlation between the incidence of child abuse
and/or neglect and family income, see id. at 5-2 to 5-10. See also 1999 CWLA STAT BOOK,
supra note 29, at 223 (reporting that "declining family support and increasing poverty and
substance abuse have accompanied the steady growth in the numbers of U.S. children placed in
out-of-home care-from 280,000 in 1986 to 530,496 in 1996") (citations omitted)); HOWZE, supra
note 2, at II (noting that the majority of cases involve people at or below the poverty line);
Appell, supra note 30, at 584 (finding that the families involved in the child protective system are
"overwhelmingly poor and disproportionately of color"); Buss, Parents' Rights, supra note 1I, at
432 (declaring that "[t]he child welfare system is a system that, in dramatic disproportion to their
numbers, affects poor people"); Courtney et al., supra note 29, at 129 (reviewing studies and
concluding that there is a high correlation between poverty and child maltreatment, particularly
neglect); Roberts, supra note 29, at 118 (maintaining that "[miost children in foster care were
removed from their homes because of parental neglect related to poverty) (footnote omitted).
Professor Emily Buss discusses why this is so:
There are some very sensible reasons for this overrepresentation: To the extent poverty
can be linked to drug addiction, violence, a hazardous living environment, and, most of
all, stress, being poor will increase the likelihood that a child will be abused or
neglected. But the poor are not overrepresented in the child welfare system simply
because their child-rearing problems are greater or more widespread. Even in factually
similar circumstances, a poor family is much more likely than a middle or upper
income family to be suspected of, and reported for, abuse or neglect. Poor families live
in close quarters with thin walls that expose them to the scrutiny of neighbors. Their
welfare checks bring with them the surveillance of income maintenance workers; their
visits to public health clinics expose them to the subset of medical professionals most
trained and oriented toward looking for abuse and neglect. Moreover, poor families
lack the resources to buy private help ... that can get them through the difficult times
by helping them to reduce their abusive conduct or by keeping the abusive conduct out
of the public eye.
Buss, Parents' Rights, supra note I1, at 432-33.
The likelihood that poverty will lead to state intervention into the lives of poor families may
only get greater with the limitations imposed by welfare reform in 1996. See Naomi R. Cahn,
Children's Interests in a Familial Context: Poverty, Foster Care and Adoption, 60 OHIO ST. L.J.
1189, 1200 (1999); Katherine Hunt Federle, Child Welfare and the Juvenile Court, 60 OHIO ST.
L.J. 1225, 1245-48 (1999); Catherine J. Ross, Families Without Paradigms: Child Poverty and
Out of Home Placement in Historical Perspective, 60 OHIO ST. L.J. 1249 (1999).
The correlation between poverty and child abuse has been noted for at least the last three
decades. See 1999 CWLA STAT BOOK, supra note 29, at 223 (noting that "[cihild maltreatment
is often part of the sad cycle of cause and effect that poverty may help set in motion"); ROBERT
H. MNOOKIN & D. KELLY WEISBERG, CHILD, FAMILY AND STATE: PROBLEMS AND MATERIALS
ON CHILDREN AND THE LAW 440 (3d ed. 1995) (maintaining that "the foster care system has long
been criticized as being class biased"); Judith Areen, Intervention Between Parent and Child: A
Reappraisal of the State's Role in Child Neglect and Abuse Cases, 63 GEO. L.J. 887, 888 (1975)
(finding that "the most prevalent characteristic of families charged with neglect is poverty");
Shirley Jenkins, Child Welfare as a Class System, in CHILDREN AND DECENT PEOPLE 3 (Alvin L.
Schorr ed., 1974) (maintaining that "poverty is often the antecedent condition" of neglect and that
the child welfare system has always predominantly served poor children and their families, and
because the system has always served children so poorly, it also can be seen as a perpetrator of
poverty); Leroy Phelton, Ph.D., Child Abuse and Neglect: The Myth of Classlessness, 48 AMER.
J. OF ORTHOPSYCHIATRY 608, 609-11 (1978) (concluding that there is a "strong relationship
between poverty and child abuse and neglect," that "the highest incidence of neglect occurred in
families living in the most extreme poverty," and that "the most severe injuries occurred within
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Ms. Smith also suffers from a dependency on drugs. 32 She has been a
victim to this addiction for the past five years, but it has become more
severe during the last two. Over the years, the family has moved from
place to place, staying with friends when possible and, at times, living
in shelters or on the street. Approximately one year ago, the family was
fortunate to move off of the waiting list and into a two-bedroom
apartment in a subsidized housing development. However, the family is
about to be evicted from this housing unit due to nonpayment of rent
and because drug dealers were alleged to be on the premises.
A social worker from the local child protection services agency
("CPS") removed Andrew and Brenda from their home after the
manager of their housing complex called the agency to report that Ms.
Smith had left the children unsupervised, alone, and with very little food
to eat for two days. The family, however, was already known to CPS.
The agency had previously received calls from the children's school
about excessive absenteeism and the fact that the children frequently
came to school dirty. In addition, Andrew's teacher had expressed
concerns of educational neglect. It seems that Andrew is not doing well
in school. He has been exhibiting some behavioral problems and the
teacher believes that he may have a learning disability. The teacher
would like to refer Andrew for a special education assessment and has
attempted to meet with Ms. Smith to discuss her concerns. However,
Ms. Smith has not responded to any of the letters the teacher has sent
home.
After being removed from the family home, Brenda was placed in a
family-like foster home. Andrew, however, was placed in an
emergency shelter. There were no available foster homes for a boy his
age, nor were there any foster homes where Andrew and Brenda could
be placed together. Significantly, the extent of CPS's assistance to the
the poorest families"). For a historical analysis of the relationship between socioeconomic status
and the child welfare system, see Jacobus tenBroek, California's Dual System of Family Law: Its
Origin, Development, and Present Status (pt. 1-3), 16 STAN. L. REV. 257 (1964), 16 STAN. L.
REV. 900 (1964), 17 STAN. L. REV. 614 (1965).
32. The prevalence of substance abuse problems in child abuse or neglect cases is quite high.
"By some estimates, 70 to 90 percent of child abuse and neglect cases known to CPS agencies
involve parents with alcohol or drug abuse problems." Howard Davidson, Child Protection
Policy and Practice at Century's End, 33 FAM. L.Q. 765, 777 (1999); see also HOWZE, supra
note 2, at t 1 (noting that "drug addiction is a common finding in neglect cases"); Cahn, supra
note 31, at 1200 (citing to studies that "indicate that between 1/3 and 2/3 of all substantiated
reports [of child abuse and neglect] involve some form of parental substance abuse"); John
Needham, One Day in a World of Hard Cases and Harder Decisions Juvenile Court:
'Dependency' Hearings Weigh the Fates of Children, Parents and Would-Be Parents. Sometimes
There is No Right Answer, L.A. TIMES, Apr. 5, 1993, § A at 22 (quoting a judge as stating that
more than eighty percent of the cases he sees involve parents using illegal substances).
[Vol. 32
Young Children in Child Protection Proceedings
family in the past has been the provision of emergency funds to help
pay some overdue rent and to reactivate the electricity and telephone.
No other resources or services have been provided.
Just prior to the shelter care hearing,33 in an interview room at the
courthouse, Andrew and Brenda meet individually with their legal
representative, a Caucasian woman in her late twenties from a middle-
class, suburban background. 34 Ms. Smith has not appeared at the
courthouse, so the representative expects that the children will continue
to be placed outside the home. Neither has expressed a preference nor a
reluctance to go home. However, both children report to her that they
are very upset about being separated from one another and have
expressed a strong desire to be with Brenda's godmother, Ms. Anita
Jones, who has come to the courthouse. Both children appear to the
attorney to be frightened and very anxious. Andrew complains of a
headache, while Brenda reports having had a stomach ache all day.
From what the legal representative can observe while at the courthouse,
the children seem very bonded with one another and comfortable with
Ms. Jones. The lawyer, however, recognizes that these first impressions
are merely preliminary.
There do not appear to be any biological relatives available to care
for the children. Ms. Jones, who is a friend of the children's maternal
grandmother, informs the representative that all of the children's
extended family live out of state, but that she has cared for the two
children on and off over the years and would be willing to do so now.
The child welfare agency social worker is aware of Ms. Jones' offer and
has even been to her home and found both Ms. Jones and her home to
33. A shelter care hearing is an emergency hearing that, in most jurisdictions, must occur
within 24 to 48 hours after children are involuntarily removed from the care of their parents.
34. Andrew and Brenda's legal representative also represents common characteristics of
advocates who represent children in child protection proceedings. Not only are the
representatives typically white and from middle-class backgrounds, but the judges and child
welfare agency social workers are as well. See Appell, supra note 30, at 585 (noting that in
contrast to the recipients of child welfare services, "the judges, caseworkers, and attorneys are
mostly middle-class and white"); Buss, Developmental Barriers, supra note 11, at 925 (briefly
describing a hypothetical situation between an attorney and a child client where the race and
socio-economic status between the two are different); Louise Kiernan, Children on Trial;
Juvenile Court, An Ongoing Struggle to Mend Broken Lives, CHI. TRIB., Jan. 19, 1997, § C
(magazine), at 3 (describing a juvenile court in Chicago as "a place where mostly white, middle-
class lawyers and judges make decisions about the lives of families and children who are mostly
black, Hispanic and poor"); see also HOWZE, supra note 2, at 1-2 (describing an incident where a
courtroom clerk was surprised that an African-American woman came to the juvenile court, not
as a mother, but as an attorney). However, according to a national study of 432 jurisdictions, the
majority of attorneys acting as child representatives are male, not female. See NATIONAL STUDY,
supra note 12, at 33.
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be appropriate. The social worker went to Ms. Jones' home as part of
her efforts to locate Ms. Smith. As the social worker would with a
blood-relative, she also ran a background clearance check on Ms. Jones
in anticipation of the shelter care hearing and the possibility of placing
the children with her. However, it is against the policy of the agency to
place children in the home of an unrelated person, even someone who is
as close with the children as Ms. Jones, unless it is a licensed foster
home. The process of licensing can take several months. 35 This is the
situation as Andrew and Brenda await their shelter care hearing.
Andrew and Brenda are not alone. Rather, they are two of the
approximately one million children who are abused or neglected each
year.36 The type of maltreatment, however, varies. Of those children
found to be abused or neglected, more than one-half suffer from neglect,
as is the case with Andrew and Brenda; nearly twenty-five percent are
victims of physical abuse; and twelve percent are sexually abused.37
35. See Randi Mandelbaum, Trying to Fit Square Pegs into Round Holes: The Need For a
New Funding Scheme For Kinship Caregivers, 22 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 907, 922-23 (1995)
(describing the problems of licensing kinship caregivers).
36. See CHILD MALTREATMENT 1997, supra note 29, at 4-1. Due to collection and analysis
lags, at the time of writing, the most recent year for which data is available is 1997.
In actuality, approximately three million children were alleged to be abused or neglected in
1997. See id. at 3-2. After investigation, approximately one million were "substantiated" or
"indicated" victims of abuse or neglect. See id. at 4-1. It is significant to note that the number of
reports of abused or neglected children has increased from the previous year. In 1996, a little
over two million children were reported as abused or neglected. See U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH AND
HUMAN SERVS., CHILD MALTREATMENT 1996: REPORTS FROM THE STATES TO THE NATIONAL
CHILD ABUSE AND NEGLECT DATA SYSTEM 2-1 (1998). By 1997, this number had risen to three
million. See CHILD MALTREATMENT 1997, supra note 29, at 3-2.
Reports of child maltreatment come from various persons and sources based on data from 42
states:
[Plrofessional reporters, including educators, law enforcement officials, social services
personnel, medical personnel, mental health personnel, child day care providers, and
substitute care providers, accounted for 777,637 reports (53.6 percent) of alleged
maltreatment that were referred for investigation. Other relatives, friends and
neighbors, parents, and alleged victims contributed 382,239 reports (16.4 percent).
Another 290,523 reports (20.0 percent) originated from anonymous or unknown
sources, other sources, and alleged perpetrators. Educators initiated 236,719 reports
(16.3 percent) and were the largest single source.... Law enforcement personnel
constituted the second largest source, contributing 193,007 reports (13.3 percent). The
distribution of sources of reports has remained virtually constant since 1990.
See id. at 3-1.
37. See CHILD MALTREATMENT 1997, supra note 29, at 4-2. The remainder of the
maltreatment consisted of psychological or emotional abuse or neglect, medical neglect, and other
types of abuse, such as "'abandonment,' 'congenital drug addiction,' and 'threats to harm the
child."' Id. at 4-2, D-13.
Of the children who were the subject of substantiated abuse or neglect findings in 1997, 6.9
percent were less than one year old, 30.9 percent were one to five years old, 39.7 percent were six
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Unfortunately, the problems for Andrew and Brenda do not stop at
home. Because of the conditions of the systems that are supposed to
protect Andrew and Brenda from abuse or neglect, there is no assurance
that all will be well for them if they are removed from their home. The
two public systems designated to both protect abused and neglected
children and assist their families in addressing the causes of
maltreatment are our child welfare agencies and our juvenile courts. In
addition, to ensure that all children involved in child protection
proceedings are represented, most states have established some system
or structure to provide for representation. Over the past few decades,
however, numerous studies and reports have documented extensive and
chronic neglect of children in these systems. In order to understand
what Andrew, Brenda and their family are likely to face if they become
involved with these systems, it is necessary to briefly describe the
functions of each of these systems, as well as some of their many
shortcomings.
B. Status of Our Child Welfare Agencies
At present, child welfare agencies in many states are under court
supervision as a result of lawsuits that documented extreme violations
of federal and state laws in providing services to children and their
families. 38 One judge described the system in his jurisdiction as one of
to 12 years old, and 19.3 percent were 13 to 17 years old. See id. at 4-3, fig. 4-3. Of these same
children, 52.3 percent were female. See id. The National Incidence Study of Child Abuse and
Neglect looked at gender differences and found that girls are three times more likely than boys to
be sexually abused. See NIS-3, supra note 29, at 8-6. However, boys are more at risk for
emotional neglect and serious injury than girls. See id.
The perpetrators of the abuse were predominantly the parents of the children. See CHILD
MALTREATMENT 1997, supra note 29, at 7-1 (reporting that in 1997 approximately seventy-five
percent of the perpetrators were biological, adoptive, or step parents).
In the last decade, the annual number of children "seriously injured by abuse ... has
quadrupled, to 572,000 from 143,000." Robert Pear, Many States Fail to Meet Mandates on
Child Welfare, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 17, 1996, at Al. Accounting for approximately 2,000 fatalities
a year among children of all ages, child abuse is the leading cause of death among children under
the age of four. See id.; see also CHILD MALTREATMENT 1997, supra note 29, at 6-1 (reporting
that children three and younger accounted for seventy-seven percent of child maltreatment
fatalities).
38. See Pear, supra note 37, at Al; see, e.g., Angela R. v. Clinton, 999 F.2d 320 (8th Cir.
1993) (summary of case from the perspective of the attorneys representing the class of children is
available at <http://www.youthlaw.org/docket.htm>); David C. v. Leavitt, 13 F. Supp. 2d 1206
(D. Utah 1998) (summary of case from the perspective of the attorneys representing the class of
children can be found at <http://www.youthlaw.org/docket.htm>); L.J. v. Massinga, 778 F. Supp.
253 (D. Md. 1991) (for modification of consent decree); LaShawn v. Dixon, 762 F. Supp. 959 (D.
D.C. 1991), aff'd in part LaShawn A. by Moore v. Kelly, 990 F.2d 1319 (D.C. Cir. 1993), cert.
denied 510 U.S. 1044 (1994); L.J. v. Massinga, 699 F. Supp. 508 (D. Md. 1988) (discussing
consent decree proposed by parties).
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"outrageous deficiencies," while another jurist declared the current state
of affairs to be a "bleak and Dickensian picture." 39 According to a
report by the United States Advisory Board on Child Abuse and
Neglect, "[i]t is not a question of acute failure of a single element of the
system; there is chronic and critical multiple organ failure. In such a
context, the safety of children cannot be ensured. Indeed, the system
itself can at times be abusive to children."
4°
The widespread deficiencies within the child welfare system can be
seen in almost every state, at every level, and at every step in the
process.41  For example, the first type of service that child welfare
agencies provide is the investigation of reports of child abuse and
neglect. The need for this service to occur in a prompt and responsible
manner cannot be overstated.42  Yet, approximately one-third of state
agencies charged with this responsibility are "unable to investigate
reports within 24 or 48 hours, as required by law." 43 Reviewing the
39. See Pear, supra note 37, at Al; see also Appell, supra note 30, at 593 & n.86 (lamenting
the many problems found in the child welfare system).
40. S. REP. No. 104-117, at 3 (1995), reprinted in 1996 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3490, 3492; see also
Buss, Parents' Rights, supra note 11, at 439 (declaring that the child welfare system "plays out
abysmally for children" and that children's treatment in this system "often constitutes abuse and
neglect of its own"); Tracy Weber, Twice Abused: Inside Orange County's Child Welfare System,
L.A. TIMES, May 5, 1998, at Al (describing the child welfare system as "antiquated" and
"struggling under the weight of too many children and too little oversight").
It also is significant to note that poor children and families of color are treated worse and
receive even fewer services than their white counterparts. See Courtney et al., supra note 29, at
108-25 (reviewing various studies of how children of color fare in our child welfare systems).
"The overall picture ... is that families and children of color experience poorer outcomes and are
provided fewer services than Caucasian families and children." Id. at 125. However, most
studies reviewed did not factor in class; those few that did "showed a reduced or nonexistent
effect of race or ethnicity." Id. at 125-26; see also Roberts, supra note 29, at 126 (concluding that
"once black children enter foster care, they remain there longer, are moved more often, and
receive less desirable placements than white children") (footnote omitted).
41. See Pear, supra note 37, at Al. In 1996, a committee report that accompanied the 1996
legislative amendments to CAPTA declared the following: "No matter which element of the
system that it [the Advisory Board] examined - prevention, investigation, treatment, training, or
research - it found a system in disarray, a societal response ill-suited in form or scope to respond
to the profound problems facing it." S. REP. No. 104-117, at 3-4 (1995), reprinted in 1996
U.S.C.C.A.N. 3490, 3492-93.
42. It is important to stress that investigations must be performed responsibly, not only so that
children are protected from serious abuse and neglect but also so that children are not
unnecessarily removed and traumatized when allegations are unfounded or not sufficiently
serious as to warrant the children being removed from their family and home.
43. S. REP. No. 104-117, at 2 (1995), reprinted in 1996 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3490, 3491; see also
Buss, Parents' Rights, supra note 11, at 433 ("Investigations of abuse and neglect reports are
routinely done by case workers with little or no specialized training in how to approach the
families, how to conduct an effective and appropriate investigation, and how to assess the
information uncovered."); Pear, supra note 37, at Al (stating that "[c]hild welfare officials in
many states, swamped with work, are slow to investigate reports of child abuse and neglect"). It
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situation of Andrew and Brenda, it appears that the agency responded
promptly. Had it not, however, the likely result would have been that
Andrew and Brenda would have spent another night alone,
unsupervised, and without sufficient food.
Children removed from the care of their parents and placed in foster
care, even temporarily, are also at great risk of not having their needs
met by the child welfare agencies. 44 Placements in overcrowded and
inadequate foster homes that fail to provide for children's basic needs
are common.45 As Professor Richard Wexler told a Senate committee,
"[f]oster care is not a haven. Often it is not even safe. Most people
assume that removing children from their parents means removing them
from danger and placing them in safety. Often it is the other way
around.",46 In the case of Andrew and Brenda, it is too early to predict
how they will fare out of their mother's care. However, we do know
that the children have been separated47 from each other and that Andrew
was not even able to be placed in a family-like foster home.
Once children are placed in foster care, it is the responsibility of the
child welfare agency to meet the needs of the children and to provide
is significant to note that the 24-48 hour rule is not required in all circumstances and in all
jurisdictions.
44. See Appell, supra note 30, at 593 & n.86 (explaining that "one of the weaknesses of the
child protection system is its failure to treat the children once it removes them from a dangerous
situation").
45. See Pear, supra note 37, at Al. As with the fictional Andrew and Brenda, it is significant
to note that the medical and psychological needs of children being placed in foster care have been
found to be extensive. "91.5% of children were found to have at least one abnormality in at least
one body system and more than half of the children's health problems warranted the need for
referrals for medical services." ABA, A JUDGE'S GUIDE TO IMPROVING LEGAL
REPRESENTATION OF CHILDREN 60 (Kathi L. Grasso ed., 1998) [hereinafter A JUDGE'S GUIDE].
Additionally, "22% of children aged 3 to 6, 63% of children aged 7 to 12, and 77% of teenagers
were found to be in need of a mental health referral." Id.; see also Appell, supra note 30, at 593
n.86 (citing M. Graziano & Joseph R. Mills, Treatment for Abused Children: When is a Partial
Solution Acceptable?, 16 CHILD ABUSE AND NEGLECT 217 (1992)), and concluding that
psychological services are not provided in a timely fashion, if at all); Walter, supra note 3, at 52
(noting that "foster children are not routinely assessed for medical, psychological, or
developmental conditions") (footnote omitted).
46. S. REP. NO. 104-117, at 3 (1995), reprinted in 1996 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3490, 3492 (testimony
of Professor Richard Wexler). Many of the children placed in non-kinship foster care are forced
to frequently move from one foster home to another. Over a six-year period, 34% of children in
non-kinship foster care had five or more placements. See Richard P. Barth, The Juvenile Court
and Dependency Cases, 6 JUV. CT. 100, 105 (1996). Kinship foster care is a term used when
children who are removed by a juvenile court from the care of their parents and placed in the
custody of the state are placed by the child welfare agency with relatives.
47. In California, "more than 60 percent of foster children are part of a sibling group and 41
percent of those are not placed with their siblings." Walter, supra note 3, at 61 nn.89 & 90 (citing
to California Dept. of Soc. Servs., Foster Care Info, Sys, Data).
Loyola University Chicago Law Journal [Vol. 32
services and resources to the family in order to address the cause or
causes of the maltreatment and to hopefully reunify the family as
quickly as possible.48 For Andrew, Brenda, and Ms. Smith, this might
mean providing medical, psychological, or educational services to
Andrew and Brenda, drug rehabilitative treatment to Ms. Smith, and
assistance in securing housing. Here too, however, the agencies have
been found to be failing abysmally.
49
48. See 45 C.F.R. § 1356.21(b) (2000).
The State must make reasonable efforts to maintain the family unit and prevent the
unnecessary removal of a child from his/her home, as long as the child's safety is
assured [and] to effect the safe reunification of the child and family (if temporary out-
of-home placement is necessary to ensure the immediate safety of the child) ....
Id. However, with the passage of the Adoptions and Safe Families Act of 1997 ("ASFA"),
reasonable efforts are no longer required in all circumstances. See 45 C.F.R. § 1356.21(b)(3)
(2000).
Reasonable efforts to prevent a child's removal from home or to reunify the child and
family are not required if the State agency obtains a judicial determination that such
efforts are not required because
(i) a court of competent jurisdiction has determined that the parent has subjected the
child to aggravated circumstances (as defined in State law, which may include but need
not be limited to abandonment, torture, chronic abuse, and sexual abuse);
(ii) a court of competent jurisdiction has determined that the parent has been convicted
of
A) Murder... of another child of the parent;
B) Voluntary manslaughter... of another child of the parent;
C) Aiding or abetting, attempting, conspiring, or soliciting to commit such a murder or
such a voluntary manslaughter; or
D) A felony assault that results in serious bodily injury to the child or another child of
the parent; or,
(iii) the parental rights of the parent with respect to a sibling have been terminated
involuntarily.
Id. Given the fact that abandonment can be considered an "aggravated circumstance," it is
possible that a determination that reasonable efforts were not required might be made with regard
to the case of Andrew and Brenda. Moreover, ASFA also codified the concept of "concurrent
planning," which gives state child welfare agencies permission to make efforts toward an
alternate permanency plan at the same time that it makes efforts to reunify the child and family.
See 45 C.F.R. § 1356.21(b)(4) (2000). For two very different analyses of ASFA, compare
Richard J. Gelles & Ira Schwartz, Children and the Child Welfare System, 2 U. PA. J. CONST. L.
95 (1999), with Roberts, supra note 29.
49. See Pear, supra note 37, at Al (maintaining that few child welfare agencies provide the
necessary services to keep families together or to reunite them once separated); see also Appell,
supra note 30, at 595-602 (discussing many of the problems with the child welfare system and
documenting a lack of necessary services to help prevent initial placements into foster care and to
assist in reunifying families).
The Child Welfare League recommends that caseworkers carry no more than 15 cases each,
although caseworkers often are responsible for 50 to 70 cases. See Pear, supra note 37, at Al
(citing to statements by David S. Liederman, Executive Director of the Child Welfare League of
America); see also Walter, supra note 3, at 51 (describing the caseloads of child welfare
caseworkers as "heavy" and exceeding established standards).
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Very few children and families receive the assistance they need, and
reunification services are often lacking. Many parents "end up with
nearly identical boilerplate plans of counseling, parenting and anger
management or drug classes - if they can get into the heavily
overbooked classes at all."50  Consequently, many children have
languished in foster care for years on end without a clear permanency
plan and without significant efforts having been made by the child
welfare agency to either reunify the child's biological family or take the
necessary steps to free the child of his legal ties to his biological family
so that he can be adopted. 51  Not only does this lack of meaningful
assistance and services create a situation that is painfully unfair to the
parents and potentially harmful to the children (who are generally better
off with their own families, if the abusive or neglectful conditions are
remedied), but when an agency fails to provide such assistance it
becomes very difficult, if not impossible, for the agency or the court to
determine and/or pursue an appropriate long-term or permanent plan for
a particular child. Recent changes in federal law, mandating that
decisions with respect to permanency be made within twelve months of
a child entering foster care, heighten the significance of this scarcity of
resources and create an even more dire situation. 52
50. Tracy Weber, Twice Abused: Inside Orange County's Child Welfare System, L.A. TIMES,
May 22, 1998, at Al; see also HOWZE, supra note 2, at 17 (describing the provision of services
by child welfare agencies as "cookie-cutter remedies" that are unhelpful and unreflective of
cultural and sub-cultural realities); Appell, supra note 30, at 601 (maintaining that "instead of
offering meaningful assistance, caseworkers too often take a cookie-cutter approach to the
families and their problems"); Buss, Parents' Rights, supra note 11, at 438 (claiming that
'overwhelmed, underfunded, and highly bureaucratic child welfare agencies provide little if any,
useful assistance" and calling for state agencies to provide parents with the means to be good
parents).
51. While some child welfare agencies have improved recently, many problems persist,
especially in those states where there are large urban centers. Of those children who are removed
from their family homes, "the vast majority of them (in excess of two-thirds) will return home,
although more than half will remain in care for at least 18 months in California, 35 months in
Illinois, 12 months in Michigan, 25 months in New York, and 9 months in Texas." Barth, supra
note 46, at 105.
52. Under ASFA, if 12 months of reunification services are unsuccessful, the agency is to
move forward in its efforts to develop an alternative permanent plan and find an alternative
permanent placement, which can include the termination of parental rights, a step that then
permits the child to be adopted. See 45 C.F.R. § 1356.21(b)(2)(i)-(ii) (2000). In fact, also under
ASFA, a child welfare agency can pursue both reunification and an alternative permanency plan
at the same time. See 45 C.F.R. § 1356.21(b)(4) (2000). This is known as "concurrent planning."
Significantly, it is more difficult to find permanent and/or adoptive homes for older children,
children of color, and children with special needs. See Roberts, supra note 29, at 119-20
(maintaining that there are insufficient adoptive homes for the number of children who need
them, and that black children are less likely than white children to be adopted).
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C. Shortcomings of Juvenile Court
Of course, Andrew and Brenda will not face the perils of the welfare
system alone. Their interests are supposed to be protected by our
juvenile court system, which will oversee the possible removal and
placement of Andrew and Brenda, as well as the provision of services to
Andrew and Brenda and their family. However, like the child welfare
agency, the juvenile court, with which Andrew and Brenda will find
themselves involved, is also likely to suffer from serious deficiencies. 53
Very little data exists that documents or explains how it is determined
which substantiated reports of abuse or neglect are brought to the
attention of the juvenile court.54 The few studies that have been
conducted reveal that only a small proportion of substantiated cases
seek the assistance of the court.55  Such a small percentage is more
easily understood when one considers that the only cases likely
requiring the court's attention are those where the child welfare agency
finds it necessary to involuntarily remove children from the care of their
parents, or where the child welfare agency finds the parents not to be
cooperating with treatment plans outlined by the child welfare agencies.
Andrew and Brenda fall into this category, as they have essentially been
abandoned, and their mother is not available to voluntarily work with
the child welfare agency in making arrangements to ensure their safety
in the future.
Despite the small percentage of substantiated instances of abuse or
neglect requiring judicial attention, the actual number of cases is quite
large - many more than most juvenile courts and presiding judges are
able to handle in an adequate manner.56 Descriptions of the operations
of our juvenile courts reveal an overwhelmed and, at times, even
unresponsive judicial process. Common characteristics include: judges
with no more than a few minutes to spend on each case; orders being
issued without any legal or factual basis; extraordinarily long delays,
53. See Walter, supra note 3, at 51 (explaining that "courts have not been given the resources
they need to adequately perform [their parens patriae responsibilities]").
54. See Barth, supra note 46, at 102 (explaining that the current national data systems do not
include information on the likelihood that a child abuse report will be presented to the juvenile
court).
55. See id. (describing how, in one study, petitions were filed in twenty-one percent of the
substantiated cases, while in other jurisdictions the percentages were as low as three to four
percent).
56. See, e.g., M. HARDIN, JUDICIAL IMPLEMENTATION OF PERMANENCY PLANNING REFORM:
ONE COURT THAT WORKS 12 (1992) ("a study of judicial caseloads in six states that found a 120
percent increase in child victim cases, but only a seven percent increase in family and juvenile
court judges from 1984 to 1990"); see also Buss, Parents' Rights, supra note 11, at 434-35
(maintaining that in many jurisdictions "courts are overwhelmed by the size of their caseloads").
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especially if any party wishes to contest an issue; and inadequate
appellate processes.
57
One unfortunate result of such an ill-functioning system is that, in
some cases, "children who should be removed from their homes are not,
and children who are removed should not have been." 58  Frequently,
children like Andrew and Brenda do not receive the attention and
protection to which they are entitled. Numerous studies of various
juvenile court systems validate these appalling characteristics. 59  A
September 1997 report by the Fund for Modem Courts found that New
York "Family Court judges were overburdened and were forced to
provide 'assembly-line' justice because they had only a few minutes to
review each case."60 A similar report concerning the Massachusetts
family court system found it to be in need of a serious overhaul. 61
In sum, the outlook for Andrew and Brenda is dismal. They and their
mother are in need of assistance. Yet, the systems designed and
57. See Buss, Parents' Rights, supra note 11, at 434-35; see also Appell, supra note 30, at 602
(lamenting the high caseloads of judges and concluding that "ineffective gatekeeping creates a
vicious circle - by keeping caseloads high, the system forecloses its ability to provide meaningful
assessment and review of whether families should be in or out").
58. Buss, Parents' Rights, supra note 11, at 439.
59. See generally Walter, supra note 3, at 51 (stating, for example, that "[a] recent study
concluded that California's juvenile courts do not comply with the national resource guidelines
on judicial caseloads articulated by the National Center for State Courts") (footnote omitted)
(quoting CENTER FOR CHILDREN & THE COURTS, JUDICIAL COUNCIL OF CALIFORNIA, COURT
PROFILES, prepared for Beyond the Bench IX (1998)). Moreover, "California juvenile court case-
processing times do not adhere to statutory timelines." Id. (footnote omitted) (quoting NATIONAL
CENTER FOR STATE COURTS, CALIFORNIA COURT IMPROVEMENT PROJECT 23-25 (1997)).
60. John Sullivan, Chief Judge Announces Plans to Streamline Family Court, N.Y. TIMES,
Feb. 25, 1998, at 7 (quoting report by the Fund for Modem Courts). As an example, the report
looked to Brooklyn, New York, where it found that a case received four minutes of the judge's
attention on the first appearance and eleven minutes on subsequent occasions. See id; see also
Jennifer Warren, System Overload: Rise in Abuse, Neglect Results in a Sputtering Juvenile Court,
L.A. TIMES, Dec. 27, 1987, at AI (quoting a deputy district attorney explaining why there is very
little time that can be allocated to each case); Weber, supra note 40, at Al (describing one
juvenile court in the Los Angeles area as chaotic and disorderly and quoting a judge who
acknowledged that he often has just minutes to decide a case). These problems are long-standing.
In his 1975 article, Professor Mnookin described a study conducted by himself and Professor
Michael Wald whereby they reviewed juvenile court cases in two counties. In approximately
two-thirds of the cases, hearings took two minutes or less. See Robert H. Mnookin, Child-
Custody Adjudication: Judicial Functions in the Face of Indeterminacy, 39 LAW & CONTEMP.
PROBS. 226, 274 (Summer 1975).
61. Among the problems cited were the poor condition of the courthouse, backlogs in cases,
scheduling problems, antiquated rules, too few judges and support staff, insufficient court
security, and outmoded phone and communication systems. See MASSACHUSETrTS BAR ASS'N,
REPORT OF THE FAMILY LAW SECTION COMMITTEE ON THE CRISIS IN THE PROBATE AND
FAMILY COURT 2 (1997); Family Court's Troubles Shock Authors of Study, AP, June 5, 1997,
available at LEXIS, Nexis Library, AP File (discussing Report of the Family Law Section
Council).
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established to render this aid are unable to assist all of the children and
families who are in need.62 In an effort to ensure that the individual
needs of each child are addressed, Congress mandated that each child be
provided with a representative. 63 As will be examined next, however,
the provision of representation has not always accomplished this goal.
D. Poor, if Any, Representation
Numerous scholars and studies have documented a multitude of
systemic problems affecting the provision of competent representation
to children who are involved in child protection proceedings. 64
Although the concerns have been characterized in various ways by
different commentators, the problems can be separated into two
categories. 65  The first set of issues involves the lack of sufficient
resources available to support competent representation, while the
second involves the lack of guidance available to representatives as to
what role they should play.6 6  Both, especially the latter, result in
representation that is often haphazard and biased.
1. Inadequate Resources and Support for Representation
With regard to the provision of representation, it is first necessary to
determine what is currently occurring at the state level. A relatively
recent report on the effectiveness of representation pursuant to CAPTA
revealed that while all states currently have statutory provisions that
provide for representation, in actuality, the states have not been meeting
their obligations to provide representation in an appropriate manner, if
62. See Walter, supra note 3, at 5 1.
63. See supra notes 3-5 and accompanying text (explaining the requirement for GAL
representation of each child and the role of the GAL by 45 C.F.R. § 5103).
64. See, e.g, ADMINISTRATION FOR CHILDREN, YOUTH AND FAMILIES, U.S. DEP'T OF
HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., NATIONAL EVALUATION OF THE IMPACT OF GUARDIANS AD LITEM
IN CHILD ABUSE OR NEGLECT JUDICIAL PROCEEDINGS: EXECUTIVE SUMMARY (1988)
[hereinafter NATIONAL EVALUATION]; FINAL REPORT, supra note 12; NATIONAL STUDY, supra
note 12; Shepherd & England, supra note 1, at 1919-32; Special Issue, supra note 8.
65. See Shepherd & England, supra note 1, at 1925. These commentators explain that
"[r]esearchers have identified both systemic and individual attorney problems that have
contributed to the poor representation of children." Id. While there is little doubt that problems
concerning individual attorneys occur, many of these concerns are similar to those regarding poor
representation in any context, and are therefore beyond the scope of this article. To the extent
that the problems of individual attorneys reflect larger systemic concerns (i.e., lack of time to
conduct adequate investigations, including contacting the child client, and lack of specialized
training), they will be addressed as part of my discussion of systemic problems.
66. See infra Part II.D.1-2; see also Heartz, supra note 4, at 328 (finding that "[t]he funding
and definitional deficiencies that plagued the early implementation of the CAPTA guardian ad
litem requirement still exist, and independent representation for abused and neglected children
remains inconsistent and inadequate").
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at all. 67  "In eight states, the appointment of a representative is
discretionary or required only in some cases, resulting in a substantial
number of abused and neglected children in these states not being
represented.- 68  In many other states, although a representative is
required by state statute, children are forced to participate in court
proceedings without representation. 69
In those states where a representative is appointed, the qualifications,
training, and support of the representatives vary greatly from state to
state, and even among counties within a state. For example, only about
half of the states mandate that all children receive representation by
attorneys. 70  Where representation is not required to be by attorneys, it
may be provided by paid or volunteer lay advocates, or by a
combination of different types of representation, including some
representation by attorneys. 71
The most prominent of the lay advocacy programs is the CASA
program, which currently operates in some form in every state by
volunteer participants. 72  The provision of representation by CASAs -
67. See FINAL REPORT, supra note 12, at xix (calling for additional resources to implement the
GAL requirement in CAPTA).
68. NATIONAL STUDY, supra note 12, at 9. Specifically, in Texas, Indiana, and Delaware, the
appointment of a representative is at the discretion of the court. See id. In Colorado, the
appointment of a representative is required in abuse, but not neglect, matters. See id. Georgia,
Louisiana, and Wisconsin require appointment only in termination of parental rights cases. See
id. Finally, in Arkansas, appointment is mandated only when custody is at issue. See id.; see also
Shepherd & England, supra note 1, at 1921 (discussing the NATIONAL STUDY).
69. See NATIONAL STUDY, supra note 12, at 9-16, 41 (1990). "All abused and neglected
children are not being represented in 26 states. In nine of these states, more than 90 percent of
children are represented and the children who do not receive representation are concentrated in
small rural areas that have small caseloads." Id. at 14. However,
[e]ight states have more widespread difficulties in providing representation....
Florida where only 49 percent of children receive a GAL, Nevada with 32 percent
representation, and Delaware with 22 percent were the lowest in the nation on this
measure . . . . In the five remaining states where representation is low - California,
Idaho, Indiana, Louisiana, and Oregon - lack of representation is widespread
throughout the state.
Id.
70. See NATIONAL STUDY, supra note 12, at 17 (concluding that 23 states mandate
representation by an attorney); PETERS, supra note 8, app. B at 253 (finding that 26 states require
legal representation). Differences in findings may be attributable to the different time periods in
which the studies were conducted or to variations between actual practice and statutory mandates.
Findings from the National Study also revealed that in another 23 states, whether the
representation was provided by an attorney or a lay advocate was left to the discretion of the
presiding judge. See NATIONAL STUDY, supra note 12, at 17.
71. See NATIONAL STUDY, supra note 12, at 18-23.
72. See Heartz, supra note 4, at 328. Most of these programs are members of the National
Court Appointed Special Advocates Association, a national organization that provides training
and technical assistance. See id. The first CASA program began in Seattle, Washington in 1977.
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who typically only handle one case at a time, are motivated, and well-
trained - has been found by some researchers to be effective, especially
in the tasks of investigation and monitoring.7 3 However, such positive
reports should be tempered by significant concerns regarding the ability
of CASAs to effectively participate in "courtroom activities."
74
While it may seem that those states that provide attorneys to all
children involved in child protection proceedings are fully complying
with their obligations under CAPTA, a closer examination reveals
otherwise. Many states that provide attorneys as representatives fail to
provide a sufficient amount of resources to the appointment of these
legal representatives. 75  The result of this deficiency in funding is
inadequately trained lawyers76 who are either poorly paid,77 forced to
Following its success, programs were developed in Arizona, California, Florida, New York, and
Rhode Island. See id. at 337. The National Court Appointed Special Advocates Association was
created in 1982 and incorporated in 1984. See id. For a full exploration of the history of the
CASA program, see Adams, supra note 4, at 1467; Heartz, supra note 4, at 336-47. For a more
detailed discussion of the use of CASAs as representatives, see infra Part VII.D.
73. See NATIONAL EVALUATION, supra note 64, at 13-19; Donald N. Duquette & Sarah H.
Ramsey, Representation of Children in Child Abuse and Neglect Cases: An Empirical Look at
What Constitutes Effective Representation, 20 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 341, 389 (1987). For a
fuller discussion of the strengths of CASA programs, see infra Part VII.D.
74. See FINAL REPORT, supra note 12, at xviii, 6-2, 6-11, 6-15. For an analysis of the
effectiveness of representation by CASAs, as well as a critique of some of the national studies
reviewing the effectiveness of various forms of representation, see infra Part VII.D.
75. See Heartz, supra note 4, at 328; Shepherd & England, supra note 1, at 1925. While a
severe lack of resources and training are largely responsible for the poor representation of
children, other factors also play a role. These variables may include the appointment of different
attorneys for the same child at different hearings, delays in the appointment of a representative,
unrealistic expectations of what is entailed in the representation of a child in an abuse or neglect
matter, and a sense of passivity on the part of the representatives. See Shepherd & England,
supra note 1, at 1925.
76. See FINAL REPORT, supra note 12, at xviii-xix (calling for the need for more focused
training); NATIONAL EVALUATION, supra note 64, at 19-20 (remarking that "law school does
little to prepare attorneys for the GAL role"); NATIONAL STUDY, supra note 12, at xviii (calling
for the need for more training); A JUDGE'S GUIDE, supra note 45, at I (maintaining that many
lawyers have not had any formal or adequate training); Duquette & Ramsey, supra note 73, at
351 (explaining that "few lawyers have had any special training or expertise in representing
children"); William A. Kell, Voices Lost and Found: Training Ethical Lawyers for Children, 73
IND. L.J. 635, 640 (1998) (remarking that law schools do not "adequately prepare" law students
to handle cases involving children); Kelly & Ramsey, supra note 6, at 451, 454 (finding that most
attorneys do not receive any specialized training and remarking on the need for increased
training); Janet Weinstein, And Never the Twain Shall Meet: The Best Interests of Children and
the Adversary System, 52 U. MIAMI L. REV. 79, 105-06 (1997) (analogizing juvenile court to a
"training ground for public sector attorneys" (footnote omitted)).
77. See NATIONAL STUDY, supra note 12, at 14 (reviewing the low levels of compensation of
representatives for children); A JUDGE'S GUIDE, supra note 45, at 1 (documenting the fact that
attorneys for children receive low levels of compensation as well as delays in receiving such
compensation); PETERS, supra note 8, at 32 n.18 (discussing the problem of inadequate
compensation); Kelly & Ramsey, supra note 6, at 452 (surveying lawyers and finding that 68% of
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handle voluminous caseloads,78 or both.79 Consequently, attorneys
appointed to represent children in child protection proceedings are often
unable to spend the time necessary to adequately investigate cases,
develop relationships with their child clients, monitor court orders, and
generally perform their responsibilities in an ethical and competent
manner.
80
those surveyed did not feel that they were adequately paid for the time spent on their cases);
William Wesley Patton, California Dependency Cases or The Answer to the Riddle of the
Dependency Sphinx, I J. CTR. FOR CHILDREN & CTs. 21, 31 (1999) (concluding that "in
California, most children's attorneys receive neither adequate compensation nor any payment for
work accomplished outside the courtroom" (footnote omitted)).
78. See FINAL REPORT, supra note 12, at 4-7 (studying and reporting on workloads of
representatives for children); A JUDGE'S GUIDE, supra note 45, at 1, 67-68 (finding some
jurisdictions to have "inordinately high" caseloads); NATIONAL EVALUATION, supra note 64, at 7
(surveying judges and state attorneys and reporting that these respondents felt that caseloads of
some attorneys were too high and that this situation interfered with attorneys' "ability to spend
sufficient time on the case[s]"); NATIONAL STUDY, supra note 12, at 35 (reporting on the high
caseload levels of different representatives); see also Shepherd & England, supra note 1, at 1924-
25 (discussing the findings of the National Evaluation, the National Study, the Final Report, and a
study conducted by Professors Kelly and Ramsey).
79. Those localities that appoint legal representatives tend to do so in accordance with one of
two models. Some adhere to a staff attorney model where a state or county contracts with a local
legal aid or public defender's office to provide representation. Others appoint private attorneys
and pay them on a per case basis. See A JUDGE'S GUIDE, supra note 45, at 66. The former
model is often characterized by high caseloads, while attorneys in the latter model complain of
low pay, delays in payment, and caps on the amount of compensation that can be received on any
given case. Both models, in different ways, create great disincentives, if not outright obstacles, to
a lawyer's ability to provide ethical and competent representation.
80. See supra notes 67-79 and accompanying text. A recent essay by a member of California
Youth Connection ("CYC"), a foster youth advocacy organization comprised of foster youth
throughout California, summarized the "top five desires" of a group of CYC members for their
court appointed attorneys as:
1. foster youth want to be treated as paying clients rather than as another number
2. foster youth want attorneys to explain what the judges are saying during court
3. foster youth want to be contacted a week before their court appointments
4. foster youth want more face-to-face and telephone communication with their
attorneys
5. foster youth want to be involved in training attorneys about the foster care system
Johnny Madrid, My Court Experience, 1 J. CTR. FOR CHILDREN & CTS. at 3, 4-5 (1999).
Unfortunately, deficiencies in the legal representation of children have been longstanding. A
study conducted in the early 1980s in North Carolina of the legal representation of children
"concluded that the attorneys were not only ineffective but even tended to substantially delay a
child's return home." Shepherd & England, supra note 1, at 1925 (citing to Kelly & Ramsey,
supra note 6, at 407); see also Robert F. Kelly & Sarah H. Ramsey, Monitoring Attorney
Performance and Evaluating Program Outcomes: A Case Study of Attorneys for Abused and
Neglected Children, 40 RUTGERS L. REV. 1217, 1240-44 (1988) (reviewing a study of the
representation of children in New York from the early 1980s and finding the performance of
attorneys and the systems that provide the attorneys to be "flawed" and the lawyers who represent
children to not be very effective).
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2. Lack of Guidance 81
Compounding the lack of adequate support for representation is the
fact that representatives face great confusion over the nature of their
role in child protection proceedings. 82  Over the years, various
commentators have attempted to define the role of the representative
with respect to attorneys representing children. 83  No clear consensus,
however, has prevailed, and the impact of this confusion on the quality
of representation is a source of enormous concern. 84 In sum, advocates
have had very little guidance in determining what their roles and
responsibilities should be, creating a situation of haphazard
representation. 85  This section details the sources of some of the
confusion.
81. Many scholars have written on the past and current confusion concerning the role of the
child's representative. However, I am especially grateful to Professor Jean Koh Peters for her
clear and extensive analysis of the current situation, most notably her statutory analysis of all
United States jurisdictions. See PETERS, supra note 8, at 24-33, app. B. at 253. While my
discussion reviews various writings, I have opted to loosely follow Professor Peters' outline
found on pages 23-39 of her book, see id., as it is the clearest and most logical way to understand
current and past thinking on the role of the child's representative.
82. See Working Group on the Allocation of Decision Making, Report of the Working Group
on the Allocation of Decision Making, 64 FORDHAM L. REV. 1325, 1331 (1996); see also Buss,
Developmental Barriers, supra note 11, at 900 (explaining that there is no "clear consensus about
the role that lawyers should assume"); Green & Dohrn, supra note 8, at 1282 (analyzing a
hypothetical child protection case and describing seven different ways that a lawyer in the
hypothetical scenario might act); Haralambie, supra note 8, at 944 (noting that "[t]he duties of
attorneys representing children are not adequately addressed by existing ethical rules, standards,
statutes, and case law"); Ramsey, supra note 6, at 289-90 (finding that there are no clear
expectations for a GAL); Shepherd & England, supra note 1, at 1925, 1933 (maintaining that
there is a "lack of clarity concerning the lawyer's role" and that neither CAPTA nor state statutes
have helped to define the role of the GAL).
83. See supra notes 6, 8, 9, 11 and accompanying text (listing references to literature
concerning the role of the attorney representing children).
84. See Shepherd & England, supra note 1, at 1925-26 (maintaining that a "lack of clarity
concerning the lawyer's role" was partially responsible for unfavorable evaluations of legal
representatives for children) (citing to Kelly & Ramsey, supra note 6, at 415-16, 451 for their
conclusion that confusion over one's role was a significant contributor to poor representation).
85. See HARALAMBIE, supra note 1, at 25-26 (finding that lawyers are left on their own to
determine how to represent children); PETERS, supra note 8, at 38 (describing the decision of
what role to play as "confus[ing]"); Buss, Children's Misperceptions, supra note 11, at 1719
(explaining that lawyers bring their own "predilections to bear" on the determination of what role
to assume); Guggenheim, Matter of Ethics, supra note 11, at 1488 (reviewing PETERS, supra note
8) (lamenting that lawyers have been "remarkably free-or remarkably burdened-to figure...
out for themselves" how to represent children in child protective proceedings).
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a. Confusion in State Statutes
With relatively no direction provided by the language or legislative
history of CAPTA,86 each state developed its own (and in many regards
idiosyncratic) model of practice. 87  In fact, the current state of affairs
can best be described as nothing short of "chaotic." 88 This disarray can
be attributed to each state's unique customs and "politics," 89 fiscal
concerns, 90 "confusion in terminology," 91 differences in the state's
definitions of the representatives' roles and responsibilities, 92 and great
discrepancies between statutory mandates and what occurs in reality.93
86. See supra notes 2, 3, 5 and accompanying text (introducing and describing the history of
CAPTA).
87. A recent and comprehensive survey of the fifty states and other U.S. jurisdictions by
Professor Jean Koh Peters "revealed fifty-six [different] state systems for representing children in
child-protective proceedings." PETERS, supra note 8, at 26; see also id. at 24-33, app. B at 253
(presenting the comprehensive survey); Guggenheim, Reconsidering the Need, supra note 11, at
305-07 (expressing concern about the lack of meaningful guidance from legislatures and courts in
determining the role of the child's representative); Heartz, supra note 4, at 333 (discussing the
"variation among the fifty states in the implementation of the GAL requirement"); Ramsey, supra
note 6, at 289-90 (maintaining that most state statutes do not assist in defining the role of the
child's representative); Angela D. Lurie, Note, Representing The Child-Client: Kids Are People
Too: An Analysis of the Role of Legal Counsel to a Minor, 11 N.Y. L. SCH. J. HUM. RTS. 205,
216-20 (1994) (reviewing state statutes in New York and Montana and finding them to be
unclear).
88. See PETERS, supra note 8, at 26 (describing lawyering for children as being in a state of
"chaos," "deffying] routinization," and "actively breed[ing] disorder and confusion); Catherine
M. Brooks, When a Child Needs a Lawyer, 23 CREIGHTON L. REV. 757, 759 (1990) (maintaining
that questions concerning the role of the lawyer are answered by looking to "the philosophy of the
local forum, the appointing judge, the guardian ad litem, the maturity, verbal and social skills and
confidence of the child-client and the alleged facts which bring the case to court"); Marvin R.
Ventrell, Rights & Duties: An Overview of the Attorney-Child Client Relationship, 26 LOY. U.
CHI. L.J. 259, 278 (1995) (explaining that deciding how to represent a child is a complex process
which often depends on "the jurisdiction; the type of proceeding; the particular appointment; and
the maturity of the client").
89. See PETERS, supra note 8, at 30 (attributing "individual state's practice and politics" as a
reason why the states' models differ from one another).
90. See id. at 32 (concluding that the high cost of providing lawyers leads some states to favor
programs that provide alternative means of representation).
91. See id. at 31.
A central cause of the confusion and inability to make meaningful generalizations
about the national trends in representation of children is the problem of terminology.
Lawyers for children in the various states are called counsel, guardians ad litem,
attorneys guardian ad litem, law guardians, attorneys ad litem, and a number of other
terms.... The central term, guardian ad litem appears to have no commonly accepted
definition.
Id. at 31 n.17.
92. For example, "[diespite the pervasive appearance of the words 'interest' and 'best
interests' both the statutes and our interviews showed absolutely no consensus about what it
means to represent a child's best interests or interest." Id. at 32.
93. See id. app. B at 253 (individual discussion sections for each state).
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The last factor may be due to differing interpretations of state mandates
by counties, other localities, courts, or individual representatives, or by
a combination of some or all of these factors.
94
b. Unhelpful Ethical Rules
A likely place for children's representatives to turn for direction, at
least for those representatives who are lawyers, is to the legal
profession's ethical regulations. However, a strong consensus of
academics and practitioners agree that these rules provide little, if any,
assistance. 95 The ABA's Model Rules of Professional Conduct, which
have been adopted in whole or in part in most states, are almost entirely
[E]ven though forty-six states use the term guardian ad litem, the essence of the role of
the guardian ad litem is unclear. Nothing guarantees that a guardian ad litem in one
state would play the same role as a guardian ad litem in the next state or even that two
guardians ad litem in the same state but different counties would play the roles
similarly. Frankly, there is not even a guarantee that the same guardian ad litem would
represent two similarly situated children similarly!
Id. at 32 n. 17.
In a similar vein, it is significant to note that even literal readings of some state statutes can
cause confusion. See id. at 31 n.17 (explaining that some state statutes use contradictory
terminology within the same statute when defining the role of the representative (i.e., describing
the obligation to "advocate" as well as to "protect the best interest of the child")); Haralambie,
supra note 8, at 941 (concluding that "courts and legislatures... have often required attorneys to
assume dual and potentially inconsistent roles").
As a further example, recent amendments to California's Welfare and Institutions Code
§ 317(e) mandate that:
in any case in which the minor is four years of age or older, counsel shall interview the
minor to determine the minor's wishes and to assess the minor's well-being, and shall
advise the court of the minor's wishes. Counsel for the minor shall not advocate for
the return of the minor if, to the best of his or her knowledge, that return conflicts with
the protection and safety of the minor.
CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 317(e) (West 2000). Not only does this statute confuse the role of
advocate and protector but it likely violates an attorney's obligations under Model Rules 1.2 and
1.14. For a critique of section 317(e) and a full exploration of its problems, see Patton, supra
note 77, at 21, and William Wesley Patton, Children's Counsel as Advocates and Guardians Ad
Litem, 2 U.C. DAVIS J. OF JUv. L. & POL'Y 16 (1997).
94. See individual discussion sections for each state in Appendix B of PETERS, supra note 8,
app. B at 253; see also Heartz, supra note 4, at 333 (discussing the National Study and noting
wide variations in how the role of the GAL is determined "even within a single state, with
adjoining counties often having different methods of representation").
95. See Annette R. Appell, Decontextualizing the Child Client: The Efficacy of the Attorney-
Client Model for Very Young Children, 64 FORDHAM L. REV. 1955, 1959-60 (1996) (maintaining
that our ethical regulations fail to provide guidance); Buss, Children's Misperceptions, supra note
11, at 1718-19 (concluding that Model Rule 1.14 raises more questions than it answers); Green &
Dohrn, supra note 8, at 1288-89 (stating that current ethical guidelines may provide "incomplete
or inappropriate answers to important questions about how lawyers properly should serve
children"); see also PETERS, supra note 8, at 36 n.21 (containing a list of additional articles
finding Model Rule 1.14 to be inadequate).
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concerned with the representation of adult clients.96 The one rule which
specifically addresses the concerns of representing children, or others
with "impaired decision making capabilities," Model Rule 1.14,
provides little guidance on the question of when a client should be
deemed to be "impaired" ("unimpaired" children are generally subject
to the same rules as competent adults) and what role should be taken by
the representative once this determination is made. 98
In treating the client's status as a minority as a form of disability,
Model Rule 1.14 is a continuation of the approach taken by Ethical
Consideration 7-12 of the ABA's Model Code of Professional
Responsibility, the predecessor set of ethical rules.99 Model Rule 1.14
96. See Green & Dohrn, supra note 8, at 1289 (explaining that "[o]ne difficulty in applying
the general principles is that representing children differs from representing other clients");
Guggenheim, Paradigm, supra note 11, at 1400-01 (finding that our ethical rules primarily
concern the representation of adult clients); Haralambie, supra note 8, at 944 (maintaining that
"[t]he existing ethical rules were not drafted with child advocacy in mind").
97. MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.14 (1992). Model Rule 1.14, Client
with a Disability, provides:
(a) When a client's ability to make adequately considered decisions in connection with
the representation is impaired whether because of minority, mental disability or for
some other reason, the lawyer shall as far as reasonably possible, maintain a normal
client-lawyer relationship with the client.
(b) A lawyer make seek the appointment of a guardian or take other protective action
with respect to a client only when the lawyer reasonably believes that the client cannot
act in the client's own interest.
Id.
98. See Buss, Children's Misperceptions, supra note 11, at 1718-19 (asserting that Model
Rule 1.14 does not answer the question of "[w]hen and how is a child's decision-making capacity
'impaired' by minority?"). Rather than refer to young children as "impaired," Professor Appell
uses the term "precapacitated" to acknowledge the fact that children, unlike many incapacitated
adult clients, never had capacity, but hopefully will in the future. See Appell, supra note 95, at
1957 & n.6. I agree with Professor Appell's concerns and prefer the term she uses. However,
because the Model Rules and most commentators refer to young children as "impaired," for ease
of reference, I will continue to use this notation.
99. See MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY EC 7-12 (1980), which provides:
Any mental or physical condition of a client that renders him incapable of making a
considered judgment on his own behalf casts additional responsibilities upon his
lawyer. Where an incompetent is acting through a guardian or other legal
representative, a lawyer must look to such representative for those decisions that are
normally the prerogative of the client to make. If a client under disability has no legal
representative, his lawyer may be compelled in court proceedings to make decisions on
behalf of his client. If the client is capable of understanding the matter in question or
of contributing to the advancement of his interests, regardless of whether he is legally
disqualified from performing certain acts, the lawyer should obtain from him all
possible aid. If the disability of a client and the lack of a legal representative compel
the lawyer to make decisions for his client, the lawyer should consider all
circumstances then prevailing and act with care to safeguard and advance the interests
of his client. But obviously a lawyer cannot perform any act or make any decision
which the law requires his client to perform or make either acting for himself if
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emphasizes the need for an attorney to "as far as reasonably possible,
maintain a normal client-lawyer relationship."' °°  Only when the client
is found to be unable to act in his own interest may the attorney "seek
the appointment of a guardian or take other protective action."10'
However, Model Rule 1.14 and its accompanying comments provide
very little guidance as to when an attorney should take such "protective
action" (i.e., find a client to be "impaired") and what process an
attorney should adopt to make this determination. 10 2 Additionally, once
a client is found to be "impaired," Model Rule 1.14 fails to explain how
an attorney should decide what "protective action" to take. 10
3
c. Disagreement Within Scholarly Literature
The scholarly literature also provides little guidance to assist lawyers
in clarifying what role they should play when representing a child
client. 10 4 Among scholars, the determination of what role a legal
competent or by a duly constituted representative if legally incompetent.
Id. Because the Model Rule has been adopted in a majority of states, I will limit my analysis to
Model Rule 1.14. However, it is significant to note that like Model Rule 1.14, EC 7-12 allows an
attorney for a client with a disability to make decisions on behalf of the client. See PETERS, supra
note 8, at 37; Appell, supra note 95, at 1960. In fact, EC 7-12 more directly authorizes such
actions. See PETERS, supra note 8, at 37 (discussing EC 7-12). However, unlike Model Rule
1.14, EC 7-12 recommends that the attorney "obtain all possible aid from the client." Id. For a
more in-depth comparison of Model Rule 1.14 and EC 7-12, see id.
100. MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.14(a) (1992).
101. Id. at Rule 1.14(b).
102. See Ramsey, supra note 6, at 304-05 (describing the ethical rules as "silent about what
standard should be used to judge the client's decision-making abilities").
103. See Robyn-Marie Lyon, Comment, Speaking for a Child: The Role of Independent
Counsel for Minors, 75 CAL. L. REV. 681, 693 (1987) (concluding that the Model Rules fail to
"provide any useful guidance for what is to be done when it is not possible to maintain a normal
lawyer-client relationship").
It has even been suggested by one commentator that where a lawyer takes on a full GAL role,
the lawyer could be found to have violated Model Rule 1.14. See Jean Koh Peters, The Roles and
Content of Best Interests in Client-Directed Lawyering for Children in Child Protective
Proceedings, 64 FORDHAM L. REV. 1505, 1522-23 (1996) (questioning whether Model Rule
1.14(b), which permits a lawyer to "seek appointment of a guardian or take 'other protective
action,"' was meant to be interpreted so broadly that it included determining a client's best
interests and advocating for the same).
104. See PETERS, supra note 8, at 41-43. "Although many commentators have attempted to
prescribe the role of the child's representative, little consensus exists regarding the
responsibilities and duties of the child's representative or regarding what constitutes effective
representation of children.". Duquette & Ramsey, supra note 73, at 347-48.
As a way of explaining the role of the representative, several commentators have focused on the
potential duties that a representative may be required to perform. For example, in 1976, Brian G.
Fraser, in one of the first, if not the first, explanation of the purposes and goals of the GAL,
described four roles: (1) investigator; (2) advocate; (3) counsel; and (4) guardian. See Brian G.
Fraser, Independent Representation for the Abused and Neglected Child: The Guardian Ad Litem,
13 CAL. W. L. REV. 16, 33-34 (1976). In 1980, a conference was sponsored by the National
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representative for a child should play has evolved into a vigorous, and
often heated, debate over whether the legal representative should
represent the child's best interests or advocate for the child's wishes as
an attorney would do when representing an adult.'015 Under the best
interests approach, the child's wishes are usually one among many
factors that the attorney would consider in determining what is best for
the child. 1°6 Whereas, under the traditional attorney model, the legal
Legal Resource Center for Child Advocacy. See Howard A. Davidson, Foreword to NATIONAL
GUARDIAN AD LITEM POLICY CONFERENCE MANUAL (ABA rev. ed. 1981) (on file with author).
A summary of this conference contains a "partial" list of 26 different duties for which the GAL is
responsible. See Howard A. Davidson, Final Report: National Guardian Ad Litem Policy
Conference, in NATIONAL GUARDIAN AD LITEM POLICY CONFERENCE MANUAL (ABA rev. ed.
1981) (on file with author). In 1990, an expert in the field of child advocacy described the
following five major roles: (1) fact finder-investigator; (2) legal representative; (3) case monitor;
(4) mediator-conciliator; and (5) information and resource broker. See DONALD DUQUETTE,
ADVOCATING FOR THE CHILD IN PROTECTION PROCEEDINGS: A HANDBOOK FOR LAWYERS AND
COURT APPOINTED SPECIAL ADVOCATES 35 (1990). The Final Report adopted these five roles.
See FINAL REPORT, supra note 12. Also in 1990, Tara Lea Muhlhauser characterized the role of
the representative as that of investigator, champion, and monitor and stressed the importance of
the representative simultaneously pursuing all three roles. See Tara Lea Muhlhauser, From
"Best" To "Better": The Interests of Children and the Role of a Guardian Ad Litem, 66 N.D. L.
REV. 633, 638 (1990).
However, a mere description of the various responsibilities of a representative does not provide
much, if any, guidance as to how one interacts with one's clients and with the other parties in the
proceeding, what positions, if any, the representative should take, and how one resolves several
difficult ethical dilemmas. In fact, such a listing of duties tends to exacerbate the confusion rather
than alleviate it.
105. See PETERS, supra note 8, at 41 (declaring that the debate has become polarizing); Buss,
Children's Misperceptions, supra note 11, at 1700-02 (describing the disagreement about the
"proper role for a lawyer to assume" as a struggle that classically comes down to a choice
between 'best interest' and 'expressed interest' representation); Shepherd & England, supra note
1, at 1933 (citing to an "ongoing debate" in the legal profession); Weinstein, supra note 76, at
134 (finding that "[l]awyers and academicians have spent a great deal of time debating the role of
the child's attorney" at the expense of the needs of the children).
It also is important to acknowledge that some scholars advocate for a hybrid role. See, e.g.,
Duquette & Ramsey, supra note 73, at 352-53; Haralambie, supra note 8, at 953-54. But see
Buss, Children's Misperceptions, supra note 11, at 1702 & n.6 (contending that the hybrid model
is really the GAL model because it allows for substitution of judgment).
106. Commentators who support the best interests model, which at times is viewed
synonymously with the term GAL and called the GAL approach, believe that most children are
without the requisite maturity, capacity, or judgment to be able to make important decisions on
their own behalf. See DUQUETrE, supra note 104, at 150 (proposing that for children under
fourteen years of age, the representative should "make a determination as to the best interests of
the child regardless of whether that determination reflects the wishes of the child"); Fraser, supra
note 104, at 30 (describing one of the roles of the GAL as a protector of the child's interests);
Muhlhauser, supra note 104, at 642 (maintaining that one of the roles of the GAL is to examine
the "better interests" of the child, acknowledging that there may be more than one good option);
Weinstein, supra note 76, at 135 (citing to a moral obligation to protect children); Albert E.
Hartmann, Note, Crafting an Advocate for a Child: In Support of Legislation Redefining the Role
of the Guardian Ad Litem in Michigan Child Abuse and Neglect Cases, 31 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM
Loyola University Chicago Law Journal
representative attempts to represent the child in a manner similar to that
of an adult client, with the same ethical obligations that representatives
have when representing adult clients. 10 7  Accordingly, directions
concerning the objectives of the representation and significant decisions
are left up to the child client, as they would be with an adult client.
10 8
237, 239 (1997) (recommending a legislative proposal that calls for representatives to utilize the
best interests approach, but to also state the child's wishes if the child has articulated any). While
not advocating for such an approach, Professor Buss has clearly explained and summarized this
approach:
Those who advocate the GAL approach argue that children lack the maturity of
judgment, even the cognitive capacity for decision making, necessary to assess
appropriately their own interests, particularly their long-term interests. Even to the
extent children's judgment is no worse than that of adults, proponents of the GAL
approach would argue that society has a greater obligation to protect children from
their own bad judgments. Moreover, children are under tremendous pressure to
misidentify and/or misarticulate their own interests - pressure from their families, from
the court process, and from the circumstances leading to the court process.
Buss, Children's Misperceptions, supra note 11, at 1702-03 (footnotes omitted). Most
proponents of this model also consider it important - and part of the representative's role - to
ensure that the court has all available and relevant information before any decision is rendered.
See Fraser, supra note 104, at 33 (explaining that along with the responsibility to protect the
child's interest, the GAL must "ferret out all of the relevant facts ... [and] insure that all the
relevant facts ... [and] available options" are before the court); Muhlhauser, supra note 104, at
641-42 (describing the GAL's role as someone who "provide[s] information to the court,
explore[s] options or alternatives, and... negotiate[s] with and among the systems or institutions
having an interest in the case").
107. Practitioners and scholars preferring the traditional attorney or expressed wishes model
assert that the child either has a right to have her position heard and represented to the judge like
any other party, or at the very least, that important issues are better decided if the child's wishes
are made known to the court. See Buss, Children's Misperceptions, supra note 11, at 1703-05
(describing the traditional attorney approach); see also Ventrell, supra note 88, at 260 (asserting
that "the law supports a modern concept of zealous child advocacy" where attorneys advocate for
"the interests of child clients, just as they would the interests of adult clients"); Shannan L.
Wilber, Independent Counsel for Children, 27 FAM. L.Q. 349, 354-57 (1993) (arguing for the
child's representative to advocate for the child's wishes and point of view if the client is able to
articulate a reasoned preference).
Expressed wishes advocates argue that not only is giving the child a voice empowering to the
child, but "lawyers who practice under the traditional attorney model are inspired by the
considerable wisdom of children, whose judgment about their best interests often proves at least
as sound as that of the adults who have substituted their own judgment." Buss, Children's
Misperceptions, supra note 11, at 1704 (articulating one of the justifications for the expressed
wishes model); see also Ramsey, supra note 6, at 297 (arguing that representing a child's wishes
"might result in wiser decisions"); Catherine Ross, From Vulnerability to Voice: Appointing
Counsel for Children in Civil Litigation, 64 FORDHAM L. REv. 1571, 1583 (1996) (noting that
"[m]ore is at stake than simply communicating the child's preference").
Additionally, these advocates believe that a child will more readily go along with a decision,
even if he does not agree with it, if he feels that he had a say in how it was determined. See Ross,
supra at 1619; see also Wilber, supra, at 355 (proclaiming that "[i]f the child perceives that
someone is on his side and the court has considered his views, even an unsatisfactory result will
be easier to accept").
108. See Green & Dohrn, supra note 8, at 1295; Marvin Ventrell, The Child's Attorney:
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Additionally, as with an adult client, the attorney must preserve
confidences, keep the child informed, maintain undivided loyalty to the
child, and conduct himself in accordance with the norms of competent
representation. °9 As the debate has evolved, a consensus of scholars
and practitioners has expressed a preference for the traditional attorney
model. l0
Nevertheless, neither approach is without problems, and neither
works well for children of all ages." '1 It is difficult, if not impossible, to
represent the wishes of a child who is too young to communicate
verbally."12  Likewise, it is extremely hard not to advocate for the
wishes of a teenager who certainly is mature enough to have a voice and
an opinion on important matters in his life." 3 For these reasons, there
are few scholars who steadfastly and rigidly adhere to one approach or
the other. In sum, the discussion often boils down to the questions of
when is a child capable of directing the objectives of the representation,
Understanding the Role of Zealous Advocate, 17 FAM. ADVOC. 73, 74 (1995) (discussing the
need for attorneys to represent their child clients just as they would represent an adult client).
109. See Green & Dohrn, supra note 8, at 1294-95; Ventrell, supra note 108, at 74-75.
Although one's ethical obligations may be clearer under the traditional attorney model, they are
by no means easily discernible. As a thorough reading of the Fordham recommendations and
ensuing articles and responses reveals, many ethical dilemmas remain. For example, questions
regarding the attorney's obligations to preserve the child's confidences may be difficult,
especially when not revealing the confidences may mean that the child is likely to be in danger.
110. See Green & Dohrn, supra note 8, at 1294-95 (1996); Proceedings of the Conference on
Ethical Issues in the Legal Representation of Children, Recommendation of the Conference, 64
FORDHAM L. REV. 1301 (1996) [hereinafter Recommendation].
111. See PETERS, supra note 8, at 40 (explaining that "the line between these two positions is
in no way hard and fast"); Buss, Children's Misperceptions, supra note 11, at 1705; Buss,
Developmental Barriers, supra note 11, at 903 (noting here as in her earlier work that few take an
"absolutist" position).
112. See PETERS, supra note 8, at 40 (concluding that "[a]lmost all those who focus on wishes
acknowledge that children below a certain age or competence must be represented in a way that
differs from the traditional representation of an adult"); Buss, Children's Misperceptions, supra
note 11, at 1705 (explaining "that those advocating the traditional attorney approach necessarily
exclude children too young to speak, and most require that the children be old enough to engage
in a rationale decision-making process about the particular issue in question"); Buss,
Developmental Barriers, supra note 11, at 903 (remarking that the "traditional attorney model
assumes... that the child is old enough to communicate a position"); Lyon, supra note 103, at
692 (arguing that "[t]he possibility that the child may not be able to express a clear, uninfluenced
and competent opinion complicates the task of representing the child-client wishes").
113. See PETERS, supra note 8, at 40 (stating that "[clurrently, I would be hard-pressed to
identify anyone who still advocates the 'pure best interests point of view' or the 'pure wishes
point of view'); Buss, Children's Misperceptions, supra note 11, at 1705 (explaining that even
"[tlhose advocating the guardian ad litem role.., generally still concede that at some age ...
children should be able to direct their counsel .... ); Buss, Developmental Barriers, supra note
11, at 903 (noting that "proponents of the GAL model generally recognize that, at some age,
children become developmentally indistinguishable from adults in all relevant respects").
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and what role the attorney should play for the child who lacks this
capacity.114 The remainder of this paper primarily focuses on this latter
issue.
III. CONCERNS REGARDING THE REPRESENTATION OF YOUNG CHILDREN
AND PROPOSALS TO ELIMINATE OR LIMIT SUCH REPRESENTATION
A. Concerns About the "Best Interests" Approach - Unfettered
Discretion and the Possibility of Attorney Bias
The "best interests" model has been the approach predominantly
relied upon by attorneys when representing young children. 115 Yet,
many have expressed concern about legal representatives who represent
a child's best interests according to what the attorney deems best (often
and inevitably based upon the legal representative's values and life
experiences, albeit unwittingly at times) and the haphazard
representation that ensues. At the Fordham Conference in 1995, the
participants determined that "lawyers for children currently exercise too
much discretion in making decisions on behalf of their clients." 116 They
were concerned that this discretion could lead to situations where two
different, equally well-intentioned, legal representatives, in nearly
identical situations, might advocate for different, even contradictory,
results.11 7 While the conferees were concerned about the representation
114. Professor Katherine Hunt Federle would not agree with this statement. As one of the
most prominent spokespersons for the importance of empowering children, Professor Federle
believes one should not analyze the role of the attorney in terms of the capacity of the child. See
Katherine Hunt Federle, The Ethics of Empowerment: Rethinking the Role of Lawyers in
Interviewing and Counseling the Child Client, 64 FORDHAM L. REV. 1655, 1696 (1996); see also
Katherine Hunt Federle, The Abolition of the Juvenile Court: A Proposal for the Preservation of
Children's Legal Rights, 16 J. CONTEMP. L. 23 (1990); Katherine Hunt Federle, The Child As a
Client, 15 GP SOLO & SMALL FIRM LAW. 22 (Oct./Nov. 1998); Katherine Hunt Federle,
Constructing Rights for Children: An Introduction, 27 FAM. L.Q. 301 (1993); Katherine Hunt
Federle, Looking Ahead: An Empowerment Perspective on the Rights of Children, 68 TEMPLE L.
REV. 1585 (1995); Katherine Hunt Federle, Looking For Rights in All the Wrong Places:
Resolving Custody Disputes in Divorce Proceedings, 15 CARDOZO L. REV. 1523 (1994);
Katherine Hunt Federle, On the Road to Reconceiving Rights for Children: A Postfeminist
Analysis of the Capacity Principle, 42 DEPAUL L. REV. 983 (1993); Katherine Hunt Federle,
Overcoming the Adult-Child Dyad: A Methodology for Interviewing and Counseling the Juvenile
Client in Delinquency Cases, 26 J. FAM. L. 545 (1987-88); Katherine Hunt Federle, Rights Flow
Downhill, 2 INT'L J. CHILDREN'S RIGHTS 343 (1994).
115. It is significant to note that many state statutes require that representatives follow the best
interests approach in their representation of all children. For analyses of the roles of
representatives for children in every state, the District of Columbia, and U.S. territories see
PETERS, supra note 8, app. B at 255-479 (excerpting statutes and providing discussion explaining
the practice in each jurisdiction).
116. Recommendation, supra note 110, at 1309.
117. Green & Dohrn, supra note 8, at 1286-90; see also Guggenheim, Paradigm, supra note
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of children of all ages, they were most concerned about young children,
especially those who are not yet verbal. With regard to these children,
the conferees felt that because the children were so young, and therefore
had only a limited range and number of life experiences, there was very
little about the child's life that could be useful in advising the lawyer as
to the child's goals and objectives. 18 The situation is only made more
difficult by the fact that there are few, if any, helpful professional norms
or standards that a legal representative can look to for guidance in
determining what would be in the best interests of a particular child."19
One might ask what is so alarming about well-meaning attorneys
making decisions on behalf of children who have come before the
juvenile court because the family that was supposed to love, protect, and
care for them has failed in its responsibility in some way. The answer is
complex, but essentially can be reduced to two related worries, both of
which emphasize a serious concern that the decisions being made are
biased and do not reflect the children's lives. First, there is unease
caused by the fact that these determinations are beyond the scope of a
legal representative's expertise and therefore may require attorneys to
make decisions that they are not well-suited to make. 20 Second, there
is concern that the determinations that legal representatives are making
may not be what is best for the children. 121 Very few lawyers have had
any significant training in law school, or elsewhere, on how to represent
a child client. 122 Nor have they had training in representing clients from
cultural and socioeconomic backgrounds that are different from their
own. 123 Lessons in child development; child psychology; recognizing,
11, at 1414-15; Guggenheim, Reconsidering the Need, supra note 11, at 312-19; Peters, supra
note 103, at 1527.
118. See Green & Dohrn, supra note 8, at 1290.
With a young child, no lifetime footprints guide the lawyer about the person's intent or
wishes or nature. Consequently, the discretion accorded the lawyer or guardian ad
litem for a preverbal child is unparalleled in scope. The opportunity, indeed
inevitability, of bias and personal value-determined judgments in such a situation,
including the class, race, ethnic, and religious assumptions that underlie notions of
child rearing and family life is vast and undisclosed.
Id.
119. See supra notes 82-114 and accompanying text (discussing the lack of guidance
regarding the role of the child's representative).
120. See Peters, supra note 103, at 1525-27.
121. See id.
122. See id. at 1525-26; see also Green & Dohm, supra note 8, at 1286-87; supra note 76 and
accompanying text (explaining how lawyers for children are often not well-trained); infra notes
307-13 and accompanying text (recommending comprehensive and mandatory training programs
for all participants in the child protective system).
123. See Peters, supra note 103, at 1525; see also Earlene Boggett, Cross-Cultural Legal
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understanding, and working with clients from different racial, ethnic,
and class backgrounds; and interviewing, counseling, and interacting
with a child client are seldom, if ever, a central part of law school
curricula, nor are they often, if ever, a legislatively mandated
prerequisite for being appointed as a legal representative for a child. 124
The inevitable result is that many lawyers are likely to arrive at
decisions and advocate for positions on behalf of their child clients that
are invariably based on what they believe to be best, based on the only
value system they know, their own. Not only is there a significant
chance that these decisions and ensuing positions may be against the
best interests of the individual child, who is likely of a different race,
ethnicity, and/or class than the legal representative, 125 but it also leads
to a system where the position taken by a child's attorney may largely
be based, not on what would be best for the individual child with unique
needs and values, but rather on the arbitrary chance of who was
appointed to represent the particular child. 126
Additional concerns about legal representatives who undertake the
best interests approach center around the fact that the role of the child in
the process is often minimized. 127  At worst, it has led to situations
where representatives do not even deem it necessary to meet with their
child clients. 128 More frequently, it has led to a greatly reduced role for
Counseling, 18 CREIGHTON L. REV. 1475, 1497 (1985) (arguing that law schools need to enhance
their curricular offerings to include courses in cross-cultural legal counseling); Gerald P. Lopez,
Training Future Lawyers to Work With the Politically and Socially Subordinated: Anti-Generic
Legal Education, 91 W. VA. L. REV. 305, 343, 305-58 (1989) (asserting that legal education
teaches law students to "approach practice as if all people and all social life are homogeneous").
124. See Peters, supra note 103, at 1525. But see infra Part VII.D for a discussion of the
mandatory training requirements imposed upon CASA representatives by many CASA programs,
including training on cultural awareness.
125. See supra note 34 (discussing the common ethnic, class and race distinctions between the
child clients and the legal representatives).
126. See Recommendation, supra note 110, at 1309 ("References to the lawyer's own
childhood, stereotypical views of clients whose backgrounds differ from the lawyer's and the
lawyer's lay understanding of child development and children's needs should be considered
highly suspect."); see also Guggenheim, Paradigm, supra note 11, at 1415 (declaring that
"[s]imilar cases will be decided differently merely because assignment of a different lawyer").
127. See INGER J. SAGATUN & LEONARD P. EDWARDS, CHILD ABUSE AND THE LEGAL
SYSTEM 50-52 (1995); Peters, supra note 103, at 1523.
128. See FINAL REPORT, supra note 12, at xv (stating that "[allmost 30 percent of private
attorneys had no type of contact with their [child] clients, followed by 17.4 percent of staff
attorneys and 8.9 percent of CASAs. One possible explanation for these high percentages is the
perception among GALs that contact with abused/neglected infants and toddlers is not applicable
to investigating and preparing for their cases."); Peters, supra note 103, at 1523 (describing some
"extreme" situations where lawyers have represented children without meeting them) (footnote
omitted); Shepherd & England, supra note 1, at 1929 (finding that many attorneys have "no
contact or limited contact with their child clients"). Many states now specifically require by
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the child, such that the child's wishes are not made known to the court
and the child has very little, if any, understanding of the court process,
his role in it, and what it means to his life. 129
In sum, there has been widespread dissatisfaction with a best interests
approach that, to a large degree, leaves the determination of what is best
for their child clients to the discretion of the legal representatives.
Inadequate resources, time, training, and awareness of developmental
and cultural differences have served only to increase this discontent and
to cause growing and serious concerns about both the lack of uniformity
in role and potential bias in decision-making. While these concerns
have caused many students of child advocacy to favor an approach
where legal representatives act as much as possible as traditional
counsel in accordance with standard ethical norms, this clearly does not
solve the problem for all children, either because of diminished capacity
or prevailing state statutes that call for a best interests approach to be
taken.
B. Recent Proposals Addressing the Role of the Attorney for Young
Children
Considering the serious concerns about the role of legal
representatives for young children, the quality of representation in
general, and the limited resources available for social and judicial
services for children and families, it is not surprising that some child
advocacy scholars have taken to rethinking issues regarding the
appropriate role of legal representatives for young children and, in fact,
whether an attorney is even appropriate and/or necessary. The most
prominent and vocal of these scholars is Professor Martin Guggenheim,
whose writings over the past fifteen years, most notably over the last
four, have focused on the dual questions of whether and when
representation is needed for young children in child protection
proceedings. 130  Specifically, Professor Guggenheim has opined that
lawyers for young children are not needed or, at the very least, lawyers
statute that representatives meet with the children they are appointed to represent. See PETERS,
supra note 8, app. B at 253. According to Professor Peters' statutory excerpts and statutory
analyses, those states are California (four years of age or older), Colorado, Hawaii, Illinois, Iowa,
Kansas, Maine, Minnesota, Montana, Nebraska, Texas (four years of age or older), Utah, and
Wisconsin.
129. See Buss, Children's Misperceptions, supra note 11, at 1712 (discussing the importance
of children understanding the legal processes and the attorney's and child's roles in those
processes).
130. See generally supra note II (discussing Professor Guggenheim's work).
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should not advocate for any position in these proceedings. 13 1 Professor
Emily Buss also has recommended that legal representatives of young
children decline to take positions, although she clearly finds attorneys
necessary and enunciates an alternative role for them - that of
"educators" and enforcers of "statutory fidelit[ies].' 32
1. Professor Guggenheim's Paradigm
Professor Guggenheim proposes that the proper analysis for
ascertaining the role of the attorney for a young child involves an
assessment of the intended scope and purpose of the representation.
133
He begins his analysis by explaining how the role of counsel for adults
is based on the "central principle" of "individual autonomy."'134 In other
words, "[u]nimpaired adults have the inherent power to make all the
important decisions concerning their lives."'135  Therefore, consistent
with a lawyer's ethical code, "lawyers for adults are obliged to 'abide
by the client's decisions concerning the objectives of representation'
and to use their skill to achieve the objectives sought by the client."' 136
Professor Guggenheim then contrasts the inherent power of adults
with the limitations on young children's ability to exercise power and,
therefore, to assert their rights to autonomy. 137  Because of these
differences, he concludes that the law "treats children differently than
adults in many ways," and, as a result, the role of counsel may be
different. 138 Because he finds the right of autonomy to be at the heart of
an adult's right to direct the representation, Professor Guggenheim
asserts that the same analysis must be applied to the determination of
the appropriate role of counsel for children. One must determine
"whether law or policy empowers, or refuses to empower children with
a prominent role in deciding their own future."' 1
39
131. See Guggenheim, Paradigm, supra note 11, at 1431; Guggenheim, Reconsidering the
Need, supra note 11, at 351; Guggenheim, Reflections, supra note 11, at 77.
132. Buss, Developmental Barriers, supra note 11, at 955-60 (discussing "the lawyer as
teacher").
133. Guggenheim, Paradigm, supra note 11, at 1408-09, 1412-17.
134. See id. at 1405-06; Guggenheim, Reconsidering the Need, supra note 11, at 321
(explaining that "[tihe ethic of self-determination remains the touchstone of most forms of
lawyer-client relationships") (quoting Frank P. Cervone & Linda M. Mauro, Ethics, Cultures and
Professions in the Representation of Children, 64 FORDHAM L. REV. 1975, 1985 (1996)).
135. Guggenheim, Paradigm, supra note 11, at 1405.
136. Id. (quoting MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.14 (1992)).
137. See id. at 1405-21.
138. Id. at 1407-08.
139. Id. at 1408.
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In discussing the autonomy rights of children, Professor Guggenheim
distinguishes between inherent autonomy rights and autonomy rights
based upon the law of a particular subject area.1'4 With respect to the
inherent autonomy rights of children, Professor Guggenheim looks to
the Model Rules of Professional Conduct and concludes that if a child
can be found to be "unimpaired," as defined by the Model Rules, then,
like an adult, he presumably is of a sufficient state of mind to make
decisions and determine the objectives of his case. 14 1  Although
Professor Guggenheim specifically states that it is beyond the scope of
his examination to address the question of how a child is determined to
be "impaired,"' 142 he defines young children as "children so young that
they cannot articulate their preferences to counsel (e.g., newborns to
children ages two or three) and children who, though old enough to
communicate, would be considered to be 'impaired,' within the
meaning of Rule 1.14 of the Model Rules of Professional Conduct."' 143
Significantly, Professor Guggenheim also recommends that attorneys
err on the side of finding children impaired. 144 Professor Guggenheim's
views on the issue are perhaps most apparent when one looks to the
AAML standards for custody and visitation proceedings, which he co-
140. See id. In order to more easily understand Professor Guggenheim's analysis, he has
devised a two-part inquiry. First, one should question if the child is:
of sufficient age, intelligence, and maturity to be 'unimpaired' as defined by the Model
Rules[.] If the answer is 'yes,' the inquiry should cease. In these circumstances,
children are empowered by established principles to set the objectives of the litigation.
If the answer is 'no,' then it is necessary to continue the inquiry by examining whether
and to what degree children are supposed to have autonomy rights in the particular
subject matter under consideration.
Id. at 1409.
Professor Guggenheim acknowledges that this inquiry is a departure from his earlier analysis.
See id. at 1421 n.69. In 1984, Professor Guggenheim concluded that, because attorneys for
seven-year-old children in delinquency matters must abide by their child clients' wishes, they
must do the same in child protection proceedings. See Guggenheim, Reflections, supra note 11,
at 90-91. In reaching this conclusion, Professor Guggenheim compared delinquency cases to
child protection matters and found many similarities, most notably the fact that both types of
proceedings can result in a child being removed from the care of his parents. See id. at 92.
Interestingly, he also found support for the assertion that the causes of delinquency and child
maltreatment, and thus the need for a child to be removed from his home, were often identical.
Hence, he argued that it would not be proper to base the determination of whether a child is given
the right to direct counsel on the arbitrary decision by the state of whether to proceed with the
prosecution of a delinquency or a neglect petition. See id.
141. See Guggenheim, Paradigm, supra note 11, at 1399. Professor Guggenheim finds that
unimpaired "children enjoy the identical right to the kind of counsel as adults." Id. at 1408.
142. See id. at 1402 n.14.
143. Id. at 1399.
144. See id. at 1402 n.14, 1412 n.43.
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authored. Under these standards, a child is presumed to be impaired
until the age of twelve. 1
45
If a child is found to be impaired, and therefore not to have any
inherent autonomy rights, then a lawyer must "examine the relevant
legislation and case law in the particular subject area."' 146 If these legal
sources confer autonomy rights on the child, then the lawyer must let
the child direct the representation. 147  If not, the lawyer must limit her
representation to advancing the child's rights "as the legislature and
case law have articulated them."
148
As an example of a circumstance where a child would be found to
have autonomy rights based upon substantive law, Professor
Guggenheim describes the hypothetical situation of an eleven-year-old
girl seeking permission from a judge to terminate her pregnancy.149 The
prevailing law in the jurisdiction described by Professor Guggenheim
states that a minor must have the written consent of one of her parents
or an adult family member, or a judicial waiver, in order to undergo an
abortion.15 ° A judge must grant such a waiver if the minor is found to
be "'mature and well-informed enough to make the abortion decision on
her own' or if the judge finds that the abortion is in [the minor's] best
interests." '  In this situation, Professor Guggenheim believes that
whether the child is found to be unimpaired or impaired, a lawyer
representing the child must zealously advocate for what the child
145. See AAML STANDARDS, supra note 11, at 9 (Principle 2.2 states that "[tihere is a
rebuttable presumption that children age twelve and above are unimpaired. There is a rebuttable
presumption that children below the age of twelve are impaired.").
146. Guggenheim, Paradigm, supra note 11, at 1421.
147. See id. at 1412 (stating that "[wihere the legislature wants a child's own views to be an
important factor in the decision-making process, the child's views should become prominent.").
148. Id. at 1416. Professor Guggenheim acknowledges that the Model Rules do not limit an
attorney who has been appointed to represent an impaired child in this way. See id. at 1414. In
fact, he notes that the Model Rules explicitly allow lawyers to assume the role of guardian, and as
such, to choose the best position for the child. See id. However, Professor Guggenheim calls
upon all lawyers for young children to "eschew this alternative." See id. His views are based
upon his concerns regarding the lack of uniformity in the role of the lawyer and his fears that the
choices lawyers will make will be based on their own values and backgrounds, rather than those
of the children. See id. at 1414-15 (arguing that our system works best when the instances of a
randomly chosen adult making decisions for another person are limited). Professor Guggenheim
states that "[s]imilar cases will be decided differently merely because of assignment of a different
lawyer. Some lawyers will end up seeking diametrically opposed results in indistinguishable
cases. The only differences in these cases frequently will be the personalities, values, and
opinions of the randomly chosen lawyers." Id. at 1415.
149. See id. at 1417-20.
150. See id. at 1417.
151. Id.
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wants. 152 He arrives at this conclusion because he finds that the child in
this situation is "empowered" to set the objectives of her case "because
she possesses a substantive constitutional right to do so."
153
Professor Guggenheim distinguishes this situation from a child's
rights in the adjudicatory phase of a child protection proceeding, where
he finds the proceeding to "have virtually nothing to do with
empowering children."' 154 He, therefore, concludes that the appropriate
role of a lawyer for an impaired child "throughout the fact-finding stage
of a child protective proceeding is to attempt, in the most objective way,
to aggressively enforce the law as it was written by the legislature and
interpreted by the courts. 155 According to Professor Guggenheim, if
lawyers for young children take any position at adjudicatory hearings,
they "should insist that children not be removed from the parents'
custody until a court has determined, based on reliable evidence, that
there are statutory grounds for removal."' 156 Given this limited role, he
ultimately concludes that, in many cases, lawyers for young children are
not needed at all.157
Whether Professor Guggenheim advocates for the complete removal
of the attorney from the court process, or merely a limited role, is
152. See id. at 1418.
153. Professor Guggenheim states that, "[t]he substantive law of abortion is that all pregnant
minors - both 'impaired' and 'unimpaired' - have the right to ask a judge to allow them to abort
the fetus they are carrying." Id. at 1418-19.
154. Id. at 1428. Professor Guggenheim asserts that, "[c]hildren have no more right to insist
that the state intervene to protect them from inadequate parents than to insist that the state stay out
of their lives." Id.
155. Id. at 1431. It is significant to note that Professor Guggenheim's analysis in 1996 was
limited to adjudicatory hearings. However, Professor Guggenheim does suggest, in some of his
other writings, that once a child is found to be in need of the court's assistance (i.e., there has
been a positive determination of parental unfitness), there may be some justification for the
appointment of counsel. For example, in his article in the Loyola University Chicago Law
Journal, he mentions that "some situations may still justify the appointment of an attorney" and
elaborates in a footnote that one of these situations would be where a child becomes a ward of the
state and enters the foster care system. Guggenheim, Reconsidering the Need, supra note 11, at
351 & n.200. Similarly, in 1984, he briefly noted that the role of counsel is altered once a finding
of neglect against the parents is made. See Guggenheim, Reflections, supra note 11, at 142-43.
156. Guggenheim, Paradigm, supra note 11, at 1431. Professor Guggenheim finds support
for this assertion in the writings of Joseph Goldstein, Anna Freud, and Albert Solnit. See id. at
1407. These authors defer to parental autonomy and do not advocate appointing a legal
representative for the child until a "ground for intervention" has been established at an
adjudicatory hearing. See JOSEPH GOLDSTEIN, ET AL., BEYOND THE BEST INTERESTS OF THE
CHILD 11 1-12 (1973); see also Guggenheim, Reconsidering the Need, supra note 11, at 344.
157. See Guggenheim, Reconsidering the Need, supra note 11, at 351 ("Once attorneys for
impaired children stop advocating an outcome, they become a type of procedural grease,
principally concerned with making sure that the child receives all the appropriate procedural
protection.").
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ambiguous. Professor Guggenheim was perhaps clearest in his views
on the appropriate role for counsel in 1984, when he directed attorneys
"not [to] participate in any aspect of a neglect proceeding until the child
has been judicially declared to be neglected."'158  In 1996, Professor
Guggenheim did not directly suggest that lawyers should not
participate. Instead, he proposed that their role be limited to that of
"law enforcers."' 159  However, because he focused only on the
adjudicatory phase, he emphasized the need to enforce the law that
states that children should not be removed from their parents' care until
the parents have been found to be unfit.16°  In 1998, Professor
Guggenheim once again advised attorneys to refuse to take any position,
but also stated that at adjudicatory hearings, "[o]nce attorneys [for
children] stop advocating an outcome," the functions they serve "could
just as effectively [be] safeguard[ed]" by the judge and the other parties
in the matter. 161 Whatever his exact recommendation may be, Professor
Guggenheim clearly advocates for substantially limiting the role of the
attorney. In all phases of a child protection proceeding, he would limit
the role of the attorney for young children to, at most, ensuring that
statutory mandates are enforced. At adjudicatory hearings, his
preference appears to be to eliminate the role of the attorney for young
children. 162
158. Guggenheim, Reflections, supra note 11, at 138 (italics omitted).
159. See Guggenheim, Paradigm, supra note 11, at 1431.
160. See id.
161. Guggenheim, Reconsidering the Need, supra note 11, at 351. In 1998, Professor
Guggenheim also asserted that the lawyer should ensure that the court has all the information it
needs to make a well-informed decision. See id. at 348. However, he does not explain whether
an attorney appointed to represent an impaired child should conduct her own factual
investigation, and if so, whether she should include an inquiry as to the child's wishes as part of
this investigation. Moreover, it is not evident from Professor Guggenheim's writings whether he
would include a reporting of the child's wishes as part of any neutral report that an attorney might
make or give to the court in a child protection proceeding. To the extent that Professor
Guggenheim finds it appropriate or necessary for a lawyer for an impaired child to conduct a
factual investigation, it is difficult to comprehend how a lawyer could not help but get involved in
advocacy. Likewise, it is difficult to envision how one enforces statutory mandates in an
objective fashion. For further analysis of these problematic aspects of Professor Guggenheim's
analysis, see infra Part III.B. (discussing the inevitability that lawyers will exercise some
discretion).
162. The fact that Professor Guggenheim argues for such a limited role at the adjudicatory
stage takes on an even greater significance when one considers that only a small percentage of
cases filed with the juvenile court are actually dismissed at the adjudicatory phase. See Buss,
Developmental Barriers, supra note 11, at 902 (concluding that decisions at adjudicatory hearings
often "mark the first in a long series" of court decisions). As is stated above, in most
substantiated reports of abuse or neglect, it is not necessary to seek the assistance of the court
system. See supra notes 54-55 and accompanying text. In my experience, in those cases where
the agency has found it necessary to seek the aid of the judicial system, there is often little doubt
2000] Young Children in Child Protection Proceedings
2. Professor Buss' Recommendations
Professor Emily Buss shares Professor Guggenheim's concerns about
the potential influence of attorney bias in determining what is best for
their young child clients. 163 She also has concerns about the ability of
children, with the exception of older children, to meaningfully
participate in attorney-client relationships in accordance with a more
traditional attorney model. She therefore recommends that attorneys for
children be prohibited from taking any positions in litigation until the
children are developmentally capable of understanding the nature of the
proceedings and the significance of their role as decision-maker. 164
Until such time, Professor Buss proposes modifying the traditional
attorney model. 165  She advocates for attorneys to adopt a "teaching
that the family is in need of some form of assistance (although I do not mean to imply that in
order to provide assistance, the children always need to be removed from the care of their parents
and family). Rather, the cases that are brought to the court's attention are usually those where the
child is thought to be in danger or where the child welfare agency finds the parents to be
uncooperative and acting against the interests of the children. Given the likelihood of cases
moving onto the dispositional phase, it is not fair to the child, nor is it efficient, to wait until the
disposition hearing to appoint counsel for the child.
Moreover, because the interests and facts of each stage in a child protection proceeding are so
closely related, it is often impossible to view the proceeding as comprised of separate and distinct
phases. What occurs in one stage can directly affect what occurs in subsequent hearings. For
example, a parent might agree to a finding that she has had difficulty caring for her children in the
past, if all of the parties also agree that the disposition will be to return the children to her care
and for the child welfare agency to provide services to the family. In practice, because the issues
at adjudicatory and disposition hearings are so closely connected, many jurisdictions actually
allow for the two hearings to be merged. For similar reasons, many courts and judges may be
"preoccupied throughout all phases of all proceedings with the 'best interests of the child,' even
when, at a given phase of the proceedings, another standard such as parental fault is controlling."
Peters, supra note 103, at 1515. Finally, Professor Guggenheim's focus on adjudicatory hearings
ignores the fact that emergency removal hearings, where issues of temporary placement are
decided, occur prior to adjudicatory hearings.
163. See Buss, Developmental Barriers, supra note 11, at 960-61. Professor Buss refers to a
representative of a young child as a Guardian Ad Litem or "GAL." This is her way of
distinguishing them from representatives who approach their role as traditional attorneys would.
A GAL generally lacks expertise in assessing how to choose the best among generally
unattractive options for children. The socio-economic gulf between lawyer and client
further undermines the lawyer's ability to make good, generic judgments on her
clients' behalf, and the limited contact she has with any particular client prevents her
from developing any child-specific insights into which plan will best serve her client's
interests.
Id. at 960 (footnotes omitted).
164. See id. at 958-60.
165. See id. at 956.
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approach" as educators 66 and protectors of "statutory fidelit[ies]."167
The overall focus of Professor Buss' analysis is not on whether or
how young children should be represented, but on the questions of
whether and when children are able to be empowered. 168 In answering
these questions, Professor Buss finds it necessary to look to
developmental literature that considers children's socio-cognitive
functioning and development. 169 This literature leads Professor Buss to
the conclusion that, until children are capable of understanding their
sense of themselves and their sense of themselves in relation to others,
they will not be able to be empowered. 170
Professor Buss acknowledges that empowerment is not the only goal
of attorney-child client relationships, but she explains that her concerns
about children's abilities to be empowered extend to all of the other
reasons why legal representatives would seek to engage in traditional
attorney-client relationships with their child clients. 171 Specifically, she
166. Professor Buss envisions that representatives would "approach their representation as a
teaching opportunity-an opportunity to begin to expose a child to what it means to engage in the
decision-making process and take some control ... ." Id. at 956. Professor Buss acknowledges
that her suggestion that legal representatives should educate their clients is not significantly
different from any lawyer's current obligation to keep his clients informed, to take the time to
develop relationships with his clients based on trust and rapport, and to explain the law, legal
processes, and the purposes and outcomes of all legal proceedings and significant occurrences.
See id. at 956-57. In fact, she states that the primary difference between her recommendation and
existing professional responsibilities of attorneys is that the process of education that she is
contemplating "could take years." See id. at 957.
167. See id. at 959.
168. See id. at 896-99. Professor Buss chooses to focus on children's ability to be empowered
because she finds there to be "a growing call for child 'empowerment' among those concerned
with the legal representation of children." Id. at 896. In fact, she states that she used to be "a
long-time advocate of child empowerment." Id. at 897. However, she now fears that those
advocating for child empowerment have failed to consider whether children's immaturity and
lack of familiarity with court processes and lawyers create situations where empowerment is
difficult, if not impossible, for all but older children. See id. at 896-99.
Professor Buss states that her "definition of empowerment derives from [her] interpretation of
both the adult and child empowerment literature .... Id. at 918. Specifically, Professor Buss
defines empowerment with respect to child clients as:
[T]he transformation of the child client's perception of his influence in the litigation
process and the creation of an appetite for the exercise of that influence. The influence
in question has two targets: (1) the process and outcomes of litigation and (2) the
perceptions of the client held by the client and others.
Id. at 917-18.
169. Id. at 921. Professor Buss contrasts this developmental study with previous analyses that
have "focuse[d] almost exclusively on the development of logical reasoning skills - often
generically described as cognitive development - and more specifically on the capacity to engage
in a rational decision-making process." Id. at 904-05.
170. See id. at 921-26.
171. See id. at 951-52.
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states that "[d]isentangling the empowerment goal from other
justifications for the traditional attorney model, we discover that the
same socio-cognitive sources of confusion can undermine these other
justifications as well." 172
Professor Buss understandably is reluctant to cite to an exact point in
time when children might attain this developmental capacity. 173
Nonetheless, she ultimately concludes that it likely would not occur
before children reach "late childhood," a period of time that, for her,
corresponds to the ages of ten to twelve. 174 Moreover, Professor Buss
notes that children who are abused or neglected, or who have been
forced to grow up in other stressful environments, may not develop this
requisite capacity until even later. 75 In sum, what is pertinent to the
inquiry of whether children need representation is that Professor Buss
recommends that lawyers refrain from taking any positions in the
litigation and limit their role to ensuring statutory fidelities until their
child clients are able to understand the nature and impact of their
influence, a point in time that likely would not occur until the child
reaches the age of ten or twelve, if not later.
IV. RESPONSE TO PROPOSALS CALLING FOR THE REDUCTION IN THE
SCOPE OF REPRESENTATION FOR YOUNG CHILDREN
While attempts to reduce discretion and bias in the representation of
young children are extremely important and laudable, limiting the role
of attorney to ensuring statutory fidelities or enforcing statutory
mandates will not substantially accomplish these goals because much
discretion remains in the determination of when a child is impaired and
the meaning and implementation of statutory fidelities or statutory
mandates.
A. Substantial Discretion Remains in the Determination of Whether a
Child is Able to Direct the Objectives of the Representation
Before a decision can be made as to whether an attorney should
assume the role of a traditional attorney or limit her role to enforcer of
statutory mandates or statutory fidelities, the attorney must, as discussed
above, first decide whether or not a child is capable of directing the
objectives of the representation and participating in an attorney-client
relationship. Professors Buss and Guggenheim attempt to offer some
172. Id. at951.
173. See id. at 920, 955.
174. See id. at 951.
175. See id. at918-19, 918 nn.76-77, 929 & nn.109-10.
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guidance on this question. Professor Buss provides an analysis of the
necessary developmental thresholds. Professor Guggenheim offers that
attorneys should err on the side of finding a child to be impaired. In the
end, both suggest that many children will reach significant
developmental hurdles between the ages of ten to twelve. 176
Yet, what is important to highlight is that in making the
determination of when a child is sufficiently mature, an extraordinary
amount of discretion still remains with the legal representative. For
example, Professor Guggenheim claims to be proposing a methodology
for all impaired children. Yet, for all but the youngest of these young
children (e.g., newborns to ages two or three), there may be a question
of whether they are actually impaired. It is highly possible that in the
representation of Andrew and Brenda one conscientious lawyer might
find the children to be unimpaired, while an equally well-meaning
attorney might reach the opposite conclusion. Professor Buss, in an
earlier work, examines the likelihood of this occurring:
[E]ach lawyer will bring her own predilections to bear - predilections
about children's needs and abilities, about the legal process, and about
the lawyer's place in the process. And it is these predilections, rather
than the Rule itself, that will determine what model of representation
the lawyer will assume. A lawyer predisposed to depart from the
normal client-lawyer relationship in the representation of children will
conclude that the differences in children's developmental and life
experience make such a relationship impossible. A lawyer
predisposed, on the other hand, to maintain the normal client-lawyer
relationship in her representation of children will conclude that,
despite some differences in children's development and experience,
the relationship can nevertheless reasonably be maintained. 177
The outcome of this exercise of discretion will have a tremendous
impact on every aspect of the lawyering that follows. In the case of
Andrew and Brenda, it is not likely that either Professor Guggenheim or
Professor Buss would find Andrew and Brenda able to maintain a
traditional attorney-client relationship. However, considering their ages
and their potential maturity levels, it is highly plausible that other
scholars and practitioners might disagree. 178 In particular, it may have
176. See supra notes 144-45, 173-75 and accompanying text.
177. Buss, Children's Misperceptions, supra note 11, at 1719.
178. Several scholars have posited the age of seven as a significant developmental threshold
and the point at which a child is capable of making decisions and rational thought. See, e.g.,
Ramsey, supra note 6, at 310-19. "Many-seven year-old children can consider cause and effect,
can use information, can reason about alternatives, and can communicate the decision reached."
Id. at 314; see also Haralambie & Glaser, supra note 15, at 60-61 (citing Lois Weithom,
Involving Children in Decisions Affecting Their Own Welfare, in CHILDREN'S COMPETENCE TO
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significant consequences on the positions advocated by the attorneys for
the children, including positions affecting where the children will be
placed and what services will be provided to the children and to their
mother. For example, if their attorney finds them to be sufficiently
mature, she would advocate at the shelter care hearing for the children's
desire to be placed with Ms. Jones pending the adjudicatory hearing. In
doing so, she would inform the court of Ms. Jones' presence, her bond
with the children, her availability and suitability to care for the children,
at least temporarily, and the children's wishes to be placed with her.
On the other hand, if the legal representative finds the children to be
too young, Professors Guggenheim and Buss would have the attorney
limit her representation to enforcing statutory mandates or statutory
fidelities. Depending on how one defines statutory mandates or
statutory fidelities, and what a lawyer is permitted to do with respect to
enforcing such mandates, this difference may prove substantial. 7 9 If
the legal representative does not interpret statutory mandates to allow or
require a placement with Ms. Jones, then the lawyer would be silent on
this issue, which likely would result in the children remaining separated
and in foster care. Statutes, especially at this early stage, seldom direct
or provide guidance as to how determinations of where children should
be placed are made. At most, they might identify the types of
placements that could be considered. 180 Hence, the discretion exercised
in making the decision about when children are too young to direct their
CONSENT 246 (1983) (concluding that many seven-year-olds "may have reasonable preferences
and ideas about what happens to them")). Some legislatures have even determined that four-year-
olds are sufficiently mature as to warrant mandating their lawyers to interview them. See Patton,
supra note 77, at 29 (reporting that in California "4-year-old children are presumptively
determined capable of expressing their desires because both attorneys and social workers are
mandated to interview them").
179. It is likely that none of the other parties will bring the existence of Ms. Jones to the
judge's attention as placement with her is against the rules and policies of the child welfare
agency and Ms. Smith is not present.
180. See, e.g., MD. CODE ANN., CTS. & JUD. PROC. § 3-815(h)(1)(iii) (1999). "If the child is
alleged to be in need of assistance ... , he may be placed in shelter care facilities maintained or
approved by the Social Services Administration, or the Department of Juvenile Justice, or in a
private home or shelter care facility approved by the court." Id.
Some lawyers might interpret statutory mandates or fidelities more broadly or loosely to
encompass either advocating for a particular placement or, at least, bringing information about a
particular placement to the court's attention. If this occurs, it is not clear how this would be
different than advocating a position or how it would substantially reduce discretion. For further
analysis of the difficulty of determining statutory mandates or fidelities and distinguishing
between enforcing statutory mandates or fidelities and advocating for a position, see infra Part
1V.B.
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representation can have enormous implications on the lives of the
children in child protection proceedings. 81
This brief hypothetical circumstance also illustrates how difficult it is
to define what constitutes a statutory mandate and what is the
appropriate role for the lawyers in enforcing these mandates. It is to
this discussion that we now turn our attention.
B. Enforcing "Statutory Mandates" or "Statutory Fidelities" Requires
the Exercise of Discretion
Under Professor Guggenheim's analysis, if the lawyer for the young
child determines that her child client is impaired, then the attorney must
define her role and responsibilities by the legal interests that are
mandated by statute or case law, and the only appropriate role for the
lawyer of an impaired child is to "aggressively enforce the law as it was
written by the legislature and interpreted by the courts." 182 Professor
Buss argues that representatives for young children should "limit [their]
advocacy to ensuring statutory fidelities." 183 It is not clear to this writer
whether these two recommendations are the same, or what exactly they
mean. However, assuming they are similar, two concerns exist, both of
which limit the likelihood that discretion and bias will be substantially
reduced. First, it will be difficult to identify the relevant legal interests.
181. While there is little, if any, research that analyzes the significance of these early
emergency removal hearings, it is unquestionably a critical and traumatic time for the children
involved. Given children's different sense of time (e.g., three weeks for a child can seem like an
eternity), as well as the fact that, like Andrew and Brenda, many of these children likely just
experienced an episode of abuse or neglect, the decision of where they should spend the next few
weeks, if not months, is of the utmost importance and has the potential to have long-standing
ramifications for them, their families, and even the course of the court proceeding. For an
analysis of children's sense of time see GOLDSTEIN, supra note 156, at 40-43.
Until such a point that the case is dismissed or the court has found that the children are in need
of the court's assistance (a finding that is made at the conclusion of the adjudicatory hearing) and
has made a formal disposition, there will continue to be a need to determine the temporary
custody and placement of the children. Accordingly, if the adjudicatory hearing is continued, if it
is begun, but cannot be completed in one day or in one sitting, or if the disposition hearing takes
place at a separate and different time from the adjudicatory hearing, there will be a need for
subsequent shelter care hearings. See Kiernan, supra note 34, at 10 (observing juvenile court
practice and declaring that "[tihe decision made during a temporary custody hearing is crucial
because it can mark the beginning of a long, painful odyssey. For the first of what may be many
times, the judge must predict whether a child will be safe."). Moreover, judges are more likely to
continue early custodial decisions than they are to change them. See Peggy Cooper Davis &
Gautam Barua, Custodial Choices for Children at Risk: Bias, Sequentiality, and the Law, 2
ROUNDTABLE 139, 148-55 (1995) (discussing empirical evidence and research that suggests that
"status quo bias" leads judges to favor maintaining placements made at emergency removal
hearings).
182. Guggenheim, Paradigm, supra note 11, at 1431.
183. Buss, Developmental Barriers, supra note 11, at 959.
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These interests are not always clear and may even be subject to multiple
and conflicting interpretations. 184 Second, even if the interests can be
identified, it is not possible to ensure that these interests can be enforced
without advocating for a position and therefore exercising a substantial
degree of discretion.
Studying Professor Guggenheim's framework illustrates the
difficulty, if not impossibility, of determining the legal interests of a
child in a child protection proceeding. For example, in his analysis of
the adjudicatory phase of a child protection proceeding, Professor
Guggenheim posits that there are two possible interpretations of a
child's legal interests. 185 First, he states that one could "say that
children have a right to live with their parents unless a court finds the
parents unfit."'186 Second, he explains that children also could be found
to "have the right to be separated from their parents whenever their
parents are actually unfit."'' 8 7  Although he acknowledges that there is
"much force to this alternative definition,"'188 Professor Guggenheim
does not find these competing conceptions of a child's legal interests to
be equally compelling. In fact, he disposes of the second interpretation
by stating that "the law prefers nonintervention and presumes that
children are best off remaining in their parents' custody without
coercive assistance." 189  Yet, some might arrive at the opposite
conclusion, while others would find a conflict between two "clearly
defined legal rights" of a child.190 Clearly, there is confusion over what
184. Many have agreed that a lawyer for a young child should attempt to limit the scope of her
representation to the legal interests at hand. See Proposed Standards of Practice for Lawyers
Who Represent Children in Abuse and Neglect Cases, 29 FAM. L. Q. 375, 381 (1995) (examining
Standard B-4(2) which declares that "[to the extent that a child does not or will not express a
preference about particular issues, the child's attorney should determine and advocate the child's
legal interests"); Recommendation, supra note 110, at 1310 (stating that a lawyer must "narrow
the area of inquiry by determining the legal interests of the child"). However, it is not at all clear
that everyone would agree on what constitutes a legal interest. See Appell, supra note 95, at 1963
(concluding that children's legal rights may conflict); Roberts, supra note 29, at 117 (concluding
that "there is no fixed meaning of children's rights in any particular context involving children's
welfare"); Walter, supra note 3, at 47 (describing the "child's interests that are affected by
governmental intrusion in an abuse and neglect case" as the following: "being free from abuse,"
"growing up with their families," obtaining a "swift and legally permanent plan," and "being
informed and having a voice").
185. See Guggenheim, Paradigm, supra note 11, at 1429.
186. Id. at 1429-30.
187. Id. at 1430.
188. Id.
189. Id.
190. See Appell, supra note 95, at 1963. Professor Appell discusses the legal interests of a
child to remain with his parents and of a child to be protected from harmful parents. See id. In
some situations, especially those where it seems clear that the child has suffered harm in the care
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constitutes a child's legal interests and rights at an adjudicatory hearing,
or, if multiple rights are identified, how the differing interests should be
"prioritized" or resolved if in conflict.19'
Assume for the moment that Andrew and Brenda have been
determined to be too young to direct the representation and that their
legal representative is concerned for their safety if they are returned to
the care of their mother. How should the attorney proceed at the
adjudicatory hearing? 92 In other words, which legal interests should
prevail? Should the lawyer assert the children's right to remain with
their mother unless the state can prove unfitness, or should the attorney
assert the children's right to be free from harm? The approach of
Andrew and Brenda's legal representative will be different depending
on how she interprets their legal interests. If the attorney focuses on the
children's right to be with their mother, she will seek to ensure that the
state is forced to prove its case, that all of their mother's defenses are
appropriately and aggressively raised, and that the strong bond between
Andrew and Brenda and their mother is highlighted. On the other hand,
if the legal representative's emphasis is on protecting Andrew and
Brenda from harm, she will be concerned with whether the facts
supporting her concerns regarding past, current, and future harm are
made known to the court by the state child welfare agency. Clearly,
there is tremendous discretion in determining what constitutes the
children's legal interests at the adjudicatory stage.
When one moves to phases other than the adjudicatory stage, the
number of potential legal interests at stake only increases. Thus, a
situation is created where it is either more difficult to determine what
interests should prevail, 193 or where the predominant interest is the best
interests of the children and it is difficult to determine what is best. 194
of his parents, she believes these interests may be in conflict. See id. Thus, in her view, a
paradigm that directs a lawyer to exclusively represent a child's legal interests may be
ambiguous, if not subject to differing, and at times conflicting, interpretations. See id. at 1963-
65. Specifically, she concludes that "a child has the right to remain a part of his or her family of
origin, yet a child also has an interest in being protected from abusive or neglectful parents." Id.
at 1963 (footnotes omitted). Professor Appell also cites to possible confusion when a lawyer
determines that the "child's substantive legal rights may violate the child's less defined
constitutional rights." Id. In this instance, she maintains that Professor Guggenheim's paradigm
could lessen the likelihood that a lawyer will pursue constitutional challenges of state or federal
law. See id.
191. See id. at 1963-65.
192. See id. at 1955 (offering a similar illustration concerning two children, both under the age
of two years).
193. See id. at 1958.
194. See infra notes 245-52 and accompanying text.
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For example, at a disposition hearing, where the focus is on
"planning for the child[ren] and the future of the family,"' 195 the court
must make determinations as to what services are required by the
family, where the children should be placed, what the legal status of the
children should be, and what should be the plan for the future. 196 The
prevailing standard that the court must use in making all of these
decisions is the best interests of the children. 197 Moreover, the goal,
unless formally changed by the court,' 98 is to reunify the family if the
children are placed out of the care of the parents, or to maintain the
family structure if they have not been removed. 199 However, under the
Adoptions and Safe Families Act of 1997 ("ASFA"), if children are
placed out of the care of their parents, child welfare agencies are
permitted, and even encouraged, to pursue "concurrent planning," a
policy whereby the agency simultaneously makes efforts to reunify the
family and to develop an alternative permanency plan if reunification is
unsuccessful.2 °° Once again, multiple legal interests are at stake,
especially for the children who now not only continue to have the right
to be free of harm, but also to have their needs met by the state if they
are placed out of the care of their parents. This includes the need for a
permanent placement if attempts at reunification fail and, regardless of
where they are placed, to have the state provide services to them and
their families to address the cause of maltreatment.
195. HOWZE, supra note 2, at 38.
196. See id.
197. See, e.g., 705 ILL. COMP. STAT. 405/2-27 (West 1998 and Supp. 1998). For an example
of how extensive and difficult a best interests determination can be, see 705 ILL. COMP. STAT.
405/1-3(4.05) (West 1998), which lists an exhaustive set of factors to be considered when making
a best interests determination. See also TEx. FAM. CODE ANN. § 263.307 (West 1996) (outlining
a similar type of assessment); infra notes 245-52 and accompanying text (explaining the
difficulty, if not impossibility, of determining what is best for a child).
198. See 45 C.F.R. § 1356.2 1(b)(3) (2000) (outlining circumstances where reasonable efforts
to prevent a child's removal or to reunify a child with his family are not required); see also supra
note 48.
199. See id. § 1356.2 1(b).
200. See id. § 1356.21(d)(4). Professor William Patton explains how the requirements of
concurrent planning may cause the potential of conflict for a child's representative:
Under concurrent planning, the child's attorney will now be forced at the disposition
hearing and at all future review hearings not only to argue what reunification services
should be provided, but also to advocate his or her client's desire for alternative
permanent placement should parental severance take place. Concurrent planning
changes the context and the tactics of the child's advocate because it functionally
presents a balance of competing parental universes.
Patton, supra note 77, at 34. See also Roberts, supra note 29, at 114 (concluding that the
requirement of concurrent planning creates "conflicting incentives").
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Again, an examination of Andrew and Brenda's situation illustrates
these varying and numerous interests. At a disposition hearing, a legal
representative of Andrew and Brenda who concludes that the children
have a legal interest in being returned to the custody of their mother,
likely would focus on the responsibility of the child welfare agency to
make "reasonable efforts" to reunify the family and the probability that
such efforts, if made in a prompt and appropriate manner, would be
successful. 2 1 However, an attorney who has found that reunification
would not be in the children's best interests likely would not emphasize
the "reasonable efforts" requirement and might even assert that it should
not be required in this instance. Even if "reasonable efforts" were found
to be required, a representative who has come to the conclusion that the
best long-term placement for the children is with Ms. Jones, or at the
very least not with their mother, would stress that under the ASFA, a
parent only has twelve months to make efforts at reunification. 20 2
Likewise, she would carefully monitor the situation so that, at the first
possible moment, she could alert the court that it is time for the
permanency plan to be reviewed. Moreover, she would continuously
stress to the court the importance of the agency licensing Ms. Jones
and/or investigating the out-of-state relatives as to their interest in
caring for Andrew and Brenda.
Even if the determination of what legal interests are at stake is clear,
it is difficult to envision how one ensures that all of these relevant
interests are addressed by the court without the attorney taking or
advocating for a position in some way.20 3 In other words, how does an
attorney play a "watchdog" role without entering into some advocacy-
type role where one position is favored over another? By the very
nature of what the attorney chooses to call to the judge's attention, the
attorney likely is emphasizing a particular point of view. Moreover, it
is unclear whether this new role requires the lawyer to conduct a factual
investigation. If not, it will be difficult for the attorney to know on what
interest and issue the court should be focusing. To the extent that it is
appropriate or necessary for a lawyer to conduct a factual investigation,
however, it is difficult to comprehend how a lawyer could not help but
get involved in advocating for a position.
201. See 45 C.F.R. § 1356.21(b).
202. See id. § 1356.21(b)(2)(i)-(ii); § 1355.20.
203. Professor Buss recognizes that a distinction between asserting that a statutory obligation
has not been fulfilled and taking a position may be very difficult to make and "will prove elusive"
at times. Yet, her only advice on how to distinguish the two is that attorneys should "make clear
to the court when they are acting without the client's direction." Buss, Developmental Barriers,
supra note 11, at 959 n.202.
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In sum, not only is it difficult to determine when a child should be
deemed too young to direct the representation, but what legal interests
or statutory mandates are involved and how they should be enforced
also are seldom clear. Hence, any attorney of a young child who seeks
to enforce such mandates will be forced to use substantial discretion in
interpreting whether a child is impaired, which legal interests are
present, and what will be required to satisfy those interests in a given
proceeding.
V. WHY CHILDREN NEED REPRESENTATION
Even if the proposals made by Professors Guggenheim and Buss are
found to reduce discretion and bias on the part of legal representatives
of young children in child protection proceedings, which I do not
believe they do to a significant degree, they should not be followed
because, in my view, there are compelling reasons why the
representation of young children should not be curtailed or eliminated.
Examining why such representation is needed, as this Part does, is not
only an important inquiry in its own right, but also aids in our
understanding of why their recommendations may be potentially
harmful to the young children who are the subjects of child protection
proceedings.
A. The Presiding Judge Cannot Adequately Protect the Children's
Interests
Professor Guggenheim asserts that young children's interests in child
protection proceedings can be adequately represented by either of the
other two parties (i.e., the parent(s) and the child welfare agency) in the
proceeding or, alternatively, by the presiding judge. 204 In theory, this is
conceivable, as the stated charge of the child welfare agency is to ensure
that children are protected. In addition, the overriding role of the state,
primarily through the court system, is to act in accordance with its
obligations as parens patriae.20 5 In practice, however, this is not
204. See Guggenheim, Reconsidering the Need, supra note 11, at 351; see also Duquette &
Ramsey, supra note 73, at 347 (noting that in the 1980s "some debate still exist[ed] regarding
whether a child need[ed] independent representation" and that "[s]ome writers view[ed] the
child's representative as an extraneous figure" because the other parties or the judge could
adequately protect the child's interests) (footnote omitted).
205. The literal translation of the term parens patriae is "parent of the country." BLACK'S
LAW DICTIONARY 1137 (7th ed. 1999). The term traditionally refers to the role of the state as
sovereign and guardian of persons under legal disabilities. See id. While the role of the state as
parens patriae is an important and controversial function, a full exploration of this duty is beyond
the scope of this article. For a historical analysis of the state's parens patriae function, see
Areen, supra note 31, at 896-917 and Susan B. Hershkowitz, Due Process and the Termination of
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possible.20 6  As one commentator has noted, "[a] judge cannot
simultaneously act as an advocate for the child and as an impartial
arbiter in the case. Nor can a judge independently investigate the
circumstances of a case in order to assist in identifying the child's
interests." 207
Although the prevailing standard, in most phases of child protection
proceedings, is the "best interests" of the child,20 8 without a
representative for the child, a judge will be forced to make this
incredibly difficult and important determination with little, if any,
knowledge of the child's perspective209 and without all of the necessary
information. 210  For example, a judge cannot visit with the child out of
court in a setting that may be more comfortable and natural for the
child. Likewise, a judge is unable to conduct any out of court
interviews with persons who may be able to provide important
information about the child's life experiences and the circumstances that
brought the case to the court's attention. In fact, the only way that a
judge can hear from such persons as family members, teachers, or
therapists is to subpoena them to court and force them to testify in front
of many persons, including attorneys, parents, social workers, and,
potentially, the children. Unfortunately, information obtained in this
manner likely will be different than if the inquiries were made in a more
private setting. 21
1
Moreover, because a judge would not have had the opportunity to
develop the case factually, she might not even know which persons are
necessary to subpoena. For example, in the case of Andrew and
Parental Rights, 19 FAM. L.Q. 245, 249-52 (1985). For an understanding of the doctrine's origin,
see Lawrence B. Custer, The Origins of the Doctrine of Parens Patriae, 27 EMORY L.J. 195
(1978).
206. See Wilber, supra note 107, at 350 (stating that "the traditional role of the court as parens
patriae... has been widely discredited"); see also Walter, supra note 3, at 49 (maintaining that
juvenile courts have not been able to protect the interests of children).
207. Wilber, supra note 107, at 350; see also Haralambie & Glaser, supra note 15, at 92
(explaining that the judge in matrimonial matters is not an investigator and cannot protect the
child); Walter, supra note 3, at 49 (stating that "[a] court's decisions can only be as good as the
information it has before it" and asserting that the information that juvenile court judges typically
receive is incomplete because the flow of information is controlled by the attorneys).
208. See supra notes 2, 197 and accompanying text; infra notes 245-52 and accompanying
text.
209. See PETERS, supra note 8, at 3-9 (setting forth the proposition that one can always learn
information from a child, even from an infant); Peters, supra note 103, at 1515;.
210. "One can question how often, if ever, any judge will have the necessary information."
Mnookin, supra note 60, at 257.
211. It also can put a treating therapist or other professional in awkward positions - positions
that ultimately could damage the treatment process itself. See Peters, supra note 103, at 1529-32.
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Brenda, without a representative for the children, a judge might not
have become aware of the existence of Ms. Jones, especially early in the
proceeding. Nor would the judge necessarily have learned of the extent
of the children's medical and educational needs. 212 As stated above, the
child welfare agency social worker would have been precluded from
discussing Ms. Jones with the judge. It also is questionable whether
either the child welfare agency or the children's mother would have
been inclined to highlight the needs of the children. While most parents
wish for all of their children's medical and educational needs to be met,
many parents in child protection proceedings may be hesitant or afraid
to openly discuss the needs of their children, as doing so might cause
them to publicly air their own perceived failures as parents. 213  Also,
disclosure may be against the parents' own interests. Moreover, if the
agency, through its representatives, displays openly that it is aware of
the children's needs, then it becomes incumbent upon the agency to use
its limited resources to provide services to meet those needs.
In sum, a judge is dependent on information being brought to her.
Although she certainly has some mechanisms at her disposal to augment
the amount of information she receives, and thus to better her
understanding of a case, such efforts are inevitably limited.214 In
actuality, the customary, if not only, persons that a judge will hear from
are the child welfare agency social worker and one or both of the
parents. 215 As will be seen below, however, the interests of both of
these parties often do not coincide with those of the child.
Consequently, without the input and participation of the child, through a
representative, the court will miss critical information. 216 Thus, even
the most conscientious and well-trained judge217 would be unable to
make fully informed determinations that are in the best interests of the
children.218
212. See Walter, supra note 3, at 49.
213. In addition, if a child is placed outside of his home, the parent may not know of the status
of the child's well-being. See id.
214. One of the more comprehensive approaches that a judge can take is to order that the
children and/or the parents receive psychological evaluations. However, at least one scholar has
noted some serious concerns regarding these assessments. See Peters, supra note 103, at 1535.
215. Interviews with judges reveal that they "rel[y] heavily on social workers' reports." Terry
Pristin, Child Courts Struggle in Harsh Environment, L.A. TIMES, Feb. 2, 1998, at 1. Yet, the
quality of these reports "range from the barely adequate to the comprehensive." Id.
216. See Walter, supra note 3, at 49.
217. See infra note 307-13 and accompanying text.
218. See Haralambie, supra note 8, at 985 ("It is only when all parties are represented by
independent and competent counsel that the court can have access to all of the relevant
information and alternatives.").
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B. Interests of Children May Differ From All Other Parties
Numerous scholars and commentators have concluded that the
interests of the parents and the state do not necessarily coincide with
those of the child.219 In fact, there are many times where neither the
interests of the parents nor the state are synonymous with those of the
child.
1. Conflict Between Interests of Children and Parents
"One does not have to work in family court very long to learn that in
countless circumstances a juvenile's rights and interests ... are at sharp
variance with those of his parents." 220 The very fact that allegations of
child abuse or neglect are being brought against a parent places the
parent and child in a situation where their interests are potentially, if not
actually, in conflict.221 Even if a parent did not intentionally mistreat
her child, once she is alleged to have harmed her child, it cannot be
assumed that the parent will act (at least at the court hearing) in a way
that is consistent with the well-being of her child. At that point, the
parents' interests almost certainly will conflict, to some extent, with
those of the child.
2. Conflict Between Interests of Child and Child Welfare Agency
Perhaps less obvious than the interests of the parents and children
being in conflict 222 is the situation where the interests of the children
219. See SAGATUN & EDWARDS, supra note 127, at 68-70 (maintaining that the other parties
in the matter cannot be relied upon to assert the perspective of the child); Duquette & Ramsey,
supra note 73, at 346 (recognizing that children need independent legal representation because
neither the state's nor the parents' interest can "be assumed to coincide entirely with the child's");
Ramsey, supra note 6, at 292 (concluding that a "lawyer's advocacy for the child's interests is
needed because the traditional representatives and protectors of the child are unable or unwilling
to put the child's interests first"); Ross, supra note 107, at 1585 (finding that "parents and state
guardians do not and cannot always speak for their children"); Wilber, supra note 107, at 350
(discussing how the state, the courts, and the parents do not satisfactorily represent the children's
interests).
220. Lyon, supra note 103, at 686 (quoting In re Clark, 185 N.E.2d 128, 130 (Ohio Misc.
1962)); see also Ross, supra note 107, at 1582-84 (maintaining that the interests of parents and
children are not always the same); Walter, supra note 3, at 49 (declaring that "in terms of
protecting the child's best interests, it would be folly to rely on the attorney for the parent").
221. See Wilber, supra note 107, at 351 ("Parents engaged in a ... protracted child abuse
proceeding... are often blind to the child's need for a prompt, harmonious resolution. Counsel
for the child can oppose unnecessary continuances, move to quash frivolous motions, or request a
court order providing counseling or other supportive services for the child.").
222. As explained above, many abused or neglected children and their families are living in
impoverished and hostile environments. Stress as a result of these unfortunate living situations,
and not ill-will or malice on the part of the parents, often leads to or causes the maltreatment of
the children. It is therefore worth noting that the interests of the parents and the children may not
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and the child welfare agency are in conflict. As was discussed above,
state child welfare agencies are plagued with "budgetary constraints,
large caseloads, public pressures, political loyalties, and bureaucratic
inertia. 223 Moreover, the ability to obtain federal funding for certain
activities and services, but not others, creates "perverse incentive[s] to
state child services agencies." 224 For example, the provision of a steady
stream of income and stable housing may be required to reunify a
family and truly advance a child's best interests. 225 Yet, federal funding
"for state administered foster care programs [is] readily available, [but
not] funding for job training and housing programs and the jobs and
homes themselves ...."226 All of these factors not only diminish the
ability of these agencies to adequately represent the children's interests,
but they create a situation where the agencies may be taking positions
primarily based on institutional considerations and not on the needs of
individual children. 227
conflict to as great an extent as may initially be assumed.
223. Wilber, supra note 107, at 350; see also Buss, Parents' Rights, supra note 11, at 438
(describing child welfare agencies as "[o]verwhelmed, underfunded, [and] highly bureaucratic");
Haralambie, supra note 8, at 951 (finding that the positions of the child and the state are not
"necessarily identical"); Walter, supra note 3, at 50 (explaining that there are "many conflicting
interests" preventing the agency from safeguarding each child's interest); Lyon, supra note 103,
at 686-87 (maintaining that the state is "unlikely to present an uncompromised view of the child's
interest that is free of institutional or professional biases and interests"); Stacy Robinson,
Comment, Remedying our Foster Care System: Recognizing Children's Voices, 27 FA M. L.Q.
395, 398 (1993) (discussing how budgetary constraints have caused state child welfare agencies
to be understaffed and unqualified).
For a description of the consequences of this lack of resources and staffing, see supra notes 38-
52 and accompanying text.
224. Wendy Anton Fitzgerald, Maturity, Difference, and Mystery: Children's Perspectives
and the Law, 36 ARIZ. L. REv. 11, 48 (1994) [hereinafter Fitzgerald, Maturity, Difference, and
Mystery]. An example of these conflicting interests can be seen in the ASFA, which provides
financial incentives to states that increase the number of children that are adopted, but not for
states that improve their ability to reunify families. See Walter, supra note 3, at 50; see also
Romo, supra note 13, at 8 (quoting Terry Friedman, presiding judge of Los Angeles juvenile
court, as saying that "[iut's not likely that an attorney is going to advocate zealously for a child
when that counsel is advocating for an agency that could lose federal money").
225. See Fitzgerald, Maturity, Difference, and Mystery, supra note 224, at 47-48.
226. Id. (citing to CHILDREN'S DEFENSE FUND, THE STATE OF AMERICA'S CHILDREN 1992,
28, 61-67 (1993)).
227. See Duquette & Ramsey, supra note 73, at 355 (concluding that because of high
caseloads, the state agency "may be unwilling or unable to meet each child's individual needs");
Jinanne S.J. Elder, The Role of Counsel for Children: A Proposal for Addressing a Troubling
Question, B. B. J., Feb. 1991, at 6, 9 (1991) (stating that "placement decisions are often based on
institutional constraints and personal biases rather than on a true perception of the needs of the
child"). One national study found that caseworkers had less contact with children than with the
children's representatives. See FINAL REPORT, supra note 12, at 5-7. For example,
representatives reported "talking with the child to assess placement needs in 59.8 percent of the
cases, while caseworkers reported such contacts in only 45.5 percent of cases." Id. Moreover,
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For example, in the case of Andrew and Brenda, such institutional
factors may prevent the agency from adequately representing the
children and ensuring that the needs of the children are met. Regardless
of where Andrew and Brenda are temporarily placed, there almost
surely will be a need for them and their mother to receive multiple
services from the state child welfare agency.228 In addition to medical
and mental health services for the children, their mother likely needs
substance abuse treatment, as well as some support and guidance in
advocating for Andrew's educational needs. There may be a need for
the family to be assisted by the child welfare agency in securing their
current housing arrangement or, if this is not possible, in obtaining
alternative housing. For the reasons discussed above, it is not likely that
the child welfare agency on its own would bring the need for all of these
services to the attention of the court.
229
Even if the child welfare agencies were adequately and appropriately
staffed and funded, they likely still would not be able to fully represent
the interests of the children. State child welfare agencies would
continue to be bound by internal policies that, inevitably, could not meet
the unique and individual needs of each child who is forced to interact
with them. Studies conducted to determine the appropriate and optimal
child welfare policies have proven that it is extremely difficult to
establish policies that will meet the needs of all children.230  Yet, in
order to have a well functioning agency, such policies are essential.231
"[t]he percentages for contacts to assess service needs were 53.5 and 41.2 percent, respectively."
Id.
228. My assertion that the state child welfare agency is required to provide services to Andrew
and Brenda's mother presumes that at least one of the permanency plans for the children is for
them to be reunified with their mother.
229. See Walter, supra note 3, at 50 (noting services are more likely to be provided if the
child's attorney is advocating).
230. For example, see study conducted by MICHAEL WALD ET AL., PROTECTING ABUSED
AND NEGLECTED CHILDREN 181-200 (1988) (examining the effects of foster care versus home
placement and finding that abused and neglected children are at serious risk in both settings). See
also Areen, supra note 31, at 889 (remarking that there is "little agreement on when intervention
in a particular family is justified [and] ... about what forms of intervention are constructive"),
893 n.26 (citing B. Russell for the proposition that administrative agencies like uniformity, but it
can create problems of pigeonholing and persecution of those who can't conform); Courtney et
al., supra note 29, at 130-31 (reviewing various studies and exhorting policy makers to question
the efficacy of 'one size fits all' services, and especially to consider the role of race and ethnicity
in the provision of services); Kiernan, supra note 34, at 10 (quoting a judge as saying that "[wihat
we need to do is create many different approaches. We need to understand that kids rely upon
their family structure and create a more comprehensive approach to dealing with the families.").
231. See JAMES Q. WILSON, BUREAUCRACY: WHAT GOVERNMENT AGENCIES DO AND WHY
THEY Do IT 334-35 (discussing the use of rules as a means of reducing agency discretion and
'making the actions of government fair and predictable" (citing MAX WEBER, 3 ECONOMY &
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Hence, it is necessary to have a representative appointed for the child
whose sole responsibility is to learn the unique needs and goals of each
child and to ensure that these needs and goals are advocated for and
addressed as part of the proceedings.
The placement issues concerning Andrew and Brenda are a good
example of this dilemma. One could argue that, rather than require
representation for all children, it would be more cost effective and
efficient to change the administrative policy concerning non-relative
placements. However, this policy is just one of many that might not
coincide with Andrew and Brenda's individual needs. It is impossible
to anticipate the needs of all of the children forced to interact with our
child welfare system and, in turn, to formulate policies that will
appropriately address all of those needs. Consequently, representatives
are necessary to identify all such needs, to advocate for appropriate and
adequate remedies, and to challenge existing policies if necessary.
Finally, at a systemic level, representatives also are needed to keep
pressure on the child welfare bureaucracies, which, like most
bureaucracies, are not always able to respond to their clients because
they are perpetually in need of additional funds and, as a result, are
continuously being forced to streamline and curtail services.232 Even if
the child welfare agencies were to receive renewed and augmented
funding today, without ongoing pressure from advocates for the
children, one cannot assume that the funding would go directly toward
addressing the needs of the children and their families, nor that the
funding would remain at this increased level over the long-term.
Some might ask why the judge, the ultimate arbiter of the child's best
interests, could not monitor the actions of the other parties and ensure
that the children's legal interests are protected and their needs
addressed. As explained above, however, the judge is not in a position
to independently and adequately investigate the matter and, thus, cannot
assess whether the children's interests are being met or appropriately
represented by the other parties in the proceeding. 233
Given the differing, and often conflicting, interests of the parties
involved in a child protection proceeding, it is critical for each young
child to have an independent representative, someone whose sole charge
SOCIETY, 958, 973-75, 979 (1968))).
232. See MICHAEL LIPSKY, STREET LEVEL BUREAUCRACY: DILEMMAS OF THE INDIVIDUAL
IN PUBLIC SERVICES 39 (1980) (describing the financial situation of "street-level bureaucracies"
as "chronically inadequate").
233. See supra notes 204-18 and accompanying text (discussing the inability of judges to
adequately protect the children's interests).
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is to learn and then advocate for the child's needs and goals. Without
such an advocate, the child risks being harmed by the very process and
parties that are supposed to protect him and ensure that his best interests
are being promoted.234 Professor Ramsey powerfully articulates the
multiple ways that a child who is the subject of a child protection
proceeding can be harmed.
First, there is the possibility that the gravity of the child's situation
may not be realized, adequate protection will not be provided, and the
child's parents will seriously injure or even kill him. Second, the
child runs the risk of being harmed by too much intervention. The
child's family life can be disrupted or even destroyed by coercive state
action. Finally, the child runs the risk of being neglected by the state
once the state has taken jurisdiction over him.235
Clearly, in any given child protection proceeding, numerous possible
solutions can be generated, and the need for a careful and
comprehensive analysis underlies most decisions that must be made. In
such a setting, the child's interests and position will "easily differ" from
those of the other parties, and the child's interests will seldom be
protected by one of the other parties.
236
VI. A BETTER MODEL FOR REDUCING BIAs AND DISCRETION
Recognizing that the interests of young children cannot be
sufficiently protected by the presiding judge, nor adequately advanced
by one of the other parties in the proceeding, the need for someone to be
appointed to identify, understand, and advocate for the interests of
young children becomes apparent. Considering the current state of legal
representation, whether there should be a requirement that
representation be provided by lawyers is somewhat less clear. The
serious nature of child protection proceedings, the substantial interests
at stake for the children, the difficult decisions that must be made, and
the forum in which these decisions are determined point to the
conclusion that the interests of young children would be most
adequately advanced and protected if a lawyer is appointed. Yet, at the
same time, the legitimate concerns articulated by Professor
Guggenheim, Professor Buss, and others about haphazard, underfunded,
234. See SAGATUN & EDWARDS, supra note 127, at 67-68, 72, 84-85 (concluding that the
other participants in the proceeding cannot be counted on to listen to and represent the needs of
the child) (footnotes omitted); Margulies, supra note 8, at 1499 n.94 (maintaining that "reducing
the power of an advocate for children just gives the other advocates more authority"); Walter,
supra note 3, at 51-53.
235. Ramsey, supra note 6, at 292 (footnote omitted).
236. See Wilber, supra note 107, at 351.
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and biased representation offer grounds to question a requirement that
all young children be provided with legal representation.
The final two parts of this paper will set forth several suggestions
addressing these concerns. This part discusses why representation by
lawyers is preferable and necessary. Further, this part examines an
approach requiring legal representation of all children, which aims to
address the concerns regarding haphazard and biased representation by
developing a deep understanding of the children's lives and
experiences. Part VII, acknowledging the history of insufficient support
for providing adequate representation to children and the likelihood that
the resources necessary to support the recommendations in Part VI are
not going to be available in most jurisdictions in the foreseeable future,
proposes several modest recommendations. Two pertain to
enhancements in the policies of our child welfare agencies and in the
responsibilities of our juvenile court judges. Both of these alterations
could help the juvenile courts and child welfare agencies focus more on
the needs of the children. A third tentatively suggests that alternative
models of representation for young children be studied that might be
able to provide more cost effective and principled representation of
young children than currently is taking place. While the
recommendations in Part VII would not ensure the caliber of
representation that is discussed in Part VI, and that I think is necessary
to adequately protect and advance the needs and interests of young
children, they would enhance our child protection system and, in turn,
help protect the interests of young children in these proceedings.
A. Competent Attorneys as the Preferred Type of Representation
A consensus of the participants of the Fordham Conference, as well
as numerous scholars, practitioners, and organizations, have expressed
the need for children to be represented by attorneys. 237 The reasons
emphasized in support of this need are significant. Among some of the
considerations highlighted by the Working Group at the Fordham
Conference were the inability "to ensure that the best result" will be
reached for each and every particular child if a lawyer is not appointed,
the importance of "redress[ing] the imbalance of power," and the need
to "minimize the risk of harm to the child that flows from contact with
the legal system."238 Others concerned with children receiving legal
237. See FINAL REPORT, supra note 12, at xv; A JUDGE'S GUIDE, supra note 45, at 4-5; Green
& Dohrn, supra note 8, at 1294-95; Recommendation, supra note 110, 1301-02, 1328; Ross,
supra note 107, at 1572-73; Walter, supra note 3, at 51; Wilber, supra note 107, at 350-52.
238. The Working Group on the Allocation of Decision Making, Report of the Working Group
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representation have stressed notions of fairness and efficacy 239 and the
unwillingness of some judges to listen to and take seriously the
arguments expressed by lay advocates. 24°  One commentator in
particular has noted that "[t]he essence of the adversarial system is theidea that an equitable result is best reached through zealous and
effective representation of all sides of an issue. ' 24 1 Finally, one child
advocate emphasized the mediating effect that a legal representative for
the child can have on the proceeding. 242  "Good lawyers for children
can expedite the resolution of disputes, help minimize unnecessary
contentiousness between the adult parties, [and] facilitate the settlement
of contested issues .... -243
Clearly, there are important reasons why all children need to be
represented and why this representation should be conducted by
attorneys. However, the considerations leading to the conclusion that
lawyers would provide the best type of representation presume that the
lawyers being appointed are able to provide competent representation.
As discussed earlier, many commentators question this assumption in
the case of the legal representation of young children, largely due to the
potential for unfettered discretion and bias. I already examined why the
proposals limiting or eliminating representation for young children
either would not substantially reduce discretion and bias or would leave
children without a representative to protect and advance their needs and
interests. However, if these proposals are not acceptable, what is?
on the Allocation of Decision Making, 64 FORDHAM L. REV. 1325, 1327 (1996).
239. See FINAL REPORT, supra note 12, at xv (stating that "TEG [Technical Expert Group]
members maintained that, in their opinion, it was unacceptable for any child to appear before the
court without being represented by either an attorney or another person equally qualified to fulfill
the role, and the study recommends that an attorney be present at all hearings."); Romo, supra
note 13, at 8 (quoting Terry Friedman, presiding judge of Los Angeles juvenile court as saying
"Children must have counsel. They must be independent and must be viewed as equal with all
other counsel."); Walter, supra note 3, at 58 (exhorting that "[d]ue process and fundamental
fairness cry out for a child's right to independent representation in dependency proceedings.").
Some of the unique and important skills of an attorney include: the ability to recognize and
research legal issues, analytically apply facts to law, take testimony of witnesses, cross-examine
witnesses, prepare and submit written pleadings, bring matters to the court's attention through
motions, creatively challenge and advance substantive law, and argue appeals.
240. See Margulies, supra note 8, at 1499 n.94 (discussing court appointed advocates, and
stating that "reducing the power of an advocate for children just gives the other advocate more
authority"); Ross, supra note 107, at 1572-73 (quoting Justice Powell's concurrence in
Argersinger v. Hamlin, 407 U.S. 25, 65 (1972) ("'[Tlhe adversary system functions best and most
fairly only when all parties are represented by competent counsel.' Indeed the absence of counsel
in an adversary system severely diminishes the odds of justice being served.").
241. Wilber, supra note 107, at 354.
242. See A JUDGE'S GUIDE, supra note 45, at 1.
243. Id.
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B. The Search for a Less Discretionary Model
The solution lies in our ongoing attempts to answer the question of
how lawyers for young children can provide principled and unbiased
representation to young children. Any model that is developed must
give sufficient guidance and direction so that the representation is less
arbitrary, less biased, and hopefully true to the children's lived
experiences. Yet, it also must be flexible enough to encompass and
reflect the unique needs and circumstances of each child client, leading
to representation that is based on each child's perspective as it can be
learned from the child and a contextualized, 'deep understanding' of his
world.244
Any attempt to guide lawyers looking for a more principled and
contextual model of representation must first recognize that efforts to
develop a paradigm that will always lead to a conclusive determination
of what is best for a young child will never succeed completely. It is
virtually impossible to definitively determine what is best for a child,
for doing so would require predictive capabilities that none of us
possess. 245 As Professor Catherine Brooks has stated:
244. See PETERS, supra note 8, at 1 (proposing contextual approach); Peters, supra note 103,
at 1512, n.12. See infra Part V.B.2 (discussing the need for an advocate to assure that a child's
unique needs are met).
My support for a contextual approach to representation runs contrary to an earlier assertion of
mine that there is a need for a "bright line" test, at least with regard to the ethical rules of
confidentiality and potentially for other aspects of representation as well. See Randi
Mandelbaum, Rules of Confidentiality When Representing Children: The Need for a "Bright
Line" Test, 64 FORDHAM L. REV. 2053 (1996). My earlier suggestions were based on my desire
to both give guidance to practitioners and to acknowledge the realities of practice. Yet, after
further thought, I have come to the conclusion that we cannot accept the current state of practice.
There are no "easy answers" to these very tough questions about proper models of practice and
what constitutes the ethical representation of children. As explained above, the lack of answers is
in part responsible for the poor state of representation for children. However, if we are ever to
improve practice, we must struggle with the hard questions and develop models of representation,
like that of Professor Peters, that attempt to understand each child's individual world with all its
unique and idiosyncratic features. See PETERS, supra note 8, at 1-2.
245. See Brooks, supra note 88, at 770-71 (declaring it impossible to ever know what is in the
child's best interests); David L. Chambers, Rethinking the Substantive Rules for Custody Disputes
in Divorce, 83 MICH. L. REV. 477, 478 (1984) (concluding that in custody cases the best interests
standard "is both too broad and too narrow to be acceptable"); Lurie, supra note 87, at 235
(questioning whether it is possible to predict what a particular child would want); Guggenheim,
Reconsidering the Need, supra note 11, at 307 (quoting Hillary Clinton, "[the] best interests
standard ... is not properly a standard. Instead, it is a rationalization by decision-makers
justifying their judgments about a child's future, like an empty vessel into which adult
perceptions and prejudices are poured."); Mnookin, supra note 60, at 255-62 (maintaining that
what is "best" for a particular child is "usually indeterminate and speculative"); Twila L. Perry,
Race and Child Placement: The Best Interests Test and the Cost of Discretion, 29 J. FAM. L. 5 1,
58 & n.23 (1990) (explaining that "[t]here... is no general agreement as to what a child's best
interests are" and that "[t]he standard has long been criticized as being overly vague and
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Knowing, advocating, and adopting the position which addresses the
best interests of the child requires a prediction of the future of the
child, the child's relationships within the family, and the parents'
ability to meet the apparent and hidden needs of the child. All of
those pieces which make up a "best interests" analysis cannot be
known in any real way.246
Moreover, when considering what is best from the child's perspective, it
is not clear from what standpoint of time this determination should be
made. 247 In other words, should one look to what the child would want
at the current time or at the time the child becomes an adult? 248
It is equally difficult to eliminate all discretion on the part of
attorneys. 249 Given the nature of the decisions that often must be made
in the course of a child protection proceeding, it is inevitable that
lawyers (and judges) will need to exercise some discretion. 250 As has
been previously noted, "[d]eciding what is best for a child often poses a
question no less ultimate than the purposes and values of life itself., 251
Such determinations could be "elaborated endlessly" and always will
involve some discretion, subjectivity, and value judgments. 252
1. Past Attempts to Offer Guidance
It is possible, however, to limit the amount of discretion and bias
involved in the representation of young children253 and to give guidance
as to how to represent young children in a way that is as true as possible
to their lives and backgrounds. Some commentators might argue that
subjective"); Weinstein, supra note 76, at 81, 108-12 (discussing how vague the best interests
standard is and how there often is no one correct answer).
246. Brooks, supra note 88, at 771.
247. See Mnookin, supra note 60, at 260.
248. See id.; see also Chambers, supra note 245, at 488-89.
249. See Peters, supra note 103, at 1512 n.12 (remarking that discretion in the determination
of a child's best interests cannot be eliminated).
250. See Carl E. Schneider, Discretion, Rules, and Law: Child Custody and the UMDA 's Best-
Interest Standard, 89 MICH. L. REV. 2215, 2218-19, 2247-49, 2261-64 (1991) (arguing "that no
easy choices are available in thinking about custody disputes, that wholeheartedly rejecting
discretion is certainly not such a choice, and that a motley mix of discretion, guidelines, and rules
may be the best we can do").
251. Mnookin, supra note 60, at 260; see also Fitzgerald, Maturity, Difference, and Mystery,
supra note 224, at 53-64 (analyzing the difficulties and the numerous problematic aspects of best
interests determinations in custody disputes); Herma Hill Kay & Irving Phillips, Poverty and the
Law of Child Custody, 54 CAL. L. REV. 717, 720 (1966) (discussing the difficulty of determining
what is in a child's best interest).
252. See Mnookin, supra note 60, at 260.
253. See Mary Ann Glendon, Fixed Rules and Discretion in Contemporary Family Law and
Succession Law, 60 TUL. L. REV. 1165, 1170-71 (1986) (finding that in divorce matters
"discretion need not be uncontrolled and that significant predictability can be introduced").
[Vol. 32
2000] Young Children in Child Protection Proceedings
these efforts already have been made and were ultimately
unsuccessful.254 Yet, a closer look reveals that those efforts were limited
and insufficient. As explained above, most scholars have focused on
the debate between the traditional attorney model, the best interests
approach, and why one should be favored over the other.25 Moreover,
while many writers focused on how to represent young children, or
children of any age, in accordance with a best interests approach, these
writers tended to merely define the tasks for which a lawyer would be
responsible.256 Although this provided some guidance, it did not assist
lawyers in understanding the lives and needs of their young child clients
and ultimately what would be best for these young children.
Nonetheless, a few scholars in the past have proposed models that
stressed the importance of determining the child's perspective in order
to understand the needs and interests of the child, and they have
attempted to give some guidance as to how one should proceed in
identifying this perspective. These commentators looked to the doctrine
of substituted judgment, an approach most often seen in the medical
context, and attempted to apply it to the child protection setting. 257 The
254. See supra notes 116-29 and accompanying text (discussing problems with the "best
interests" approach).
255. See supra notes 104-14 and accompanying text (discussing debate over "best interests"
or "traditional" approaches).
256. See supra note 104 (listing the duties that a representative may be required to perform).
257. See Elder, supra note 227, at 6; Wilber, supra note 107, at 349; Lyon, supra note 103, at
681.
It is significant to note that several other well-respected scholars have also written on the
importance of recognizing children's perspectives as different and distinct from all other
individuals. See Fitzgerald, Maturity, Difference, and Mystery, supra note 224, at 11; Wendy
Anton Fitzgerald, Stories of Child Outlaws: On Child Heroism and Adult Power in Juvenile
Justice, 1996 WIS. L. REV. 495 (1996) [hereinafter Fitzgerald, Stories of Child Outlaws]; Martha
Minow, Rights for the Next Generation: A Feminist Approach to Children's Rights, 9 HARV.
WOMEN'S L.J. 1 (1986); Barbara Bennett Woodhouse, Hatching the Egg: A Child-Centered
Perspective on Parents' Rights, 14 CARDOZO L. REV. 1747 (1993) [hereinafter Woodhouse,
Hatching the Egg]; Barbara Bennett Woodhouse, Out of Children's Needs, Children's Rights:
The Child's Voice in Defining the Family, 8 BYU J. PUB. L. 321 (1994). Although these scholars
do not necessarily focus on child protection proceedings or attorney-child client relationships,
they do stress the importance of understanding children's unique perspectives in all spheres.
Moreover, they emphasize how policies and laws would be different if they were enacted in
accordance with children's viewpoints. For example, Professor Woodhouse examines the unique
right of children to receive basic nutrition, support and protection not only from their parents, but
from society at large. See Woodhouse, Hatching the Egg, supra, at 1755-56. Accordingly, she
argues that "parental rights should be reconceptualized as flowing from parents' responsibilities"
and that parenthood should not be considered a form of ownership, but rather a "stewardship."
Id. Similarly, Professor Fitzgerald calls for including the perspectives of children in our efforts to
reform our juvenile justice systems and to amend our laws and policies governing family
disputes. See Fitzgerald, Maturity, Difference, and Mystery, supra note 224, at 11; Fitzgerald,
Stories of Child Outlaws, supra, at 495. Although at times it may be difficult to determine the
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doctrine of substituted judgment has been utilized for nearly two
centuries as an approach by which a court determines decisions for a
person who is incapacitated and not able to make decisions for
himself.25
8
To determine the intent of a young child, these scholars developed a
tiered analysis. They first considered the best source of information to
be the child himself and they recommended learning as much as one
could from the child.259 If this was not possible or only led to a limited
understanding, then they next suggested that the attorney attempt to
learn as much as possible from people involved in the child's life who
know the child well. 260 Finally, they recommended that the attorney
either look to what others who were in a similar situation as the child
wish had been advocated or to what a reasonable child in the client's
position would want. 261  In order to determine the latter, these
commentators suggested looking to the types of things that a child
would value.
262
actual perspectives of very young children, the recommendations and theoretical interpretations
of these noteworthy scholars serve to illustrate that children's interests are unique and in need of
expression and protection.
258. See Wilber, supra note 107, at 359-60 (citing Louise Harmon, Falling Off the Vine:
Legal Fictions and the Doctrine of Substituted Judgment, 100 YALE L.J. 1, 16 (1990)).
Currently, the doctrine of substituted judgment is most common in the area of medical treatment
consent (i.e., informed consent). The doctrine has been the subject of much controversy based on
its uneven application by various courts and the difficulty of inferring intent where there is little,
if any, evidence on which to base such a conclusion (i.e., for a person who has always been
incapacitated). See id. at 361. Yet, despite these limitations, scholars still found it useful to
explore its relevance to the legal representation of young children. Acknowledging that it was
difficult to discern the needs and desires of a young child, they found significant differences
between the way in which the doctrine was applied in the medical treatment context and the way
in which it could be employed when representing a young child. See id. at 362; see also Lyon,
supra note 103, at 702.
259. See Elder, supra note 227, at 8-9; Lyon, supra note 103, at 702-03.
260. See Elder, supra note 227, at 9; Wilber, supra note 107, at 362; Lyon, supra note 103, at
703-04.
261. See Elder, supra note 227, at 9; Wilber, supra note 107, at 362; Lyon, supra note 103, at
704-05.
262. For example, one commentator defined such values as "the protection of the child's
physical and emotional safety, preservation of the child's family of origin whenever possible,
placement in the least restrictive alternative - preferring family, relatives, or a family-like setting
over institutionalization - and minimizing disruption and exposure to prolonged or intense
conflict." Wilber, supra note 107, at 363. While another writer defined these necessities as: (1)
the provision of basic needs; (2) provision and maintenance of nurturance, stability, and
continuity; (3) freedom from abuse and neglect; and (4) maintenance of the family. See Elder,
supra note 227, at 8-9.
A variation of this approach has been proposed by Professor Margulies, who advocates that, in
making decisions on behalf of the child client, the representative look to three important factors
as guidelines: (1) continuity of caregiving; (2) parents' commitment of time to their child's
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Although the substituted judgment approach focused the
representative's thinking on the importance of the child's perspective,
this model is lacking in the amount of guidance it provides on how to
determine the child's perspective. Because of the difficulty in
identifying the interests of young children, these scholars tended to
ultimately rely on a type of "reasonable child" test, an approach that
does not adequately consider the unique and individual realities of each
child client's world.263 Hence, while the substituted judgment model
provides some help in guiding the lawyer to more principled or child-
centered representation, it still leaves room for too much discretion and
the need for a better way to focus the representation on the unique and
individual interests of each child.
2. Paradigm Proposed by Professor Jean Koh Peters
Professor Jean Koh Peters has developed a model of representation
that I believe helps us to do this. Her model calls for attorneys to
represent the "child-in-context. '" 264  Professor Peters' approach to
lawyering is the most thoughtful and comprehensive model to date on
how to provide principled representation to all children, and especially
young children. 265 Specifically, she proposes a new model that
attempts to reframe the duality between wishes and best interests
representation into a paradigm that unites representation of all children
along the age spectrum around the idea of the child-in-context ....
In essence, the concept of the child-in-context is the child
understood on her own terms in ways that she would be able to
understand and endorse. 266
As part of her new paradigm, Professor Peters advocates for
maximizing the participation of the client wherever and however
possible. 267 Also, she provides detailed guidance on how to proceed if
education; and (3) the presence of exploitation or violence against the child or other family
members. See Margulies, supra note 8, at 1502; see also Chambers, supra note 245, at 493-95
(acknowledging the difficulty of defining "elemental qualities of life or personal characteristics
that most children would want," but attempting to do so nonetheless).
263. See Lurie, supra note 87, at 235 (noting that the substituted judgment approach has been
criticized because, in actuality, it simply gives an attorney the ability to rationalize doing
whatever she wants to do (citing Kevin W. Bates, Live or Let Die; Who Decides an Incompetent's
Fate? In re Storar and In re Eichner, 1982 BYU L. REV. 387, 392 (1982))).
264. Professor Peters adheres to the views of the participants of the Fordham Conference, the
ABA, and other scholars in her insistence that children of all ages be represented by attorneys.
See PETERS, supra note 8, at 1.
265. See Peters, supra note 103, at 1505.
266. PETERS, supra note 8, at 2.
267. In order to emphasize and illustrate the importance of the child's participation, but also
the difficulty when a child is very young, Professor Peters posits that "[a) useful image for
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the child's ability to participate is limited or if a representative is
mandated by state statute to represent the child's best interests. 268
In representing children too young to fully participate, Professor
Peters is very concerned with making certain that all aspects of the
representation, including actions that attorneys might take as well as the
decisions or positions for which attorneys might advocate, remain true
to the children's realities and perspectives. 269  Professor Peters
thinking about the child's competence to contribute to his representation is the concept of
'dimmer switch,"' where the "child's potential contribution... should be seen as covering a point
across a broad spectrum." Id. at 53. She adds that even a newborn child can contribute some
amount to his lawyer's representation and "the lawyer must strive to incorporate every percentage
of the client's contribution into the representation." Id. at 53-54. Furthermore, Professor Peters
recommends that lawyers for children should conduct their representation according to the
following three default practices: (1) Relationship default: "A lawyer should begin her
representation as she would any other lawyer-client relationship, by meeting the client and trying
to ascertain the client's goals." (2) Competency default: Presume the child "can understand the
legal issues" in the case and express subjective perspective or offer critical information about
them. (3) Advocacy default: "All lawyers whose child clients can express a view relevant to the
legal representation should proceed in the first instance as if the stated view is the goal of the
representation." Id. at 49-54. Professor Peters believes that these defaults outline a model of
practice that is consistent with Model Rule 1.14. Id. at 49. "Rule 1,14's admonition that the
lawyer maintain a traditional lawyer-client relationship dictates that lawyers for children must
observe three default practices with respect to their clients from day one of the representation."
Id.
268. For example, in a supplement to the text, Professor Peters describes a creative mapping
process - stellar cartography - to assist the lawyer in making sense of both the child's daily life
and the child's history. See id. at 6.
In addition, in her earlier work, she presents a framework for assessing and determining the best
interests of a young child. See Peters, supra note 103, at 1554-55. First, if the child is able to
converse, she insists that the representative attempt to communicate with the child and engage in
counseling sessions with the child. See id. Second, she advises the representative to conduct an
investigation to uncover as much as possible about the child's world. See id. at 1555. Next, she
recommends "evaluat[ing] the actual alternative options in terms" of two existing developmental
theories that she discusses - "the psychological parent and family network paradigms." Id.
Finally, she suggests "consult[ing] experts for guidance." Id. at 1557.
Interestingly, when representing young children, Professor Peters, like the drafters of the
Fordham Conference Report, recommends informing the court of all potential solutions if no one
option is clearly the best option. See id. at 1558; Recommendation, supra note 1 10, at 1311. To a
certain extent, this can be viewed as analogous to Professors Guggenheim and Buss' proposal of
declining to take a position and enforcing statutory mandates. However, on closer analysis, such
a comparison is inaccurate for Professor Peters anticipates that a representative would be involved
in advocacy. Specifically, Professor Peters recommends that an attorney conduct a full
investigation and perform all tasks necessary to advocate for a position. See Peters, supra note
103, at 1554-63. Only if there is no definitively preferable option does she propose presenting
more than one position to the court. See id. at 1558. Moreover, she recommends that the
representative argue against all options that the representative finds to be inappropriate. See id.
Such actions seem to reflect a different role for the representative than that proposed by
Professors Guggenheim and Buss.
269. For example, Professor Peters discusses ten "principles of good communication with
clients." PETERS, supra note 8, at 84-89. She gives pointers for how to do a thorough, but quick,
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explicitly states that she is "rejecting and replacing" 270 the GAL model
and, accordingly, the best interests approach that permits lawyers to
determine what is best primarily based on the discretion of the
attorney. 271 Rather, she outlines how attorneys can advocate on behalf
of a child based "on a full, efficient, and speedy factual investigation
that leads the lawyer to a deep understanding of the child's family
system, her history, and her daily life."-2
72
In sum, Professor Peters' approach substantially reduces the presence
of the attorney's own biases and predilections and provides guidance for
how a lawyer can more faithfully identify the interests of the child from
the context of the child's life. In doing so, she preserves the critical role
of the attorney as advocate, while reducing bias. However, our search
for a less discretionary approach to the representation of young children
must not end here.
investigation. See id. at 92-110. In addition, Professor Peters emphasizes the importance of
interdisciplinary meetings. See id. at 153-91. She also lists and describes seven questions to keep
the lawyer honest with herself and suggests that the lawyer write a letter to the child explaining
why she is making a particularly significant decision. See id. at 65-69.
270. See Peters, supra note 103, at 1507.
271. See id. at 1523. It is "useful and necessary to abandon the guardian ad litem role for the
following reason: Lawyers playing the role of guardian ad litem often have felt unconstrained by
traditional lawyering duties." Id.
272. Id. at 1554-55. Not surprisingly, Professor Guggenheim is critical of Professor Peters'
paradigm. See Guggenheim, Matter of Ethics, supra note 11, at 1489 (reviewing PETERS, supra
note 8). In a recent book review of her text, Professor Guggenheim praises her attempts to reduce
attorney discretion and bias, but is critical of how she advises attorneys to do so. See id.
Specifically, he dislikes "the method by which she recommends that lawyers determine what they
should advocate when representing very young children in child protection proceedings" and
again asserts that lawyers should define their role based on substantive law. Id. at 1505.
However, in his criticism, Professor Guggenheim fails to acknowledge the depth of Professor
Peters' analysis as well as the totality of what her model presents. His critique condenses her
proposals into a simple recommendation that lawyers adhere to Professor Peters' blending of
child development theories. See id. at 1509-11. Accordingly, he is fearful that representatives
will just disagree with her developmental theory and choose alternative ones, thus perpetuating a
discretionary approach. See id. at 1511. What is problematic with Professor Guggenheim's
critique is not his disagreement with Professor Peters' approach, but his failure to appreciate that
the central focus of Professor Peters' paradigm is not child developmental theory, but the child
and the development of a thorough and contextual understanding of the child's world. See Peters,
supra note 103, at 1554-63. In helping the lawyer to understand the child's perspective, she
encourages representatives to look to various developmental theories (and does discuss two
popular developmental theories) and to consult with experts. See id. at 1556-59. However, a
reliance on any one theory of child development, or even a blending of theories, is not an accurate
portrayal of Professor Peters' model. In fact, Professor Peters encourages lawyers to "continue to
deepen their understanding of the rich and complex debates about child development that
continue in other disciplines." Id. at 1556. Moreover, she cautions lawyers to "be aware that the
understandings of child development and placement issues in other disciplines are dynamic and
constantly changing" and that the two theories that she discusses "will certainly shift, evolve, and
probably be replaced in the coming years." Id. at 1556 n.148.
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C. Concerns with Professor Peters' Approach - The Need To Go
Further
1. The Need to Recognize Differences
There exists a great need to study how Professor Peters' model can be
built upon to more explicitly acknowledge and account for the fact that
the lives of these child clients are likely to be vastly different from those
of their representatives, especially in terms of race, ethnicity, and
socioeconomic status. 273  Although Professor Peters' paradigm
emphasizes the importance of understanding the child's life, which
would include a recognition that the child's experiences, background,
and culture may be different from that of the lawyer, she does not
explicitly discuss the difficulty on the part of an attorney to fully
understand the child's world, particularly how differences in race,
ethnicity, and class might impact the child's experiences, including how
the child experiences the attorney-child client relationship. 274  Such a
recognition of differences has enormous ramifications for all aspects of
the lawyering process, including, but not limited to, the attorney-child
client relationships that develop, the activities that the lawyer
undertakes, and the best interests determinations that the lawyer
273. Other significant differences (i.e., age and possibly gender or sexual orientation) will
exist as well. However, at this time, my analysis is limited to differences in race, ethnicity, and
socioeconomic status. Professor Peters and others have done an excellent job of illustrating how
differences in age may affect many aspects of lawyering. It is difficult to determine how often
differences in gender and sexual orientation are likely to occur and the extent of the impact of
these potential differences on the lawyering process and developing attorney-client relationships.
Further study and examination is necessary, but is beyond the scope of this paper.
It also is critical to explore how the implications of race and class are intertwined. However,
once again, the complexities of this interrelationship justify a much more thorough analysis than
is possible in this writing.
274. While I was in the final stages of the preparation of this piece, I learned that the 2000
Supplement of Professor Peters' book, currently unpublished, will provide a prescription as to
how a lawyer should take into account the many differences that likely will exist between herself
and her client. It is my hope that my writing supports the great need for such guidance and that
Professor Peters' supplement will move lawyers to re-examine the way in which they are
lawyering and encourage persons from all disciplines to continue to study why and how it is so
important to recognize differences.
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makes. 275 These implications rarely have been studied in the context of
the attorney-child client relationship. 27
6
As was documented above, a disproportionate number of children
who enter the child protection system are poor and of color.277
Moreover, a large majority of the attorneys appointed to represent these
children are white and from middle to upper-middle class
backgrounds. 278 Scholars in a variety of disciplines, as well as policy-
makers, already have begun exploring how race and class impact our
child welfare policies and programs. 279 Yet, we have spent little time
275. See Boggett, supra note 123, at 1477-79 (discussing from a multi-disciplinary
perspective the many barriers to cross-cultural counseling that exist); Bill Ong Hing, Raising
Personal Identification Issues of Class, Race, Ethnicity, Gender, Sexual Orientation, Physical
Disability, and Age in Lawyering Courses, 45 STAN. L. REV. 1807, 1809 (1993) (explaining that
differences in class, race, and gender between an attorney and a client greatly impact an
attorney's ability to build rapport).
276. But see HOWZE, supra note 2, at 74; Janet Chaplan, Youth Perspectives on Lawyers'
Ethics: A Report on Seven Interviews, 64 FORDHAM L. REV. 1763 (1996); Recommendation,
supra note 110, at 1301. Ms. Howze thoughtfully enunciates why it is so important to consider
the impact of differences in cultures and backgrounds:
Central to the ability of lawyers and judges to answer these questions is a willingness
to look beyond what we know, what our life experiences have been. We must develop
a method of interacting with families that assumes there is validity in examining the
total family environment - including cultural and sub-cultural context.
HOWZE, supra note 2, at 13.
In her short article, part of the Fordham Symposium, Ms. Chaplan briefly discusses the need to
"learn from clients' narratives of their experiences" and its derivation in postmodern theory. She
then interviews seven youths - six young men, ages seventeen to twenty, and one young woman,
age eighteen - who all had been involved in child protection proceedings and the foster care
system. In her interviews, she questions the youths as to their perceptions about their attorneys
and the attorney-client relationships. "All of these youths valued the opportunity to have their
attorneys get to know them" and listen to them. Chaplan, supra, at 1775. However, they differed
somewhat on their perceptions of the lawyer's role and ethical obligations. See id. at 1768-84.
Listed in the recommendations of the Fordham conference are references to the importance of
recognizing differences in race, class, and culture. For example, when discussing
recommendations for improving the interviewing and counseling skills of representatives, the
participants recommended that the lawyer's techniques should be "culturally competent." See
Recommendation, supra note 110, at 1303. Likewise, when determining whether a verbal child is
capable of directing the representation, the conferees cautioned that "[a] lawyer should be aware
of the risks that biases based on cultural, race, ethnicity, or class differences between the lawyer
and child client may inappropriately influence the lawyer's perception of the child's capacity to
direct the representation." Id. at 1313. The participants recommended .that lawyers for children
should receive specialized training on how "competing paradigms address the needs of children
of diverse ethnic, racial, and class backgrounds." Id. at 1312. Finally, they proposed that
"[flurther study should be made of how differences in race, ethnicity, culture, or class may affect
children's decision making with respect to legal representation, and of how lawyers may properly
take that into account in determining a child's capacity to direct the representation." Id. at 1314.
277. See supra notes 29 & 31.
278. See supra note 34.
279. See, e.g., Brown & Bailey-Etta, supra note 29; Gilbert A. Holmes, The Extended Family
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studying how these cultural and socioeconomic differences affect the
development of our attorney-child client relationships and the lawyering
that ensues, especially how we determine what to advocate for on behalf
of our young child clients.280  Only with a sound understanding of how
lawyers should attempt to recognize these differences will we be able to
limit attorney discretion to the greatest extent possible, better
understand the lives of our child clients, and therefore be in the best
position to determine what is in a child's best interests free of our own
biases and more consistent with the lived experiences and realities of
the young children who we are representing.
281
Racism pervades every segment of our society and every aspect of a
person of color's life experiences, from small to large. 282 For example,
Professor Peggy Davis discusses the infinite number of
"microaggressions" that a person of color must sustain on a daily
basis.283 Moreover, white persons also are influenced by their own
System in the Black Community: A Child-Centered Model for Adoption Policy, 68 TEMP. L. REV.
1649, 1658-69 (1995) (documenting and discussing the prevalence of extended family systems in
African American communities); Perry, supra note 245, at 57 (arguing "for more specific rules
for the treatment of race" in child placement decisions); Symposium, Helping Families in Crisis:
The Intersection of Law and Psychology, 22 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 295 (1996-97);
Symposium, The Impact of Psychological Parenting on Child Welfare Decision Making, 12
N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 485 (1983-84).
280. But see HOWZE, supra note 2, at 7-14, 72-76 (explaining that assumptions and
perceptions about race and ethnicity influence all aspects of child protection proceedings and
emphasizing the importance of understanding the numerous ways that culture and subculture can
affect decisions central to a determination of what is in a child's best interests).
281. See id. at 7 (calling for a new methodology that emphasizes cultural differences and
context, encourages continuous questioning, and "requires that the scope of relevant facts be
expanded to include the total life experiences of adults and children before the court").
282. See Leslie G. Espinoza, Legal Narratives, Therapeutic Narratives: The Invisibility and
Omnipresence of Race and Gender, 95 MICH. L. REV. 901, 933 n.168 (maintaining that "'being
Black or White affects every element of individual existence including access to jobs, education,
housing, food, and even life or death"' (citing ROBERT STAPLES, INTRODUCTION TO BLACK
SOCIOLOGY 250 (1976))). See generally Peggy Davis, Law as Microaggression, 98 YALE L.J.
1559 (1989); Charles Lawrence, The Id, the Ego, and Equal Protection: Reckoning with
Unconscious Racism, 39 STAN. L. REV. 317 (1987); Ian F. Haney Lopez, Social Construction of
Race. Some Observation on Illusion, Fabrication, and Choice, 29 HARV. C.R-C.L. L. REV. 1
(1994); Chester M. Pierce, Psychiatric Problems of the Black Minority, in AMERICAN
HANDBOOK OF PSYCHIATRY 512 (S. Arieti ed., 1974). Obviously, a full exploration of the rich
body of literature that constitutes critical race theory is well beyond the scope of this article.
However for a good introduction to the literature see CRITICAL RACE THEORY: THE CUTTING
EDGE (Richard Delgado & Jean Stefancic eds., 2d ed. 2000).
283. See generally Davis, supra note 282, at 1565-76. Professor Davis defines
microaggressions as "subtle, stunning, often automatic, and non-verbal exchanges which are 'put
downs' of blacks by offenders." Id. at 1565 (footnotes omitted). These microaggressions
"simultaneously sustain defensive-deferential thinking and erode self-confidence in Blacks." Id.
at 1565-66 (citing to Chester M. Pierce, Unity in Diversity: Thirty Years of Stress 17 (1986)
(unpublished manuscript) (on file with author)). Moreover, "[b]y monopolizing perception and
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attitudes and society's attitudes, both conscious and unconscious,
toward race.284 Professor Charles Lawrence explains:
Americans share a common historical and cultural heritage in which
racism has played and still plays a dominant role. Because of this
shared experience, we also inevitably share many ideas, attitudes, and
beliefs that attach significance to an individual's race and induce
negative feelings and opinions about nonwhites. 285
In other words, it is impossible for people to not have strong perceptions
and attitudes about race based upon their own race and background.286
The ramifications of living in poverty have been found to be equally
devastating and subordinating. Not only are the economic conditions
extremely difficult, but persons forced to live in poverty are far more
likely to suffer from the ill-effects of poor educational systems,
deficient or non-existent health care, inadequate housing or
homelessness, hunger, social isolation, police brutality, environmental
health hazards, racial discrimination, high crime rates, and substance
abuse addiction. 287 How these stressors impact a person's perspective
obviously will vary with each person and each situation. Yet, it is
apparent that any one of these circumstances, and especially a
combination of them, has the capacity to alter one's life in a myriad of
ways.
One of the few studies to even look at these issues in the context of
child protection proceedings and the attorney-child client relationship
found that, when black children were represented by black attorneys, or
when white children were represented by white attorneys, the odds that
the children would be removed from their home were reduced
substantially. 288 The researchers believe that one explanation for this
occurrence may "lie in the fact that race remains a substantial social and
action through regularly irregular disruptions, they contribute to relative paralysis of action,
planning and self-esteem. They seem to be the principal foundation for the verification of Black
inferiority for both whites and Blacks." Id.; see also Pierce, supra note 282, at 515 (defining
microaggressions as "white putdowns, done in automatic or unconscious fashion").
284. See Lawrence, supra note 282, at 321-30 (describing racism as both a crime and disease
and examining unconscious racial motivations).
285. Id. at 322 (footnote omitted); see also Pierce, supra note 282, at 513.
286. See Pierce, supra note 282, at 513 (concluding that "[iun almost any instance of black-
white negotiation, the black sees things one way, while the white see them differently").
287. See generally HERBERT J. GANS, THE WAR AGAINST THE POOR: THE UNDERCLASS AND
ANTIPOVERTY POLICY 5 (1995); JOEL F. HANDLER, THE POVERTY OF WELFARE REFORM 32-39
(1995); Federle, supra note 31, at 1237-43; Paul A. Jargowsky & Mary Jo Bane, Ghetto Poverty
in the United States 1970-1980, in THE URBAN UNDERCLASS 235, 249-50 (Christopher Jencks &
Paul E. Peterson eds., 1991); Charles N. Oberg et al., A Portrait of America's Children: The
Impact of Poverty andA Call to Action, 4 J. OF SOC. DISTRESS & HOMELESS 43, 45-53 (1995).
288. See Kelly & Ramsey, supra note 6, at 438.
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communicative barrier and consequently, where no barrier exists among
attorney, client, and parents, greater degrees of empathy and
cooperation may help to avoid a drastic custodial disposition such as
removal. 289
2. The Applicability of the Theoretics of Practice Movement
Further support for the need to specifically acknowledge and
recognize the impact of differences in race, ethnicity, and class on one's
lawyering and relationships with clients can be found in a relatively new
and developing scholarly literature known as the "theoretics of practice"
movement. 290 This new body of literature has begun to apply critical
race theory and multi-disciplinary knowledge concerning power,
subordination, and marginalization to the study of lawyering. 291  The
significance of this literature is its concern regarding prevailing
practices of lawyering for "lower income persons"292 and persons from
disadvantaged backgrounds, and its focus on the need to "situate their
work in the lives and in the communities of the [clients]. 29 3 One of the
primary goals of this approach to lawyering is the empowerment of the
client through the relationship that the attorney and client develop
together and the collaborative lawyering efforts in which they work
together.294 "Rebellious lawyers" emphasize the need to work with, not
289. Id.
290. See, e.g., Symposium, Theoretics of Practice: The Integration of Progressive Thought
and Action, 43 HASTINGS L.J. 717 (1992). Depending on one's focus this new literature also has
been called "rebellious lawyering," see GERALD P. LOPEZ, REBELLIOUS LAWYERING: ONE
CHICANO'S VISION OF PROGRESSIVE LAW PRACTICE (1992) [hereinafter REBELLIOUS
LAWYERING], "collaborative lawyering," see Ascanio Piomelli, Appreciating Collaborative
Lawyering, 6 CLINICAL L. REV. 427 (2000), or "community lawyering," see, e.g., Shauna
Marshall, Mission Impossible: Ethical Community Lawyering, CLINICAL L. REV. (forthcoming
Jan. 2001).
291. Some of the leading proponents of this movement are Professors Anthony V. Alfieri,
Gerald P. Lopez, and Lucie E. White. For complete lists of their works, see Piomelli, supra note
290, at 432 nn.27, 25, and 26 respectively. Clearly, a full analysis of this new theoretical
approach to lawyering far exceeds the thesis of this paper. For an excellent and recent synopsis
of the literature, as well as a discussion of those who critique it, see id. at 427.
292. Professor Piomelli explains why it is preferable to use the term "lower-income" rather
than "poor." He finds that the latter term connotes "pitifulness." Moreover, he maintains that
"some of the authors of this new scholarship do not limit their focus to representing those with
the very lowest incomes." Id. at 423 n.23.
293. Gerald P. Lopez, Reconceiving Civil Rights Practice: Seven Weeks in the Life of a
Rebellious Collaboration, 77 GEO. L.J. 1603, 1608 (1989) [hereinafter Lopez, Reconceiving Civil
Rights Practice].
294. "At the level of practice, the most significant common theme of this literature is its
commitment to more active client participation in the framing and resolution of disputes ....
What is different about the new scholarship is its call to involve clients in the actual
implementation of remedial strategies." Piomelli, supra note 290, at 440; see also REBELLIOUS
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for, their clients and to constantly be aware of how the dynamics of
power shape every aspect of the clients' lives and experiences. 295
In sum, the theoretics of practice movement aims to critique and
improve the attorney-client relationship and the performance of
attorneys who work with lower income adult clients by studying how
preconceived and unconscious beliefs based on differences in culture
and background impact the ability to competently lawyer. 296  For
example, one legal scholar looked to social science research and
concluded the following:
Cultural differences may have several effects. They can lead to
misunderstandings between counselor and client. They can interfere
with the establishment of rapport and trust between counselor and
client. Cultural differences may also alienate the client from the
source of help. Additionally, if the counselor is unaware of cultural
differences, the counselor may incorrectly analyze an interaction with
the client. Moreover, the counselor may fail to fully appreciate that
his/her role is dynamic and impacts on any given interaction with the
client.2
97
Another declared that it is necessary to take gender, race, and class
into consideration in order to answer the following questions:
[H]ow are lawyers to understand the 'individual makeup of each
client?' How are we to learn 'who she 'really' is?' How are we to
establish a 'counseling dialogue?' How are we to 'help clients resolve
LAWYERING, supra note 290, at 38-82; Lopez, Reconceiving Civil Rights Practice, supra note
293, at 1608-57; Lucie E. White, Collaborative Lawyering in the Field? On Mapping Paths from
Rhetoric to Practice, 1 CLINICAL L. REV. 157, 157-61 (1994).
295. See Anthony V. Alfieri, Speaking Out of Turn: The Story of Josephine V, 4 GEO. J.
LEGAL ETHICS 619, 629 (1991) (imploring advocates to "listen [] to and giv[e] voice to client
stories" as a way of beginning to overcome some of the power imbalances between clients and
attorneys); Peter Gabel & Paul Harris, Building Power and Breaking Images: Critical Legal
Theory and the Practice of Law, 11 REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 369, 375, 375-79 (1982-83)
(describing a "power-oriented" approach to law practice); Piomelli, supra note 290, at 439-40
(summarizing how collaborative lawyering scholars conceptualize power); Lucie E. White,
Subordination, Rhetorical Survival Skills, and Sunday Shoes: Notes on the Hearing of Mrs. G., 38
BUFF. L. REV. 1, 21-58 (1990) (examining how a client's subordination affects her ability and
willingness to participate in attorney-client relationships and formal legal proceedings).
296. See Michelle S. Jacobs, People from the Footnotes: The Missing Element in Client-
Centered Counseling, 27 GOLDEN GATE U. L. REV. 345, 377 (1997) (studying "(1) how the
lawyer's unconscious racism and cultural bias may impact the attorney-client relationship; and (2)
how the client's cultural experiences and internalization of microaggressions impact the client's
view of the relationship with not only the lawyer, but, also, the law"); see also Anthony V.
Alfieri, Disabled Clients, Disabling Lawyers, 43 HASTINGS L.J. 769, 791-92 (1992) (discussing
how lawyers' depiction of clients as "dependent," "incompetent," or "deviant" serve to maintain
clients in these roles).
297. Jacobs, supra note 296, at 377; see also id. app. at 413 tbl. I (containing examples of
some possible verbal and non-verbal sources of miscommunication between cultural groups).
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problems?' How are we to assign 'maximum value' to client decision
making? Finally, how is a client to 'hear' what we have to say and
'see' what we have to show? 298
While the significant issues presented by the age and maturity levels
of child clients, as well as the context of child protection proceedings,
may have enormous implications for the relevance of this literature to
attorney-child client relationships, it does not follow that this literature
is irrelevant and unimportant to child advocates. For example, it is an
inescapable fact that race is a factor in Andrew and Brenda's lives and
in the life of their attorney.299 It will affect Andrew and Brenda's
understanding of and relationship with their attorney, as well as with
court officials, child welfare agency personnel, and everyone else who
takes part in child protection proceedings. 3° Similarly, race will impact
the lawyer's understanding of Andrew and Brenda, her interactions with
them, and her ability to communicate with Andrew, Brenda, Ms. Jones,
and any other family or community member. Ultimately, what happens
between Andrew and Brenda and their lawyer may have both subtle and
profound effects on the lives of Andrew and Brenda. Not only will it
likely impact the decision made by the lawyer on behalf of Andrew and
Brenda, but it will tremendously affect Andrew and Brenda's
willingness and ability, both now and in the future, to participate in the
proceedings, work with their lawyer, and understand what is
occurring. 30
1
298. Anthony V. Alfieri, The Politics of Clinical Knowledge, 35 N.Y. L. SCH. L. REv. 7, 18-
19 (1990); see also Hing, supra note 275, at 1810 (acknowledging that "by knowing more about
[the client's] race and culture and by being cognizant of our differences, I may avoid making
inappropriate assumptions and establishing false expectations and thereby improve my ability to
communicate with her"); Robert Rubinson, Constructions of Client Competence and Theories of
Practice, 31 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 121, 134 (1999) (noting how "attorney perceptions of clients are
influenced by stereotypes"); White, supra note 295, at 21-58 (illustrating through a case example
how and why the recognition of race and class differences is so important).
299. "Cognitive development around three years of age permits a child to become aware of
racial difference and it is here that he or she can first directly experience the effects of racism....
The effects of racism begin to impact children more directly after eight or nine years of age."
James P. Comer, Racism and the Education of Young Children, 90 TCHRS. COLLEGE REC. 352,
354-55 (1989).
300. "Somewhere between eight and twelve children begin to 'place' themselves and their
families in the social status structure that they have begun to observe. They begin to internalize
the attitudes about themselves held by powerful individuals in their environment - parents,
teachers, others - and they often act on or react to these expectations in a self-fulfilling manner."
Id. at 355.
301. See Jeanne B. Robinson, Clinical Treatment of Black Families: Issues and Strategies,
SOC. WORK 323, 325 (1989) (finding that differences in race significantly impact on the
relationship that is developed between a clinical social worker and her client and on the
effectiveness of counseling); Chalmer E. Thompson et al., Counselor Content Orientation,
Counselor Race, and Black Women's Cultural Mistrust and Self-Disclosures, 41 J. OF COUNS.
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Professor William Kell has begun to focus on the very important
question of how the theoretics of practice movement can inform and aid
child advocates. 30 2  His application, however, is limited to exploring
how this literature can guide child advocates in overcoming differences
in age. 30 3  Absent from his analysis is an examination of how
differences in race, class, and ethnicity may impact lawyering for
children. Yet, knowledge of lawyering for adults of different
backgrounds stresses that such an understanding is essential,
particularly considering that such differences factor into lawyering
activities and the attorney-child client relationships that develop.
Consequently, there is a great need for scholars and practitioners, in a
variety of disciplines, to begin to broach these questions.
Our ability to understand our child clients' lives and communities, as
Professor Peters calls upon us to do, depends on our ability to open
ourselves up, to listen, to question when we do not understand, and to
recognize that there is not one ideal norm, but rather that differences
exist.304 An analysis of exactly how these principles and approaches are
incorporated into our lawyering is beyond the scope of this article.
Clearly, there is a great need for more in-depth exploration of why and
how differences in race, ethnicity, and class impact our lawyering for
children and how we might improve our representation based on our
awareness of these differences. Unless we take the time to develop this
deeper understanding, our lawyering will be lacking and our
assessments of what is best for our young child clients might still be
based on our own value systems rather than on a contextual
understanding of their lives.
PSYCHOL. 155, 155 (1994) (maintaining that "[situdies have shown that Black clients report
lower levels of rapport with White counselors than with Black counselors, prefer Black
counselors to White counselors, and report greater counseling satisfaction with racially similar
counselors than with racially dissimilar counselors").
302. See Kell, supra note 76, at 636, 642-45. Specifically, he finds that this literature
"demonstrate[s] the need for child advocates to re-examine how they approach client
relationships." Id. at 636.
It is important to recognize that to a certain extent Professor Buss, through her analysis of
whether children can be empowered, also has begun to apply this literature to lawyering for
children. However, my emphasis is somewhat different and broader. I believe we need to
consider and build upon this literature because it contributes greatly to our general understanding
of how our clients' diverse backgrounds will impact our attorney-child client relationships, the
child clients' experiences in the legal proceeding, and the outcomes of the proceedings. It is the
latter focus that I believe likely will be important to our efforts at improving the representation of
children.
303. Differences in race and class are only mentioned as one of many factors to consider in
trying to understand a child's view of the world. See id. at 644.
304. Martha Minow, Foreword: Justice Engendered, 101 HARV. L. REV. 10, 31-33, 70-81
(1987).
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VII. SOME ALTERNATIVE AND MORE FEASIBLE RECOMMENDATIONS
Given that the requisite support for the improvement of lawyering for
children has not been forthcoming and is not likely to increase in the
foreseeable future, 30 5 it is important to consider less costly alternatives
that can immediately aid in ensuring that children receive adequate
representation and that the unique needs and interests of each child is
and remains the focus of the proceeding. With the exception of my last
recommendation in Section D, which is limited to the representation of
young children, the following suggestions concern children of all ages
who are involved in child protection proceedings. As I stated above,
however, none of these suggestions, either individually or taken
together, would protect the interests of young children to the same
degree as would a legal representative following the model proposed in
Part VI.
306
A. Training
This article has focused on concerns related to discretion and bias in
the representation of children and has discussed ways to reduce such
bias and discretion in that representation. The concerns regarding
discretion and bias, however, are not limited to lawyers for young
children. Judges, representatives of the child welfare agencies, and
parents' attorneys also are not immune from bias and operate with
discretion.30 7 Thus, there is a serious need for mandatory, higher
quality, and more comprehensive education of all professionals
involved in the child protection system (i.e., representatives for the
children, attorneys for the other parties, judges, and caseworkers). 30 8
Training is a relatively inexpensive undertaking, a proposal that is
supported by numerous persons and entities,309 and, perhaps most
305. Numerous commentators have called for an increased level of support for attorneys
representing children in child protection proceedings. However, these pleas have not been
heeded. See, e.g., Walter, supra note 3, at 58.
306. It is important to note that the recommendations outlined in Sections A, B, and C could
be implemented in conjunction with the approach to lawyering outlined in Part VI. The needs of
children forced to participate in our child protection system would be best met if this were to
occur.
307. See Elaine Pinderhughes, Developing Diversity Competence in Child Welfare and
Permanency Planning, in THE CHALLENGE OF PERMANENCY PLANNING IN A MULTICULTURAL
SOCIETY (Gary R. Anderson et al. eds., 1997) (highlighting the need to train child welfare
caseworkers on how to work with diverse populations).
308. See Appell, supra note 30, at 602 (concluding that the "[i]mproved training of
caseworkers, lawyers, and judges could help ameliorate many ... problems").
309. See supra notes 76, 122 and accompanying text; infra note 311 and accompanying text.
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importantly, an activity that has demonstrated significant results. 310
Consequently, the inclusion of more exhaustive and ongoing
educational programs should be an important part of any reform
package.
Such an educational program would need to not only focus on issues
concerning child abuse and neglect, confidentiality, child protection
systems, child development, and family systems, but also emphasize the
significance of differences in race, class, and culture, and discuss how
lawyers and other representatives can work with children and families
from different backgrounds. 311 Disciplines other than law have created
comprehensive training regimens based on the need for cultural
competency. 312  Some concentrations have even gone so far as to
integrate cross-cultural training into their general curriculum.3 13 While
310. See Duquette & Ramsey, supra note 73, at 342-91 (demonstrating through a study the
benefits of training in improving the quality of representation).
311. See Espinoza, supra note 282, at 910 (calling for race-conscious education); Hing, supra
note 275, at 1810-11 (explaining that "common sense, without training, is dangerously fashioned
by our own class, race, ethnicity/culture, gender and sexual background"); Jacobs, supra note
296, at 348 (maintaining that race neutral training of interviewing and counseling skills may
actually lead to continued marginalization of clients of color); Ann Shalleck, Theory and
Experience in Constructing the Relationship Between Lawyer and Client: Representing Women
Who Have Been Abused, 64 TENN. L. REV. 1019, 1041 (1997) (exhorting legal academics to
develop teaching mechanisms that train law students to be attentive to the context of their clients'
lives); Hartmann, supra note 106, at 247 (concluding that "training will help make the 'best
interests' decision less subjective").
312. See Sharon-Ann Gopaul-McNicol, A Theoretical Framework for Training Monolingual
School Psychologists to Work with Multilingual/Multicultural Children: An Exploration of the
Major Competencies, 34 PSYCH. IN SCHS. 17, 17 (1997) (focusing on the necessity of cross-
cultural training for school psychologists so that they can address the psycho-educational needs of
a culturally and linguistically diverse student body and proposing "major competency skills...
needed by all school psychologists"); Derald Wing Sue et al., Multicultural Counseling
Competencies and Standards: A Call to the Profession, 20 J. MULTICULTURAL COUNS. & DEV.
64, 74-80 (1992) (describing 31 multicultural counseling competencies and explaining the need
for such competencies); see also APA Guidelines for Providers of Psychological Services to
Ethnic, Linguistic, and Culturally Diverse Populations (last modified Jan. 29, 2000)
<http://www.apa.org/piguide.html>; Psychological Testing of Language Minority and Culturally
Different Children (last modified Jan. 29, 2000) <http://www.apa.org/pi/psych.html>.
313. See SHIRLEY JENKINS, ETHNICITY AND RACE: CRITICAL CONCEPTS IN SOCIAL WORK
(Jacobs & Bowles eds., 1988) (stressing the need to integrate ethnic studies into the social work
curriculum); Celia Jaes Falicov, Training to Think Culturally: A Multidimensional Comparative
Framework, 34 FAM. PROCESS 373, 377 (1995) (presenting a multi-dimensional framework that
"takes culture into the mainstream of all thinking, teaching, and learning in family therapy");
Gopaul-McNicol, supra note 312, at 26 (emphasizing that in the training of school psychologists
the "[i]nclusion of cultural and ethnic content should be infused in each course, not taught as a
single course only" and that there should be "aggressive recruitment of faculty members and
students of various cultural backgrounds"); Robert-Jay Green, Training Programs: Guidelines for
Multicultural Transformation, in RE-vISIONING FAMILY THERAPY: RACE CULTURE AND
GENDER IN CLINICAL PRACTICE (McGoldrick ed., 1998) (advocating for changes in the
educational institutions and programs that train family therapists).
80 Loyola University Chicago Law Journal [Vol. 32
we must be mindful of differences in approach and purpose, this likely
is a good starting place. In sum, I wish to strenuously emphasize the
need for thoughtful, comprehensive, and mandatory training programs
for all participants in the child protective system.
B. Proposed Changes in State Laws and/or Child Welfare Agency
Policies
In addition to the need for increased training, state regulations or
child welfare policies should be amended to reflect supplemental
requirements on the part of child welfare agency representatives. 31
4
These proposed mandates would require all non-attorney representatives
of child welfare agencies, otherwise known as caseworkers, to express
to the court all services and placements which the caseworker believes
are necessary and in the best interests of the children and families who
are the subject of these proceedings even when agency policy conflicts
with the provision of such services or placements. 315 Moreover, when a
shortage of resources prevents the child welfare agency from providing
what would be in the children's best interests, the caseworker must
make this information known to the court as well.3 16
314. The representative of a child welfare agency may be an attorney or a caseworker (who
may or may not be a licensed social worker) or both. However, with respect to my proposal, I am
only referring to non-attorney representatives. Mandating attorneys to follow these proposals
might interfere with their ethical obligations as legal representatives for the agency.
315. This recommendation could be implemented in a variety of ways. First, state regulations
governing the responsibilities and conduct of employees of child welfare agencies could be
amended. Second, formal guidance could be provided by the federal child welfare agency (the
Federal Department of Health and Human Services). It is common for this federal agency to
issue policy memoranda to the state child welfare agencies. Third, internal policies of state or
county child welfare agencies could be supplemented with new provisions. Given the likelihood
that caseworkers will have a difficult time complying with this new requirement, the first option,
which is the only one that is legally binding, might be preferable.
This policy change would be buttressed if recommendations made by Howard Davidson,
Executive Director of the ABA Center on Children and the Law, also were followed. Mr.
Davidson cites the need for all caseworkers to have at least college degrees in social work,
counseling, or a directly related field and for them to "be legally required to attend a pre-service
academy similar to the intensive professional skills education that police, firefighter, and
emergency medical technician trainees typically receive, with rigorous tests of competencies
mandated at the completion of the training." Davidson, supra note 32, at 773. Moreover, Mr.
Davidson recommends that "children ombudsmen" agencies be established, "well-publicized
places where parents, other concerned adults, or children can register complaints about
infringement of rights, lack of services, improper care, etc." Id. Finally, he proposes that child
welfare agencies and juvenile courts be required "to make specific findings on the relationship of
family poverty to children's entry or continuation in the child welfare system." Id. at 775.
316. Such a change in law and agency policy also might need to include protections for the
caseworkers who will be forced to make such disclosures.
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Reviewing the circumstances of Andrew and Brenda helps to
illustrate the importance of this new requirement. For example, under
my proposed plan, a caseworker assigned to assist Andrew, Brenda, and
their mother would be required to alert the court of the existence of Ms.
Jones and the suitability of Ms. Jones as a temporary caregiver, despite
the agency policy prohibiting placement of children with unlicensed
caregivers who are not blood-relatives. Likewise, the caseworker would
have to make known to the court the fact that Andrew and Brenda's
mother needed drug rehabilitation services even if the child welfare
agency was not able to provide the services because of a shortage of
appropriate resources.
Whether the above-described alteration in policy will be able to
overcome the strong force of internal pressure that caseworkers
experience to streamline services and follow agency procedures and
policies is unclear; however, it may set a different tone and, hopefully,
will result in some caseworkers informing the court when the agency is
not able to make decisions or provide services that are consistent with
the best interests of the children and their families. In addition, it may
inspire some caseworkers, especially those who are relatively new to
their positions, to avoid accepting as inevitable certain resource
constraints and policies that may negatively impact some children and
families. My hope is that this change in policy will encourage
caseworkers to be responsible to both the agency and the children and
families that have been assigned to them for assistance.317
Of course, this new reporting requirement will not guarantee an
increase in services and resources for children and families. Judges
who become aware of problems or deficiencies will not necessarily
order the needed changes, and, even if they do, there is no certainty that
the orders will be followed.318 While my ultimate objective is to be
more responsive to the needs of children and families, I understand that,
given the serious and long-standing deficiencies that exist in all of the
structures that make up our child protection system, additional reporting
will not change the system immediately. It is, however, my hope that
by mandating caseworkers to report the needs of children and families
317. By emphasizing the need for this dual allegiance, I do not mean to imply that
caseworkers currently do not feel a sense of responsibility to the children and families assigned to
their caseloads. Rather, I aim to stress the impossible situation that many caseworkers find
themselves in of having to balance the desire to meet the needs of children and their families with
the incredible pressures that come from bureaucratic constraints which unfortunately limit the
services and resources available to these same children and families.
318. See Buss, Parents' Rights, supra note 11, at 435 (noting that juvenile court orders are
often not followed).
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notwithstanding shortcomings in policies or resources, all parties,
especially our child welfare agencies and juvenile court judges, will
become more aware of the limits of our child protection system, be
required to confront these issues, and hopefully respond
appropriately. 3 19 ,
C. Additional Responsibilities of Juvenile Court Judges
My proposal with respect to child welfare agencies likely will have a
greater impact when combined with additional responsibilities I propose
being placed on juvenile court judges. In addition to increased training,
I recommend the development of questionnaires that juvenile court
judges would be required to complete at each hearing that occurs in the
course of a child protection proceeding. The enactment of such a
requirement could be in the form of an advisory or directive from a
state's judicial association. Alternatively, and more formally, the
requirement could take the form of a legislative amendment to the
statute, regulations, or court rules that govern a state's or county's child
protection proceedings.
Different questionnaires would need to be developed for each stage
of a child protection proceeding. At a minimum, however, questioning
at each hearing would cover the issues of where the children are placed,
the needs of the children and families, and the services that are being
provided to address these needs. The questions also would be tailored
to the different phases of a child protection proceeding. For example, at
a disposition hearing, in addition to the above issues, a judge would be
required to inquire about the need for assessments, such as specific
medical and/or psychological evaluations. In addition, if the children
have been removed from the care of their parents, and the plan has not
been changed from one of reunification, a judge would have to obtain a
description of the efforts being made to achieve reunification, including
the frequency of visitation between parents and their children and
between siblings (if not placed together), and the provision of necessary
319. The suggestion that our judicial system has a role to play in the development or reform of
public policy may be viewed as controversial. However, upon closer examination, significant
precedent exists. Partnerships between juvenile court judges and child welfare officials,
attorneys, and other interested persons aimed at improving the child protection system have
occurred and are still taking place in most, if not all, jurisdictions. Many of these are being
supported by federal funds. On a related note, juvenile court judges in California voted to oppose
Proposition 21, a state initiative on the March 7, 2000 ballot that called for the enactment of
harsher penalties for various juvenile crimes and changes in state laws concerning juvenile
delinquency. See Catherine Bridge, Lining Up Against Prop 21, THE RECORDER, Feb. 17, 2000,
at 1; Bob Egelko, Judges Oppose Initiatives on Teens, SAN DIEGO UNION-TRIBUNE, Jan. 29,
2000, at A-3.
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ameliorative services to address the cause and effects of the
maltreatment.
These questionnaires may be a more formal version of the process
some judges already follow in practice. It certainly is what most, if not
all, juvenile court judges would want to do if they had the time.
However, my own experience, as well as a more general assessment of
the current functioning of the juvenile courts, unfortunately indicates
that our juvenile court systems are generally forced to rush through
child protection proceedings, allotting only a few minutes for each
hearing. 320  By requiring judges to seek out this more detailed
information at every hearing, I hope to put them in a much better
position to more systematically and thoroughly monitor and review the
welfare of the children that appear before them and, where appropriate,
intervene to protect the children.
A concern about this recommendation is that judges currently do not
have the time to devote to in-depth questioning and investigation and,
therefore, implementation of this requirement would require greatly
increased resources. While this is a valid point in the short term, it is
likely that the need for additional judicial resources will lessen over
time. Once all of the parties become accustomed to the fact that such
questions will be asked by the judge at each hearing, they will begin to
gather such information as part of their hearing preparation and
practices. Thus, the time it takes for the court to collect and record the
information will diminish.
Hopefully, the court's insistence on receiving this information will
encourage all of the parties to think comprehensively about the needs of
the children and their families and, in turn, the necessity of developing
programs and practices to better address the identified needs. When
weighed against the fact that this additional requirement likely will
increase the probability that the child welfare agencies and the courts
will be more responsive to the needs of the children and their families,
any minimal increase in resources needed to enable the juvenile court
judges to implement this recommendation is not significant.
D. An Alternative Model to Consider for Representing Young Children
My final thoughts have the potential to improve the quality of
representation that some young children currently receive, but is not one
that I make without a great deal of trepidation. Yet, if a commitment to
320. See supra notes 53-63 and accompanying text (explaining some of the shortcomings of
many juvenile courts).
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dedicate the resources necessary to improve and augment legal
representation provided to children is not supported, then inadequate,
haphazard, and biased representation likely will persist. In this instance,
it would be worth studying whether some form of a CASA program
might provide an alternative model for the representation of young
children that can ensure that these children are represented adequately
and in a less biased manner. In particular, we need to focus on the
degree of involvement needed by lawyers, the effectiveness of CASAs,
especially in the courtroom, and the ability to recruit a sufficient
number of CASAs.321  Whether any CASA model would ever be
capable of providing adequate representation to all young children is
unclear. However, in some circumstances, it would appear that such a
system might be preferred over the status quo. Yet, without additional
information and study, it is impossible to know. Therefore, this final
recommendation only calls for additional study.
As was briefly mentioned above, a CASA is a trained, volunteer, lay
advocate. 322 Programs that recruit, train, and coordinate the provision
of representation by CASAs exist in every state. 323  Some CASA
programs are configured so that a CASA is paired with an attorney
representative, while in other programs, the CASA volunteer may be on
his own or loosely supervised by an attorney. 324  Under any type of
321. As is stated above, this recommendation is the only one that is limited to young children.
Given that there is little, if any, controversy over the provision of legal representation to older
children who are competent, I limit this discussion of proposed changes to the type of
representation that is provided to young children only. It is my hope that, at least for older
children, those able to voice their interests and direct the scope of representation, my preference,
as well as the preference of many others, for the provision of legal representation will be
followed.
As for guidance on how to determine a young child, I, like others, am reluctant to pinpoint an
exact age. See Buss, Developmental Barriers, supra note 11, at 920, 955. However, given the
significance of this distinction, as well as literature that points to the age of seven as a critical
turning point, I would err on the side of designating a child as an older child so that more children
will receive representation by lawyers.
322. Some jurisdictions use trained volunteers, but do not describe them as CASAs. See
NATIONAL STUDY, supra note 12, at 6. For purposes of this discussion, I will refer to all trained
volunteers, including those organized outside of the formal CASA program, as CASAs.
323. See supra notes 4, 72-74 and accompanying text. For more details about the recruiting
and screening process for CASAs, see Adams, supra note 4, at 1468-69.
324. National Standards of the National CASA Associations require that each program
recognized by the Association operate with access to legal counsel. See Howard Davidson,
Collaborative Advocacy on Behalf of Children: Effective Partnerships Between CASA and the
Child's Attorney, in LAWYERS FOR CHILDREN 17, 25 (ABA Center for Children and the Law ed.,
1990). However, not every lay advocacy program is recognized by the National CASA
Association. Moreover, having access to an attorney does not guarantee that the attorney has the
necessary expertise, nor does it ensure that CASAs have adequate support. See Duquette &
Ramsey, supra note 73, at 349 (explaining that in some communities, "the volunteer may be
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CASA model, the typical caseload of a CASA consists of children from
no more than three families, and often a CASA is only responsible for
one child or one sibling group at a time. 325  The training of CASAs,
their responsibilities, and the point at which they are appointed in a
child protection proceeding vary from jurisdiction to jurisdiction. 326
However, all CASA programs provide training.327  In most programs,
this training consists of instruction on the roles and responsibilities of
the CASA, confidentiality, child abuse/neglect, permanency planning,
the hearing process, the investigation of cases, the interrelationships
between various agencies, child development, and cultural awareness. 328
Moreover, most programs mandate that a CASA spend a certain amount
of time per week with the children for whom they have been appointed
as advocate and that they make a commitment to remain involved with
the children and/or with the case for a significant period of time.329
The strengths of the CASA programs can be found in the
commitment and dedication of the volunteers, the extensive training that
CASA programs provide, and the fact that each volunteer pledges to
devote a significant amount of time to his work with the children. 330  It
is these factors, among others, that put CASAs in the unique position of
being able to get to know the children that are assigned to them and of
learning about and understanding their lives and needs. Some relatively
recent studies on the effectiveness of representation for children in child
paired with an attorney and become the 'eyes and ears' of the child's lawyer," while in other
areas, the volunteer may be on his own); Heartz, supra note 4, at 332-33 (remarking that models
of representation that include volunteers vary). A survey conducted by the National Court
Appointed Special Advocate Association in 1992 found that in approximately 60 percent of
CASA programs, volunteers served as the child's sole representative. See id. at 337.
325. See Adams, supra note 4, at 1470.
326. However, the National Court Appointed Special Advocates Association has developed
national standards. See id. at 1468.
327. See NATIONAL STUDY, supra note 12, at 42 (concluding that "all CASA and volunteer
programs require training"); Adams, supra note 4, at 1468-69 (discussing mandatory training
program).
328. See Adams, supra note 4, at 1468-69. Most training programs for CASAs include an
initial training program lasting from nineteen to forty hours combined with ongoing training. For
example, in San Francisco, CASAs are required to make an eighteen-month commitment.
However, it is significant to note that despite these requirements the average tenure of a CASA is
only 1.5 years, compared to 2 years for staff attorneys and 5 years for private attorneys. See
NATIONAL EVALUATION, supra note 64, at 20.
329. See FINAL REPORT, supra note 12, at xiv (finding that CASAs have been very effective
in the tasks of investigation and monitoring); see also Heartz, supra note 4, at 340-41.
330. See NATIONAL EVALUATION, supra note 64, at 18 (concluding that the two reasons for
the effectiveness of CASAs is their "personal motivation" and their "low caseloads"); see also
Heartz, supra note 4, at 340-41 (recounting the results from evaluations of the effectiveness of the
lay volunteers).
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protection proceedings suggest that CASAs are able to provide adequate
representation. 331 In fact, one study found that "compared to attorneys,
the CASA models were clearly superior."332
Despite this support, several significant concerns exist. First, it is
unclear from the studies that have been conducted to date whether
CASAs alone are providing the representation, or if they are working
with another representative who may be an attorney. Where the CASAs
clearly are functioning as the sole representative, it is unclear if the
CASAs are supervised by attorneys or other experienced advocates,
and, if so, the degree of the supervisors' involvement. 333 For example,
one report declared that trained lay advocates, law students, and trained
attorneys performed substantially similar as child advocates, and that all
of these types of representatives performed better than untrained
attorneys.334 In actuality, the CASAs that were studied worked under
the supervision of an experienced, trained attorney and the supervising
attorney "appeared in approximately sixty-five percent of the
hearings ... [and handled all] cases that went to contested
adjudication. '" 335
Secondly, and related to the previous concern, representation of
young children by CASAs alone still leaves us with the question of
whether lay advocates will be able to master the legal knowledge,
advocacy skills, and expertise necessary to adequately protect the
interests of young children, and whether children represented by
CASAs will be able to be respected and treated as an equal party by the
331. See NATIONAL EVALUATION, supra note 64, at 20; Duquette & Ramsey, supra note 73,
at 389. But see FINAL REPORT, supra note 12, at xix (suggesting that no single GAL model is
superior to others and that an "optimal approach" would involve the combined resources of
"attorneys, lay volunteers, and caseworkers to perform the broad range of functions and
services").
332. NATIONAL EVALUATION, supra note 64, at 20. "The CASA's success appeared to be
due to their intimate knowledge of the case. They conducted extensive investigations, monitored
the case closely for its duration and developed good relationships with their child clients. CASAs
were most effective in ensuring the family was receiving services that would lead to family
reunification." Id. at 18. This study also found that representation by private attorneys was
ineffective and the weakest form of representation, and that, while the staff attorney model
showed evidence of effectiveness, it was affected by caseloads that were too high. See id. at 15-
21.
333. For example, the characterization of the lay volunteer model in the National Evaluation is
vague as to the degree to which the CASAs are supervised by attorneys. When defining
representation by CASAs, it merely states that "[flay volunteers serve as the GALs under the
supervision of a staff attorney, panel attorneys, or the public defender. Volunteers receive
training, conduct all investigations and follow-up and appear in court." NATIONAL EVALUATION,
supra note 64, at 2. The extent and manner of supervision is never explained.
334. See Duquette & Ramsey, supra note 73, at 389-90.
335. Id. at 360.
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judge and other parties in the proceeding. 336 These concerns are
supported by at least one study that looked at the different tasks that
representatives are called upon to do and concluded that CASAs did not
perform very effectively in those tasks involving. negotiation and
"courtroom activities." 337
Finally, a question remains as to whether there would ever be an
adequate number of dedicated volunteers if a jurisdiction were to
expand its use of CASAs, or substitute CASAs for some attorneys. This
concern becomes even greater when one considers the time and
emotional commitment required of CASAs. It also may be a more
serious concern in large, urban settings with high child protection
dockets. Most studies of the effectiveness of representation for children
involved in child protection proceedings fail to address this concern,
and those few that do note that it is "sometimes difficult to recruit
volunteers.,"3 3 8
Having reviewed the reported strengths and weaknesses of CASA
programs, it appears that CASAs are strongest when they receive the
training and have the time necessary to appreciate the importance of
gaining a deep understanding of the lives and backgrounds of the
children they are representing. However, CASAs are lacking in their
ability to communicate the interests and needs of the children in the
courtroom and other adversarial settings (i.e., pre-trial negotiations) that
are part of child protection proceedings. Therefore, it may be worth
studying whether we can recruit and appropriately train a sufficient
number of CASAs and how CASAs and lawyers can work together so
that we maximize the reported strengths of CASAs and use lawyers to
help support them where they are weak.
A few commentators before me have suggested models that combine
representation by lay advocates and attorneys. Recently, Professor
Appell argued that the best model of representation for young children
is one where the attorney would represent a specially trained and well-
supported lay advocate instead of the child.339 Moreover, in 1990, Mr.
Davidson maintained that the best model of representation is "both a
336. See Buss, Developmental Barriers, supra note 11, at 954-55; see also supra Part V and
notes 237-43 and accompanying text.
337. See FINAL REPORT, supra note 12, at 6-15 (concluding that CASAs should be
accompanied by and represented by an attorney in all courtroom proceedings and negotiations
and that attorneys were more effective than CASAs in having their recommendations adopted as
part of the court proceedings).
338. NATIONAL EVALUATION, supra note 64, at 20.
339. See Appell, supra note 95, at 1971-73.
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lawyer and a CASA.' 340 While there is some merit to the suggestion
that all children in child protection proceedings should be appointed
both lay advocates and attorneys, it is unlikely that legislatures across
the country will do so. Convincing states to not only secure counsel for
all children, but also well-trained lay advocates, who may even be
compensated for their time, like the model proposed in Part VI, presents
serious resource issues. Moreover, if such resources are available, a
model such as the one described in Part VI likely would be preferable.
Perhaps another combined model worthy of consideration is one
where CASAs provide the majority of the representation of young
children, but are supported by child advocacy law offices, which are
staffed by one or more trained and experienced attorneys.3 41 It would
not be the duty of the staff of these law offices to serve the
representational needs of all children. Rather, these offices would: 1)
represent a few children in individual child protection matters, most
likely those which are contested, legally complicated, or concern a
novel or significant legal issue; 2) assist CASAs, generally, by
providing legal information and support; 3) monitor the overall
operation of the child protection system; and 4) advocate for positive
systemic change. Not only would this structure provide legal assistance
to CASAs and legal representation for those children embroiled in
difficult child protection proceedings, but the structure also would
enable experienced child advocates to obtain a first-hand and ongoing
understanding of the problems in the system while still allowing them to
have the time to press for systemic change.
Whether this model of dual representation or any other approach
other than the one outlined above in Part VI will be able to provide
adequate representation to young children remains unclear. Where a
jurisdiction currently does not provide any legal representation to
children and also does not provide any attorney supervision to its CASA
program, the system clearly would be an improvement and should be
340. Davidson, supra note 324, at 21-41; see also DUQUETrE, supra note 104.
341. For example, in New York City and Baltimore, the cities' legal aid offices maintain
specialty units, comprised of attorneys, social workers, and support staff, devoted entirely to the
representation of children in child protection proceedings. A major difference, however, between
these offices and my proposal is that these offices represent many, if not most, of the children that
are brought before juvenile courts due to allegations of child abuse and/or neglect. For an
analysis of the effectiveness of having legal services represent children in child protection
proceedings, see William Grimm, Child Advocacy in a Legal Services Program, in ABA CENTER
ON CHILDREN AND THE LAW, LAWYERS FOR CHILDREN 98 (1990). A different type of children's
law office can be found in San Francisco, where some children are served by a non-profit law
office known as Legal Services for Children. This office handles a variety of legal matters
affecting children, including a small caseload of child protection matters.
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considered. Moreover, in those jurisdictions where attorneys are unable
to provide competent representation due to a lack of support, it also may
be worthwhile to explore alternative models. Those models that
combine the strengths of CASAs and the strengths of attorneys may
come closest to a more affordable model that provides representation
that is both adequate and less biased. Yet, given all of the concerns
articulated above about any wide-scale reliance on CASAs and the
significance of the changes proposed, a careful and thorough period of
study is all that should be taken at this time.342
VIII. CONCLUSION
Professor Guggenheim may be correct in asserting that we have
entered "Phase Three" of the overall study of the role of counsel for
children in child protection proceedings. 343  However, his
characterization of the focus of this new phase is mistaken. Rather than
exhausting any further energy on the questions of whether and when
children should be appointed representatives, we need to keep our focus
on how to best provide such representation.
I hope that the preceding analysis demonstrates why young children
involved in child protection proceedings need representation and why
any movement to eliminate or lessen such representation will only
subject already vulnerable children to great risk of harm. Yet, what
unfortunately also is evident is that the representation with which all
children have been provided to date has been woefully inadequate. Not
only because it has been insufficiently supported, but because
representatives have lacked guidance as to their roles and
responsibilities. Consequently, representatives, especially
representatives of young children, have advocated positions that were
not reflective of the lives and experiences of the children, but rather,
were reflective of the values and views of the representatives.
The question then becomes how can we provide better representation.
Professor Jean Koh Peters' model, which calls for a contextual approach
to representation, has taken us several steps forward. Further
recognition of differences between the representatives and children in
342. Even the director of the National Court Appointed Advocates Association contends that
more study is needed. See Heartz, supra note 4, at 340 (asserting that "additional large scale and
longitudinal evaluations of volunteer models are needed to determine if volunteer effectiveness is
universal").
343. See Guggenheim, Reconsidering the Need, supra note 11, at 304. Professor Guggenheim
refers to Phase 3 as a re-evaluation of whether and when lawyers should be appointed to represent
children.
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terms of race, ethnicity, and class, and how these differences impact our
representation and the relationships we develop with our child clients
will move us even closer to a less biased and more principled form of
representation that leads to a solid and deep understanding of the lives
of our child clients.
Unfortunately, although I believe it is critical for these children to
receive this kind of representation, I also understand that it is not likely
to occur given the unwillingness to dedicate resources necessary to
provide such representation. I hope that the necessary support will one
day soon be provided. Yet, until this occurs, it is worth studying
whether less costly alternatives exist which might be able to provide
more effective representation that is true to the individual needs of the
children and their families. My suggestions in Part VII are aimed at
furthering this discussion. However, I must conclude by reemphasizing
my main point. The legal interests of all abused and neglected children
will best be protected and advanced by well-supported and well-trained
lawyers for all children - lawyers who have the time, understanding, and
commitment to provide representation that is faithful to the lives of their
child clients.
